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The capitalist mode of production does not permit a socially 
efficient allocation of resources. Resource allocation is determined 
by the twin structural imperatives of having purchasing power (on 
the demand side) and of chasing profit (on the supply side). If one 
has a need but lacks the money to back up that need, as for example 
the billion children worldwide living in poverty do, one’s need will 
not be met by the market. Conversely, investors will pursue only 
those projects that have the potential to make a profit. For example, 
many areas of rural America were still without electricity in the early 
1930s because investors had judged that the meager profits to be 
made did not justify the costs of supplying electricity to these 
regions; hence the New Deal’s Rural Electrification Administration 
and the cooperatives that sprang up to supply electricity.1 
Broadly speaking, the dynamic between capital and wage-labor, 
as well as that between millions of atomized units of capital each 
seeking profit at the expense of every other, makes for a very 
unstable and crisis-prone economy. Capital’s interests lie in paying 
the worker as little as possible and in preventing him from exercising 
control over the process of production, while the worker wants to be 
paid as much as possible and to exercise greater control over 
production. This simple structural antagonism is the basis for the 
whole history of the labor movement, the continual confrontations, 
the unions and union-busting, the private armies deployed to break 
up strikes, the government suppression of labor parties, the 
revolutionary social movements, the constant and pervasive stream 
of business propaganda, and the periodic bursts of cooperative 
economic activity among the ranks of labor. At the same time, the 
vicissitudes of the capitalist economy leave many people 
unemployed at any given time, unable to find work because their 
                                                 
1 Deward Clayton Brown, Electricity for Rural America: The Fight for the 
REA (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980). 
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skills and needs are not valued or because of insufficient investment 
in their geographical or professional area, or because of outsourcing 
to countries where labor is cheaper, or for other reasons. In recent 
decades, the liberalization and financialization of the international 
economy has entailed a tendency for corporations to seek profits not 
through investment in industry and infrastructure-development but 
through financial speculation. This sort of investment, undertaken on 
the principle of “Après moi le déluge,” is not only risky but 
essentially adds no jobs and no real wealth to the economy, which 
tends to stagnate—or to contract, after it finally becomes evident that 
all these financial transactions have been grounded in “the baseless 
fabric of a vision” (to quote Shakespeare). So, millions more people 
are thrown out of work as capital withdraws itself from further 
investments, and government initiatives are required to set the 
economy on track again—for more financial speculation and more 
stagnation, as opposed to contraction.2 
However, even before the orgies of neoliberalism it was obvious 
that capitalism is not socially efficient. Market failures are 
everywhere, from environmental calamities to the necessity of the 
state’s funding much socially useful science to the existence of 
public education and public transportation (not supplied through the 
market) to the outrageous incidence of poverty and famine in 
countries that have had capitalism foisted on them.3 All this testifies 
to a “market failure,” or rather a failure of the capitalist, competitive, 
profit-driven mode of production, which, far from satisfying social 
                                                 
2 See John Bellamy Foster and Robert McChesney, “Monopoly-Finance 
Capital and the Paradox of Accumulation,” Monthly Review 61, no. 5 
(October, 2009): 1–20; and John Bellamy Foster and Robert McChesney, 
The Endless Crisis: How Monopoly-Finance Capital Produces Stagnation 
and Upheaval from the U.S.A. to China (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
2012). 
3 Naomi Klein describes recent examples in The Shock Doctrine: The Rise 
of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007). 
Walden Bello gives other examples in The Food Wars (London: Verso, 
2009). 
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needs, multiplies and aggravates them. This should not be surprising. 
An economic system premised on two irreconcilable antagonisms—
that between worker and supplier-of-capital and that between every 
supplier-of-capital and every other4—and which is propelled by the 
structural necessity of exploiting and undermining both one’s 
employees and one’s competitors in order that ever-greater profits 
may be squeezed out of the population, is not going to lead to 
socially harmonious outcomes. Only in the unreal world of standard 
neoclassical economics, which makes such assumptions as perfect 
knowledge, perfect capital and labor flexibility, the absence of firms 
with “market power,” the absence of government, and in general the 
myth of homo economicus—the person susceptible of no other 
considerations than those of pure “economic rationality”—is societal 
harmony going to result.  
From the very beginning of its history, the manifold social evils 
of capitalism have given rise to oppositional movements. The one I 
am concerned with in this book is cooperativism, specifically worker 
cooperativism. There are many other kinds of cooperatives, 
including those in the credit, agriculture, housing, insurance, health, 
and retail sectors of the economy. But worker cooperativism is 
potentially the most “oppositional” form, the most anti-capitalist, 
since it organizes production in anti-capitalist ways. Indeed, the 
relations of production that constitute worker cooperativism also 
define socialism in its most general sense: workers’ democratic 
control over production and, in some varieties, ownership of the 
means of production (whether such ownership is organized 
individually, by owning shares of equity, or collectively). As one 
common formulation states, in the worker co-op, labor has power 
over capital, or “labor hires capital.” In the conventional business, by 
contrast, capital has power over labor, i.e., “capital hires labor.” 
None of the other kinds of cooperativism directly rejects these 
capitalist power-relations, although some may signify an implicit 
                                                 
4 Capitalists may indeed reach a modus vivendi to alleviate the mutually 
harmful consequences of competition, for instance by fixing prices, but the 
potential always remains for the antagonism of interests to reassert itself. 
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undermining of capitalism insofar as the co-op exists not primarily 
for the sake of maximizing profit but for satisfying some social need. 
It must be understood that a society’s dominant mode of material 
production, i.e., the “hegemonic” method of organizing the relations 
of material production (such as manufacturing and food production), 
conditions the overall character of the society more than any other of 
its features does. This is because the society is erected on the basis of 
material production; the first task for a society is to reproduce itself 
in its specific form, which presupposes the reproduction of a set of 
production relations. Social relations will tend to evolve that make 
possible the reproducing of the relations of production. In the spheres 
of economic distribution, of politics, of sexual relations, of 
intellectual production, and so on, social structures and ideologies 
will tend to predominate that are beneficial, “functionally selected” 
with respect to the dominant mode of production. 5  Therefore, a 
movement that aims for fundamental transformations in society 
should not limit itself to the sphere of distribution, as do consumer 
co-ops, credit unions, and housing co-ops, nor the sphere of gender 
relations, as does the feminist movement, but should concentrate on 
changing the mode of production (with its correlative property 
relations), as does worker cooperativism. 
                                                 
5  Philosophers have debated interminably the validity or invalidity of 
“functional explanation” and the notion of “functional selection,” but in fact 
functional explanations are simply shorthand versions of causal 
explanations—as in Darwinism, whose talk of the “functions” of particular 
biological adaptations is a way of rephrasing the causal doctrine of natural 
selection by means of random variation. To say, as G. A. Cohen does in 
Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (1978), that historical 
materialism is committed to functional explanation is misleading. It is 
“committed” only to causal explanations, but Marxists often use the idiom 
of functionalism because to tease apart all the causal mechanisms through 
which particular structures, patterns of behavior, and ideologies have 
developed and persisted is no easy task. I’ll return to this issue in the final 
chapter. 
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Such cooperativism on a societal scale, involving “a federation 
of free communities which shall be bound to one another by their 
common economic and social interests and shall arrange their affairs 
by mutual agreement and free contract,”6 is not only a more socially 
rational way of organizing production than capitalism but also a 
more intrinsically ethical way (even apart from its potential 
allocative efficiencies). First of all, the very premises of capitalism 
are absurd, as Michael Albert makes clear: 
 
Rewards for [owning] property are called 
profit…wherein individuals who own the means of 
production pocket profits based on the amount of those 
means of production. You own some machines. The 
machines have high output that can be sold for revenues that 
exceed the cost of maintaining them. You pocket the 
difference, or profit. You needn’t do anything other than 
keep track of your deed to your property, while sipping mint 
juleps or dry martinis.7 
 
More pertinent, however, is that capitalism tends to stultify the 
worker’s creativity, his human urge for self-expression, freedom, 
mutually respectful interaction with others, recognition of his self-
determined sense of self, recognition of himself as a self rather than 
an object, a means to an end. Karl Marx called it “alienation.” 
Capitalism alienates the worker—and the capitalist—from his 
“fundamental human need” for “self-fulfilling and creative work,” 
“the exercise of skill and craftsmanship,” 8  in addition to his 
                                                 
6 Rudolf Rocker, Anarcho-Syndicalism: Theory and Practice (Oakland: AK 
Press, 2004), 1. 
7 Michael Albert, Moving Forward: Program for a Participatory Economy 
(San Francisco: AK Press, 2000), 17. That many owners of capital do 
productive work (managerial, technical) is not essential to their ownership 
of capital considered in itself. It is this from whence they derive their 
profits. 
8 Noam Chomsky, Language and Politics (Oakland: AK Press, 2004), 364. 
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fundamental desire to determine himself (whence comes the desire to 
dismantle oppressive power-relations and replace them with 
democracy). Alternative visions of social organization thus arise, 
including Robert Owen’s communitarian socialism, Charles 
Fourier’s associationist communalism, Proudhon’s mutualism (a 
kind of anarchism), Marx’s communism, Bakunin’s collectivist 
anarchism, Kropotkin’s anarchist communism, Anton Pannekoek’s 
council communism, and more recently, Murray Bookchin’s 
libertarian municipalism, Michael Albert’s participatory economics, 
Takis Fotopoulos’s inclusive democracy, Paul Hirst’s 
associationalism, and so on. Each of these schools of thought differs 
from the others in more or less defined ways, but they all have in 
common the privileging of economic and social cooperation and 
egalitarianism.  
I take these visions to be essentially similar to “worker 
cooperativism,” which in some form is at least an element in all of 
them. If it were generalized so as to be the dominant mode of 
production, a society approximating classical utopias would be 
achieved. In this book, however, my primary focus is not on 
cooperativism’s value as the ideal we strive for, but on its value as a 
possible path towards that ideal. That is, I want first of all to evaluate 
the potential of worker co-ops for undermining capitalism and 
moving us towards something like “socialism,” or economic 
democracy. What should be their strategic role? What systemic 
effects have they had in the past? What mistakes have been made? 
How have co-ops fared as a form of business? Do they indeed tend to 
entail workplace disalienation and democracy, or is that just a 
theoretical construct that doesn’t obtain in reality? Can their 
potentially revolutionary function be reconciled with their need to 
survive in a capitalist economy? What sort of political consciousness 
has their membership tended to possess? How have co-ops interacted 
with the labor movement? What challenges do they face as 
businesses? Why are they so rare?  
Opponents of capitalism have by no means always looked 
favorably on worker co-ops as tools of revolution. We’ll have to 
consider their arguments in the following chapters. Marx had an 
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ambivalent attitude toward co-ops: he considered them to “represent 
within the old form [i.e., the capitalist economy] the first sprouts of 
the new” but thought that “they naturally reproduce, and must 
reproduce, everywhere in their actual organization all the 
shortcomings of the prevailing system.”9 Not until the working class 
had seized political power and imposed cooperative principles on the 
economy could co-ops be anything more than aberrations. Lenin and 
other Marxists agreed with this judgment. Nikolai Bukharin accused 
“pre-revolutionary” cooperators of being “purveyors of a ‘miserable 
reformist utopia’ because they imagined a socialist evolution of 
cooperatives within the capitalist system…cooperatives ‘inescapably 
fall under the influence of capitalist economics’…and ‘are 
transformed into capitalist enterprises.’”10 
Edward Greenberg observes that members of worker 
cooperatives occupy what Erik Olin Wright has called “contradictory 
class locations.” 11  “In producer cooperatives, democratic 
participation is joined to actual ownership of the enterprise so that 
shareholders are, at one and the same time, workers and 
capitalists.”12 Because of their contradictory structural locations they 
have contradictory interests and incentives, desiring both the 
maximization of profit and workplace democracy and equality. They 
might also, in their capacity as workers, identify with employees of 
conventional companies in their struggles against management, 
perhaps going so far as to join a union, to strike or boycott 
sympathetically in solidarity with their oppressed brethren, to 
participate in radical social movements—or they might renounce 
unions and the class struggle altogether and act solely as 
entrepreneurs. We’ll look at examples of this behavior later. 
In chapters two and four I’ll consider arguments for and against 
co-ops in depth. We’ll see that the issues are not quite as simple as 
                                                 
9 Marx, Capital, Vol. 3, Part V, Chapter 27. 
10 Quoted in Edward S. Greenberg, Workplace Democracy: The Political 
Effects of Participation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 153. 
11 See Erik Olin Wright, Classes (London: Verso, 1985). 
12 Greenberg, Workplace Democracy, 153. 
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Marxist opponents and anarchist proponents have sometimes 
thought. Cooperatives can behave in different ways, and much 
depends on their institutional context. Some cooperators rhapsodize 
about their experiences while others profess disillusionment. What 
factors explain these differences? I also want to consider two 
additional questions: first, can co-ops have a viable role in alleviating 
on a broad scale, within the capitalist economy, the worst defects of 
capitalism? Second, is such a role in tension with the goal of 
eventually transcending capitalism, in that it tends to stabilize the 
economy and contain discontent, postponing the necessary direct 
attack on capitalist institutions? Or, on the contrary, can the 
propagation of co-ops in the interstices of capitalism be an element 
in the long-term formation of a counter-hegemony? That these 
questions are imperative is revealed by the fact that not only leftists 
but even conservatives and fascists have at times favored worker co-
ops. Mussolini granted official recognition to the Italian cooperative 
movement once it had purged Socialists and Communists, and he 
pointed to cooperatives as embodying “worker participation, 
nonconflictual relations between labor and management, and the 
withering away of class identifications.”13  In the famous Spanish 
town of Mondragon, worker cooperativism was founded (in the 
1950s) “as an entrepreneurial alternative to working-class activism 
and socialism.”14 There is a danger, therefore, that cooperatives can 
become tools of reaction rather than progress. 
In chapter two I’ll discuss cooperatives from a non-revolutionary 
perspective, culling the scholarly literature for insights into 
organizational structure, methods of capitalization, labor 
productivity, worker satisfaction, wage levels, profitability, effects 
on employment, company survival-rates and longevity, challenges 
the movement faces, etc. Chapter three is devoted to the history of 
worker cooperativism in the United States. I will show, among other 
                                                 
13 Sharryn Kasmir, The Myth of Mondragon: Cooperatives, Politics, and 
Working-Class Life in a Basque Town (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1996), 75. 
14 Ibid., 195. 
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things, that in an overall framework of powerful institutional 
obstacles, worker cooperativism has periodically surged forward and 
then receded in a cyclical pattern. After its advances, conservative 
political and economic forces have pushed back to virtually eradicate 
it. For example, under the sponsorship of the Knights of Labor it 
made great headway in the 1870s and 1880s; in the late 1880s and 
the 1890s it succumbed to the attacks of big business on industrial 
unionism, which also decimated the Knights of Labor. 
Cooperativism made strides in the 1930s, partly with the help of 
New Deal legislation, but in the 1940s and ’50s it receded again. The 
1960s and ’70s saw further advances under the influence of such 
progressive movements as the civil rights, youth, anti-war, and 
feminist movements, while the 1980s saw massive counterattacks by 
conservative sectors of business. This whole history arises from the 
violent and cyclically prone conflict between capital and labor (in 
occasional conjunction with other progressive interests like the black 
struggle against racialized capitalism). 
I’ll apply the lessons from chapter three in the following chapter, 
where I discuss the question of what co-ops and the growing 
“alternative economy” can contribute to a long-term struggle against 
capitalism. This discussion will be more theoretical and speculative 
than that in the second chapter—inevitably so, since one can only 
speculate about the future, not analyze it. But since people study the 
past precisely to glean lessons for the future, a semi-theoretical, 
semi-empirical analysis of possibilities seems appropriate. 
To anticipate: I expound and revise the Marxist theory of 
revolution so as to provide a theoretical framework to interpret the 
alternative economy (of cooperatives, municipal enterprise, public 
banking, etc.—the solidarity economy in general). Marxists and 
“cooperators” have tended to be mutually hostile, but, as I’ll explain, 
the logic of Marxism is in fact committed to the sorts of “interstitial” 
movements that are emerging now, which represent a new society 
within the shell of the old. Marx himself misunderstood his own 
system when he adopted a statist perspective and predicted a 
dictatorship of the proletariat—two things that are very un-Marxian, 
as we’ll see. His followers persisted in his mistakes, such that up to 
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the present day virtually no one has understood the elementary truth 
that statism and Marxism are in conflict (in two ways, actually: 
morally and strategically). So, I purify Marxism, returning it to its 
logical essence. The reason for doing this isn’t only to make some 
academic points about doctrine; instead, I think that if the theory of 
revolution is purified and updated it sheds light on the historical 
moment we’re living in. 
To illuminate that moment, I retrace the logic of the West’s 
historical development in the last few centuries. The notion of a 
“logic of history” isn’t fashionable nowadays, probably because it 
implies that capitalism is merely a temporary phase that, like all 
social systems, is bound to evolve into something different. 
Nevertheless, I resurrect the idea and use it to explain why only now 
are we finally entering the revolutionary era Marx and Engels looked 
forward to—and why it couldn’t have been any other way. They got 
the timeline wrong; “socialism” on a broad scale was not possible 
earlier. But the coming revolution will not look like what they 
predicted, namely a seizing of the state and a unitary reconstruction 
of the economy. Rather, it will take place over generations and will 
sprout from the grassroots, locally, regionally, and transnationally—
again, as Marxism (despite Marx) entails. Given a true revolutionary 
situation, cooperatives are by no means antithetical to the class 
struggle; they are an essential tool of it. 
Chapter five returns to the focus on worker cooperatives, this 
time looking at their formation. In particular, I recount the 
experience of a business that was recently formed and has frequently 
been in the press, the New Era Windows cooperative in Chicago. Its 
worker-owners are the same workforce that occupied the Republic 
Windows and Doors factory in 2008, just as it was closing, to 
demand the back pay, severance, and temporary healthcare benefits 
to which they were entitled. It was one of the very few factory 
occupations since the 1930s, and it became a national cause célèbre 
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that even President-elect Obama spoke positively about.15 A couple 
months after the workers’ victory the factory was partially reopened 
under a new owner, Serious Materials—which three years later, in 
February 2012, announced that it was closing the factory again and 
consolidating operations elsewhere. So, once again, the workers 
staged a sit-in to protest the closing, which ended after the owners 
agreed to keep the factory open for ninety days. Fed up with 
capitalist caprice, the workers decided to buy the factory themselves 
and run it as a cooperative. Again they encountered resistance from 
the business class, but with determination and community support 
they overcame it. I tell their story in some detail in chapter five. 
The point of this case-study isn’t only to tell an inspiring story of 
David triumphing over Goliath. I’m also interested in how and why 
these workers have succeeded where others have failed or not even 
tried. Why were they apparently the only workforce in the U.S. to 
occupy their factory in the dismal months of late 2008 and early 
2009, when the economy was imploding? What ingredients were 
present that were missing elsewhere? Why and how did they decide 
to start a cooperative? How did they force the owners, who were 
initially reluctant, to let them buy the factory? What steps were 
required to establish the cooperative? Has the experience been 
successful so far? What challenges have had to be overcome along 
the way? In general, I try to glean lessons that can be applied in 
similar cases, which I hope and expect will become more common in 
the coming decades. 
In the final chapter I return to the topic of Marxism and 
revolution, to discuss some implications of the ideas in chapter four. 
I argue, for example, that the old mutual hostility of Marxism and 
anarchism is seen to be unfounded upon a deeper understanding of 
Marxism, and that leftists should therefore move beyond the 
sectarianism that has interfered with radical movements for at least 
150 years. On the other hand, if my revision of Marxism succeeds in 
                                                 
15 Monica Davey, “In Factory Sit-In, an Anger Spread Wide,” New York 
Times, December 7, 2008. 
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returning it to its “essence,” it becomes even clearer than it was to 
Rosa Luxemburg that Leninism is a deviation from Marxism. 
According to the latter, and to any sensible revolutionary strategy, 
the transition to a new society will take place over many generations 
and will involve every conceivable tactic, including radical political 
parties, frequent mass demonstrations, violent confrontations with 
armed personifications of authority, transnational federations of 
peasant and worker solidarity, pressures from the environmental 
movement to end destructive capitalist practices, and, crucially, the 
construction of new cooperative modes of production and 
distribution in the womb of the old regime. Activists should have a 
clear understanding that this is what we’re in for; this broad-based 
“movement of movements” is what we should expect and embrace. 
Thus, an essential element in this movement of movements is the 
worldwide spread of co-ops (of every kind) that is happening now. 
Indeed, we are living in the most exciting time for cooperativism 
since capitalism began its conquest of the world. Cooperatives 
proliferate from Canada to Argentina, across Europe and Russia, to 
India and over to Indonesia, throughout Africa and the Middle East. 
Almost 800 million people are members of cooperatives, and three 
billion depend on them for their livelihood.16 The developing world 
has made excellent use of the cooperative principle, in the form, for 
example, of microcredit, which is—or can be—a kind of cooperative 
banking. Neoliberal institutions like the IMF and World Bank, far 
from facilitating sustainable economic development, have typically 
amounted to imperialism and colonialism by other means, 
functioning so as to permit the transfer of wealth from the poor to the 
rich and from poor countries to rich countries. As a result, regions 
such as South Asia have, in some respects, begun to reject the 
neoliberal model in favor of such strategies as establishing 
institutions that grant small loans with little or no interest to 
villagers, usually women—which, incidentally, empowers them vis-
                                                 
16  International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), “Co-operative Facts and 
Figures,” http://ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-facts-figures (access-
ed December 13, 2013). 
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à-vis men—for the purpose of starting businesses or buying houses 
for their families. In Bangladesh, such institutions have helped over 
10 million people escape from dire poverty.17 In recognition of the 
fact that cooperatives “are becoming a major factor of economic and 
social development”—as the General Assembly of the UN declared 
in 2002 18 —the UN named 2012 the International Year of the 
Cooperative.  
Cooperatives have had success in the developed world too, as the 
following random statistics show. In France, farmers borrow up to 90 
percent of their loans from credit cooperatives; cooperative banks 
handle 60 percent of total deposits; and 28 percent of all retailers are 
cooperatives. 19  Ninety-one percent of Japanese farmers belong to 
agricultural co-ops. In the United States, a number of well-known 
corporations are technically cooperatives, including Land O’Lakes, 
Sunkist, Ocean Spray, Welch’s, Sunmaid, REI, the Associated Press, 
and True Value Company. Credit unions in the U.S. had 95 million 
members in 2012, or 45 percent of the economically active 
population.20 Electric utility co-ops provide electricity to more than 
42 million rural Americans; 1.2 million families live in homes owned 
                                                 
17 Richard Williams, The Cooperative Movement: Globalization from Below 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), 84. Unfortunately, 
banks have discovered in microcredit a brave new world of exploitation-of-
the-poor, and so are beginning to dominate the field even though they often 
charge interest rates of 100 percent or more. Neil MacFarquhar, “Big Banks 
Draw Big Profits From Microloans to Poor,” New York Times, April 13, 
2010. 
18  John Curl, For All The People: Uncovering the Hidden History of 
Cooperation, Cooperative Movements, and Communalism in America 
(Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012), 7. 
19 Lanyan Chen, Gender and Chinese Development: Towards an Equitable 
Society (New York: Routledge, 2008), 23; Coop FR, “Key Figures,” 
http://www.entreprises.coop/decouvrir-les-cooperatives/chiffres-cles.html 
(accessed December 13, 2013). 
20  World Council of Credit Unions, “2012 Statistical Report,” 
http://www.woccu.org/publications/statreport (accessed December 13, 
2013). 
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or operated by cooperative associations; and over 11,000 social and 
public service cooperatives exist—e.g., cooperative daycare centers, 
which serve more than 50,000 families.21 Altogether there are about 
30,000 cooperatives in the U.S., providing two million jobs and 
generating more than 600 billion dollars in revenue.22 
Of all forms of cooperative economic activity, worker 
cooperativism has had the most troubled history. And yet it too has 
had notable successes. Consider Europe again. Confining our 
attention to recent times, the European Confederation of Worker 
Cooperatives reports that the 50,000 enterprises affiliated with it 
employ about 1.4 million people. 23  Italy has a particularly high 
proportion of worker co-ops—the highest per capita in the world—
due in part to legal advantages. 24  The Mondragon cooperative 
complex in Spain has had well-publicized success since it was 
established in the 1950s, eventually diversifying its operations from 
industry to retail, agriculture, education, housing, and research and 
development. Currently it comprises about 250 companies that 
together employ 80,000 people and have annual sales of 13 billion 
euros, elevating Mondragon into the class of major multinational 
corporations.25  
Worker cooperativism has recently been spreading in Latin 
America, as societies try to piece themselves together in the wake of 
                                                 
21 2012 International Year of the Cooperative, “Quick Facts about U.S. Co-
ops,” http://usa2012.coop/co-ops-in-usa/quick-facts; University of Wis-
consin Center for Cooperatives, “Research on the Economic Impact of 
Cooperatives,” http://reic.uwcc.wisc.edu/services/ (accessed December 13, 
2013). 
22 ICA, “Cooperative Facts and Figures”; 2012 International Year of the 
Cooperative, “Quick Facts about U.S. Co-ops.”  
23 CECOP, “What is CECOP?” http://www.cecop.coop (accessed December 
13, 2013). 
24 Gregory K. Dow, Governing the Firm: Workers’ Control in Theory and 
Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 67–69; Erbin 
Crowell, “Cooperating Like We Mean It: The Co-operative Movement in 
Northern Italy,” Grassroots Economic Organizing, http:// www.geo.coop. 
25 Mondragon Corporation, http://www.mondragon-corporation.com. 
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neoliberal economic destruction. For example, factory takeovers by 
former employees were quite common in Argentina after the collapse 
of 2001; the new worker-owners have organized their companies on 
a cooperative basis.26 Some of these firms have won important legal 
battles that have affirmed their right to expropriate the property of 
the old failed business.27 After ten or more years—a long time even 
for conventional firms—many of these “recovered companies” are 
still in business. The same phenomenon has occurred in Brazil, 
perhaps on an even broader scale, as its solidarity economy has 
grown.28 
The United States has often lagged with respect to progressive 
movements, and worker cooperativism is no exception. Currently 
there are only about 300 or 350 such co-ops in the country, and most 
of them are small to medium-sized.29 (Employee stock-ownership 
plans (ESOPs), by contrast, are quite common, with 11,000 of them 
operating today.) 30  Nevertheless, the movement is growing. For 
example, the U.S. Federation of Worker Cooperatives was founded 
in 2004; smaller such federations and support organizations 
                                                 
26 The Lavaca Collective, Sin Patrón: Stories from Argentina’s Worker-Run 
Factories (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2007). See also Karen Ann Faulk, 
“If They Touch One of Us, They Touch All of Us: Cooperativism as a 
Counterlogic to Neoliberal Capitalism,” Anthropological Quarterly 81, no. 
3 (2008): 579–614; and Peter Ranis, “Argentina’s Worker-Occupied 
Factories and Enterprises,” Socialism and Democracy 19, no. 3 (Nov. 
2005): 1-23. 
27 See, for instance, Marie Trigona, “Argentine Factory Wins Legal Battle: 
FASINPAT Zanon Belongs to the People,” Upside Down World, August 
14, 2009. 
28  Mario Osava, “Solidarity Economy Combats Exclusion,” Inter Press 
Service, January 11, 2008, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=40760 
(accessed May 10, 2010). See chapter four of this book. 
29  U. S. Federation of Worker Cooperatives, “What is a Worker 
Cooperative?,” at http://www.usworker.coop/about/what-is-a-worker-coop 
(accessed December 13, 2013). 
30 Gar Alperovitz, America Beyond Capitalism (Hoboken, New Jersey: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005), 87. 
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proliferate across the country, for instance the Network of Bay Area 
Worker Cooperatives in the San Francisco area (formed in 1994), the 
Valley Alliance of Worker Cooperatives in Massachusetts (formed in 
2005), the Eastern Conference for Workplace Democracy, the 
Federation of Workplace Democracies in Minnesota (from 2004), the 
New York City Network of Worker Cooperatives, the Ohio 
Employee Ownership Center (from 1987), the ICA Group, the 
Cooperative Fund of New England, Green Worker Cooperative 
(based in the Bronx), the Cooperative Development Institute, the 
National Cooperative Business Association (founded in 1916), and 
many more. Even the organizations not exclusively devoted to 
supporting worker co-ops have recently been getting more involved 
with them, as public awareness and interest have increased. 
The worldwide growth of economic cooperation unreported by 
the corporate media suggests that we are witnessing the beginning of 
a social movement the likes of which have never been seen in 
history. It is quietly sweeping the earth, altering life for millions, but 
it has barely yet emerged from its infancy. For two centuries its 
scouts have forged ahead, so to speak, effectively building interstitial 
redoubts from which in part to wage the future war. And it will be 
waged, in the coming decades. Compared to this underlying 
economic evolution, the political headlines of today are little more 
than epiphenomena. Worker and consumer cooperativism, the social 
economy, the solidarity economy, local participatory democracy, 
public banking, regional economic coordination—all this represents 
the future. The following will establish this claim in broad outline, 





THE SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS OF 
WORKER COOPERATIVES 
 
The first question we have to answer is how to define a worker 
cooperative. Numerous definitions have been offered, all of which 
share the same intuitions about democratic ownership and control. 
Here is Derek Jones’s definition: 
 
…an autonomous enterprise in which (a) many workers 
(or members) own stock, (b) ownership is widely distributed 
among the workers, who own much of the voting stock, (c) 
working-members participate in the enterprise’s manage-
ment and control, and (d) they share in the distribution of the 
surplus, usually on the basis of work [rather than stock 
ownership].31 
 
Like most commentators, he distinguishes cooperatives from 
mere employee-owned firms, for instance those that have ESOPs, 
which do not require employee participation in their management. 
As stated in the last chapter, the conceptual starting-point of the 
worker co-op is that labor has power over capital, whereas it is the 
reverse in a conventional business. That is, in a capitalist enterprise 
both ownership and control (and the right to a share in profits) 
ultimately belong to investors, and voting rights are proportionate to 
the number of shares of equity held. The more capital one owns, the 
more control one is supposed to have over the operations of the firm. 
In the co-op, control is not directly related to ownership: the 
principle is “one worker, one vote,” not “one share, one vote.” 
Moreover, all or the majority of shares—if stock exists at all—are 
                                                 
31 Derek Jones, “American Producer Cooperatives and Employee-Owned 
Firms: A Historical Perspective,” in Worker Cooperatives in America, eds. 
Robert Jackall and Henry M. Levin (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1984), 37. 
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owned by workers, not outsiders. Otherwise there would be the 
danger that investors could acquire all the power, which would lead 
to the business’s degeneration into a capitalist firm.  
In a traditional business, the only consideration that really 
matters is the accumulation of profit. All else is subordinated to this 
goal. In a co-op, the dominant consideration is whatever the 
workforce wants it to be, for example the maintenance of steady 
employment, service to the community, or the accumulation of profit 
(to be allocated as the members decide). We’ll see below that, as a 
rule, workers prefer the continued employment of as much of the 
workforce as possible to the retention of high revenues, which in 
hard times means that they accept pay cuts in order to avoid layoffs. 
The typical governance structure of a cooperative follows from 
what has been said. In large cooperatives, a board of directors, drawn 
from the ranks of the worker-members themselves, is elected by the 
workforce and managers are appointed by the directors (or 
sometimes elected directly by members). Both directors and 
managers, therefore, have an incentive to treat workers well and 
respect their priorities, since if they don’t, they might be voted out of 
their position. Small co-ops, on the other hand, have little 
“governance structure” at all: they tend to operate by (near-
)consensus and have no need of managers or directors. Occasionally 
there is a nominal “board of directors” for minor decisions or for 
administrative matters with which other members do not want to 
concern themselves. 
Already, a major reason for the rarity of worker co-ops is 
evident: investors have a greater incentive to invest in firms that give 
capital control over labor rather than vice versa. Hence, it will 
frequently be the case that people cannot raise enough capital to get a 
cooperative started or to keep it functioning. Investors’ interest is in 
the extraction of maximum profit regardless of the will of the 
workers; indeed, the interest of the latter, as employees, is directly 
opposed to the interest of capital, since profit is inversely 
proportional to wages. Investors will therefore be reluctant to deposit 
their funds in a firm that gives control to its workers, who do not 
value the maximization of profit above all else.  
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At the same time, cooperatives are motivated, as I said, not to 
seek large amounts of outside investment, since then it might be 
difficult to prevent control from effectively falling into the hands of 
these investors, an eventuality that could lead to the erosion of the 
firm’s commitment to democratic ideals. The usual practice among 
co-ops is to rely primarily on initial investments in the firm by its 
members (who thereby gain a share in ownership),32 in conjunction 
with loans from cooperative banks or other institutions ideologically 
committed to cooperativism. But it remains true, for the reasons 
mentioned and others to be examined below, that raising sufficient 
capital is one of the biggest obstacles to the spread of worker 
cooperatives—and, as a corollary, that cooperatives have pre-
ponderated in non-capital-intensive industries.  
However, let’s consider these questions and others in more 
detail, drawing upon the scholarly literature. I will discuss small 







Collectives approach most closely the participatory democratic 
ideal of cooperation. Being of fewer than, say, 40 people, often as 
few as 15 or less, there is a minimum of bureaucracy and a 
maximum of collective decision-making. The values of decen-
tralization, spontaneity rather than bureaucracy, freedom and self-
initiative rather than external imposition of rules, are the guiding 
lights. In a sense, the structure of collectives can be seen as the ideal 
that larger cooperatives try to approximate insofar as they are 
committed to democracy.  
                                                 
32 Actually, legal structures exist according to which worker-members do 
not “own” a “share” in equity but receive a portion of the profits anyway. 
See the final section of this chapter. For now, the differences between legal 
forms are unimportant. 
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As already noted, the collectivist form of governance is directly 
democratic and usually consensual. Major decisions, and often minor 
ones, are approved of in meetings attended by all the members; the 
goal is to hammer out a policy on which everyone agrees. What 
makes this consensual decision-making possible, of course, is the 
small size of the business. As one author states, “The face-to-face 
relationships and directly democratic forms that characterize the 
collectivist organization probably cannot be maintained if the 
organization grows beyond a certain size.”33 There is no absolute 
optimal size of cooperatives, though, since the proper size varies 
with the nature of the work and the technology available. Perhaps 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s criterion, suggested in The Social Contract, 
is best: “each citizen [must] with ease know all the rest.” One writer 
states bluntly that “democracy is inversely proportional to the size of 
the cooperative,” and he advises that co-ops not exceed a size 
compatible with a general meeting of the members.34 
For example, in the 1980s the small size (around 25 members) of 
the Cheese Board, a cooperative in San Francisco that was and is the 
leading cheese store in the area, made possible a consensual 
approach to decision-making, with no formally acknowledged 
“leaders.” Any leadership was informal, based on personality and 
perceived commitment to the co-op. As Robert Jackall noted in a 
1983 case-study, when major matters had to be decided upon, “such 
as the long-term disposal of the growing surplus funds,” a consensus 
was required at one of the monthly meetings. For minor matters, 
though, a simple majority vote sufficed—or decisions could be made 
by the shift at the time that an issue arose. Achieving consensus was 
difficult and time-consuming, sometimes requiring many meetings 
over many months, as when the business decided to post a sign 
                                                 
33  Joyce Rothschild and J. Allen Whitt, Potentials and Dilemmas of 
Organizational Democracy and Participation (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 91. Italics in the original. 
34 Tadeusz Kowalak, quoted in ibid., 92. 
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publicly proclaiming its status as a collective.35 This is one of the 
reasons why a constant practicing of direct democracy, especially of 
the consensual sort, is not feasible in large organizations; it would 
take too long to reach and implement decisions on even minor issues. 
Representative democracy and a degree of bureaucracy, i.e., of the 
centralization of power, become essential to getting things done in a 
timely manner. 
(In fact, now that the Cheese Board has expanded to 50 members 
who also run a bakery and a pizza business, the old requirement of 
consensus has been partially abandoned. The new rule is that a kind 
of “modified consensus” is necessary for important decisions: 
members try to reach agreement, but if they can’t, a near-consensus 
suffices.)36 
So, the first constraint on democracy is size—of the business and 
of its market. Equal Exchange, a workers’ co-op in Massachusetts 
with over 100 members that did $51,046,000 worth of business in 
2012, necessarily has more bureaucracy, more specialized jobs 
(including customer service, media outreach, etc.), and less 
democracy than Collective Copies, a copying center with 12 
members in Western Massachusetts. 37  The second constraint, 
mentioned already, is time. “Quite simply, a boss can hand down a 
bureaucratic order in a fraction of the time it would take a group to 
decide the issue democratically.”38 On the other hand, in the latter 
case the policy might be implemented more effectively, since 
workers presumably would be more committed to it. Indeed, 
ironically, the much-maligned inefficiency of bureaucracies is due in 
large part to their undemocratic nature, their inflexible, impersonal, 
uncommunicative, unaccountable, unresponsive-to-unforeseen-
                                                 
35  Jackall, “Paradoxes of Collective Work,” in Worker Cooperatives in 
America, 122. 
36 Personal communication with a member. 
37 Equal Exchange, “Fast Facts,” http://www.equalexchange.coop/fast-facts, 
and Collective Copies, http://collectivecopies.com/about/staff.htm (accessed 
November 20, 2013). 
38 Rothschild and Whitt, Potentials and Dilemmas, 64. 
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contingencies structure. As Michel Crozier says, “A bureaucratic 
organization is an organization that cannot correct its behavior by 
learning from its errors.” 39  This is because in centralized 
organizations, change tends to come only from the top—but at the 
top are people who usually do not learn of “errors” at the bottom at 
all. Information does not flow efficiently: the atomized and dispersed 
nature of their organization isolates bureaucrats from the social and 
institutional consequences of their actions, preventing them from 
seeing the broader picture as each performs only a specialized 
function, always waiting for dictates from on high in lieu of taking 
initiative.40 These failures, and others, of bureaucracy do not apply to 
democracy. 
A third constraint on democracy in worker co-ops is 
environmental: larger structures in the society have inculcated 
behavior patterns of submission to authority, competition in the 
workplace, conformism, and passive atomization rather than active 
participation in decision-making. One finds in the scholarship 
descriptions of cooperators who simply do not have the desire to 
participate in the governance of the firm, who want only to get their 
paycheck and not deal with the challenges of deciding policy. This is 
one origin of the old elitist accusation that “the masses” want to be 
subordinate, that they have neither the capacity nor the inclination to 
exercise democratic self-control. However, as one sociologist 
concludes, “We learn to participate by participating… The 
experience of a participatory authority structure might be effective in 
diminishing tendencies toward non-democratic attitudes in the 
individual.”41 To say it in a different way:  
                                                 
39  Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1964), 187. 
40 To take a random example, Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower: Al-
Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006) explains how the 
CIA’s and FBI’s bureaucratic overspecialization resulted in the 9/11 
attacks. 
41  Carole Pateman, quoted in Rothschild and Whitt, Potentials and 
Dilemmas, 67. 
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If one accepts the assumption [that certain people “are 
not ripe for freedom”], freedom will never be achieved; for 
one cannot arrive at the maturity for freedom without having 
already acquired it; one must be free to learn how to make 
use of one’s powers freely and usefully…42 
 
As Kant goes on to say, the first gropings toward freedom and 
democracy by a people not used to it may be clumsy or ineffectual—
especially if the experiments in freedom (such as worker 
cooperatives) are situated in a still-unfree society. Actually, a lack of 
involvement by some worker-owners in the affairs of governance is 
less a problem in collectives than in larger cooperatives. But the 
point holds: the cooperative’s structure and the expectations or 
pressures that go along with it are in tension with those of the 
broader society, and this fact can undermine the co-op’s smooth 
democratic functioning inasmuch, for example, as lazy and 
undemocratic attitudes have to be overcome, and individuals with 
competitive or authoritarian personalities have to be persuaded to 
soften their behavior. 
One way to avoid these sorts of problems is to be selective in 
admitting new members. And collectives often are very selective 
indeed. The Arizmendi Bakery in Oakland, California is an example: 
 
We watch how [prospective members] work and how 
they take feedback. We bring people in for twelve hours over 
several weeks. They shadow someone and try out different 
tasks and we evaluate them. Then we bring them in for a 
group interview. If we really connect with them, then we 
bring them on for a six-month trial candidacy. We train them 
on specific shifts, and they go to meetings related to the 
history and other ideas that are important for understanding 
the collective. 
                                                 
42 Immanuel Kant, quoted in Noam Chomsky, For Reasons of State (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1973), 393. 
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By the end of six months, there will have been three 
different evaluations, which are pretty intense. We give them 
constructive feedback, time for them to voice their concerns, 
feedback from their sponsor, who has been working 
alongside them. Then it goes to a full vote and the candidate 
has to get a 75 percent positive vote to be invited in.43 
 
Joyce Rothschild and J. Whitt go so far as to say that “consensus, 
an essential component of collectivist decision-making, may require 
from the outset substantial homogeneity among members. 
Participants must bring to the process similar life experiences, 
outlooks and values if they are to arrive at agreements.”44 To an 
extent this is obviously true, and the rigorous screening process at 
Arizmendi testifies to it. But the criterion of homogeneity can surely 
be overemphasized. For example, Red Sun Press, a printing-and-
design cooperative in south Boston with ten worker-owners, has had 
a very heterogeneous workforce since its founding in 1973: young 
and middle-aged, highly educated and less educated, countercultural 
and mainstream, middle-class and working-class, whites and 
Hispanics. This fact has not prevented the business from lasting 40 
years and being financially successful. 
Another factor that can interfere with participatory structures is 
the sheer exhaustion and stress that can accompany the fusion of 
“employer” and “employee” roles. This is exacerbated by the fact 
that cooperators, especially collectivists, sometimes receive less pay 
than their counterparts in conventional businesses. “Burnout” can set 
in, and thereby “the experience of feeling constantly overworked, of 
having too much responsibility and not enough organizational 
support to carry it out, of never having enough free time for personal 
pursuits, of constantly being hassled, of, in one worker’s phrase, 
                                                 
43 Bernice Yeung, “Running a Business with 26 CEOS,” East Bay Express, 
January 27, 2010 (an interview with Kamil Dawson, a member of the co-
op). 
44 Rothschild and Whitt, Potentials and Dilemmas, 95. Italics in original. 
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‘losing your soul.’” 45  Similarly, in a directly democratic 
environment, where consensus may be required, interpersonal 
tensions are prone to flaring up. Disagreements can become personal, 
and general meetings can be quite stressful. Bureaucracy, therefore, 
is in some ways easier than democracy: the impersonal environment, 
the not-having-to-treat-people-as-people, can reduce the potential for 
emotional conflicts. 
Again, though, qualifications are necessary. A member of Red 
Sun Press, in Boston, observed in an interview with the author that, 
contrary to what one reads in much of the scholarly literature, 
working in a co-op is not significantly more stressful than working at 
a traditional business. “In a conventional workplace,” she says, 
“some of the stress comes from having little power over your 
working conditions and business decisions. In a co-op, some of the 
stress comes from having the power—then you are responsible for 
what happens! Ultimately, having the power is the option I would 
choose.”46 Most cooperators, and probably most people, would agree 
with her. 
Studies in the 1980s and earlier emphasized another 
manifestation of the collectivist commitment to egalitarianism: 
“deprofessionalization,” or the avoidance of professional special-
ization due to its bureaucratic, stratifying implications. “In the 
smaller worker cooperatives,” writes one author, “work roles are 
holistic, specialized knowledge is demystified, and there is frequent 
task sharing and job rotation.”47 The practice of job rotation (or, in a 
less extreme form, simply having the option to change one’s job) 
was in part a legacy of the radical origins of the 1960s’ and ’70s’ 
wave of collectives, but it also arose, and continues to arise, from the 
very nature of small-scale cooperative work. People working in a 
business sometimes get bored with their routine and want to learn 
                                                 
45  Jackall, “Paradoxes of Collective Work,” in Worker Cooperatives in 
America, 129. 
46 Interview with Nancy Nichols, June 10, 2010. 
47 Robert Sommer et al., “Consumer Cooperatives and Worker Collectives: 
A Comparison,” Sociological Perspectives 27, no. 2 (1984): 139–157. 
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something new. This diversification of their skill-set, in fact, may be 
intimately connected to their sense of self-worth: the more 
routinized, bureaucratized, bored, and detached from one’s activities 
one is, the less self-esteem (and happiness) one has. Humans crave 
new challenges periodically, and a life or a job bereft of challenges 
or opportunities for growth is a terrible thing. In capitalist 
businesses, where most employees have far less input than 
management in the firm’s operations, the desire for stimulating 
novelty is subordinated to the bottom-line. In collectives, by contrast, 
workers often give themselves the opportunity to change their roles, 
to learn new tasks. 
For example, Robert Jackall notes that at the Cheese Board it 
was possible during the 1980s to switch jobs occasionally if one had 
enough initiative. Certain tasks were considered attractive, such as 
baking bread in the morning, and one could “win” these jobs at least 
temporarily if his coworkers respected his contributions to the 
store—in other words, if he “deserved” the job.48 In fact, a similar 
tradition continues today. It requires initiative, but the opportunity is 
there. 
However, such deprofessionalization is not possible in all 
industries. Sometimes expertise is essential for efficiency, as in the 
printing-and-design and other high-tech industries. In these cases, 
job rotation is rare. What does happen, though, is that workers 
change their jobs if they so desire: e.g., at Red Sun Press, Nancy 
Nichols was the salesperson for seven years, then became the 
production manager, then did customer service, and now is the 
business manager. Still, to the extent that expertise in specialized 
tasks has become increasingly important in recent decades, 
deprofessionalization has declined. Similarly, the larger a 
cooperative is, the more difficult it is to organize job rotations, just 
as it is more difficult to institutionalize democracy.  
 
 
                                                 
48 Jackall, “Paradoxes of Collective Work,” 116. 
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Wages and employment 
 
One of the ways in which cooperatives rectify the injustices of 
capitalism is by instituting a relatively equal compensation-scheme 
for their members. While in the U.S. the average ratio of CEO 
compensation in the Fortune 500 companies to the ordinary worker’s 
has recently been reported as 344:1,49 in co-ops the pay-differential 
between management and the average worker rarely exceeds 4:1. In 
collectives, everyone is usually paid the same amount. 
For example, a British study from the 1980s reports that all of 
the dozens of small co-ops it researched had lower pay-differentials 
than conventional businesses, and most had little or no differential at 
all. 50  At Arizmendi Bakery everyone currently receives about 20 
dollars an hour plus a percentage of the year’s profits. The worker-
owners of Mondragon Bookstore and Coffeehouse in Canada earn 
the same rate of pay. At Equal Exchange, a relatively large co-op, 
there is a 4:1 pay ratio.  
On the other hand, collectivists sometimes earn less than their 
counterparts in private enterprises. One study reports that at a 
cooperatively run newspaper called the Community News, which had 
a full-time staff of about 15 people, staffers made between 18 and 25 
percent of what they could have made at comparable but 
“established” journalism jobs. Some workers in fact were paid 
nothing at certain times, while working a 40- to 60-hour week. At 
another co-op studied, a medical clinic, some staffers made about 50 
percent of what they could have earned at other nursing or 
counseling jobs for which they were qualified. Volunteers also made 
up a significant portion of the staff. On the other hand, because of the 
substantial equality in salaries, such workers as secretaries often 
earned as much as their ‘capitalist’ counterparts.51 
                                                 
49  Heather Landy, “Behind the Big Paydays,” The Washington Post, 
November 15, 2008. 
50  Chris Cornforth et al., Developing Successful Worker Co-operatives 
(London: SAGE Publications, 1988), 123, 124. 
51 Rothschild and Whitt, Potentials and Dilemmas, 98, 99. 
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Against examples of low pay must be set small co-ops like 
Home Green Home Natural Cleaning in San Francisco, which was 
established in 2009 to give employment and decent wages to low-
income Latinas. In addition to the 50 to 100 percent higher earnings 
the women make at their new job than earlier, they have health 
insurance now and work in healthier environments, where the 
cleaning chemicals are not as toxic as in many conventional cleaning 
companies. A study reports that the worker-owners of another such 
co-op in California, called Natural Home Cleaning (started in 2003), 
have tripled their personal income and enjoyed an increase of 70 
percent in their household income since they joined the 
cooperative.52 In some cooperatives wages might be low but because 
workers are owners they receive a share of annual profits, which, 
combined with benefits, often raises their income to above the level 
at comparable private firms. 
The reason for the sometimes-low pay-levels of collectives is not 
too obscure: it is due to undercapitalization, which means that small 
cooperatives “sometimes generate little surplus to distribute among 
their members.”53 Especially in the early days of a cooperative, the 
lack of external capital might mean that wage-levels have to be kept 
low in order to capitalize the business.54 And in times of recession, 
cooperators usually choose to lower their wages if the alternative is 
to lay off members, which they are always extremely reluctant to do. 
In conventional firms, by contrast, wages are “sticky,” hard to 
change; management typically chooses to lay off employees and let 
the remaining ones keep an income that is perhaps higher than that of 
the cooperators who have voted to cut their own wages.55 Thus, as 
                                                 
52 Hilary Abell, “Work and Pay Better at Green Cleaning Coops,” Owners 
at Work, Ohio Employee Ownership Center, vol. 21, no. 1 (Summer, 2009): 
6, 7. 
53 John McNamara, “Payment Solidarity: Looking Deeper at the Mondragon 
Principles,” SolidarityEconomy.net, February 28, 2010. 
54 Cornforth, Developing Successful Worker Co-operatives, 123. 
55 In recent years, of course, it has become increasingly common during 
recessions for capitalist businesses not only to lay off employees but to hire 
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one recent study sums up, cooperatives of whatever size tend to have 
more volatile wages than conventional businesses and less volatile 
employment.56  
These facts, of course, merely confirm what common sense 
would suggest. First of all, members of cooperatives tend to see 
themselves as part of a community of worker-owners, and they 
respect each other as belonging to this community. It is reported 
universally in the literature that the prospect of laying off or firing 
fellow workers is very painful. This is especially so in collectives, 
where the communities are tightly knit and people develop bonds of 
friendship with each other. Even in situations where close 
friendships do not develop, there usually remains mutual respect and 
a sense of obligation to each other—a sense of “we’re in this thing 
together.” In fact, historically one of the most important goals and 
functions of cooperatives has been “to provide employment security 
or to expand the employment base for the local population.” This 
was a key reason for the establishment of both the famous plywood 
co-ops discussed below and Mondragon, 57  as well as the green 
cleaning cooperatives in San Francisco and the Evergreen 
cooperatives in Ohio (see the next chapter). To lay off workers, 
                                                                                                       
new ones at a much lower rate of compensation. For instance, this is what 
the Hyatt Hotels and Resorts chain did in Boston in 2009: it laid off a 
hundred housekeepers who were earning $15 or more per hour and 
outsourced their jobs to others whom it paid $8 an hour (even though, 
because the staff had shrunk, these new housekeepers had to do far more 
work than the old ones had). Megan Woolhouse, “Firing Housekeepers 
Creates PR Mess for Hyatt,” The Boston Globe, September 25, 2009. 
Incidentally, as is usually the case in such situations, the broader recession 
was simply an excuse that Hyatt used to justify its action; in fact, the 
company was by no means in desperate financial straits. See “Hyatt Hotels 
posts narrower Q4 new loss” in The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk 
(accessed March 15, 2010). 
56 John Pencavel et al., “Wages, Employment, and Capital in Capitalist and 
Worker-Owned Firms,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 60, no. 1 
(Oct., 2006): 23–44. 
57 Jackall and Levin, Worker Cooperatives in America, 22. 
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therefore, even the least productive ones, during hard times would 
flagrantly violate not only the democratic, humanistic spirit of 
cooperativism but also one of its main economic functions in a 
society of employment insecurity.  
In short, there is no question that cooperatives, even collectives, 
have potential for alleviating unemployment, and that this function is 
typically seen to take precedence over that of securing high wages—
although the two are by no means always mutually exclusive. 
 
Incentives, job satisfaction, productivity, and “the political effects of 
participation” 
 
It should be obvious by now that a different set of incentives 
tends to operate in small cooperatives than in conventional 
businesses. Whereas the latter are typically structured primarily 
around the desire to make more money and get promotions faster 
than one’s coworkers, the internal dynamics of the former have more 
to do with interpersonal relationships, the desire to feel good about 
one’s work, the goal of maintaining a democratic workplace, and so 
on. Workers tend to have different expectations and want different 
kinds of rewards than they would hope for in a capitalist firm.  
This is particularly true of collectives. As already stated, these 
are both the most numerous co-ops and, in general, the least 
remunerative. But, as with all things cooperative, this is partly by 
choice. People choose to remain in a collective, they accept low pay 
in part because they value other things more than money. Study after 
study demonstrates that collectivists want most of all to be in control 
of their work, and that they find nothing more miserable than 
working in a bureaucratic setting with a boss who orders them 
around. The following statements are illustrative: 
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“You get a different feeling, working for yourself…” 
“You’re working more hours but you get more 
enjoyment…it’s your own.” “There must be many people 
who, like us, have been driven half-insane by the 
dehumanizing straitjacket of the orthodox working world 
and yearned to be part of something better, more fulfilling.” 
“There’s some scope for personal creativity.” “Not having 
someone who does not know the job telling you what to 
do…” “I believe now in my capability of being something. 
I’ve always felt impotent before about getting things done in 
the world. I believe I could start a business of my own if I 
wanted to. I’ve gotten practical knowledge and a sense of 
self as well that I couldn’t conceive of before.” “Every year I 
become a little more confident of myself as someone who 
counts.”58 
 
Having control over work is not the only benefit. Closely related 
to it is the satisfaction of believing in one’s work and lifestyle, being 
convinced of its moral worth. This is especially the case if the co-op 
exists in part to serve a broader social movement, whether it be 
through printing left-wing literature, as Red Sun Press does, or 
through promoting knowledge of whole foods, as some food 
cooperatives do. Such ‘moral’ orientations may serve the same 
function of raising self-esteem as does the opportunity to control the 
actual work process.  
Collectivists are usually, though not always, liberal, educated, 
young, middle-class, and white. There are many exceptions, but on 
the whole this seems, for now, to be the demographic most attracted 
to the collectivist experience. “The [potentially] low salaries and 
erratic uncertain career paths [of collectivists] exclude, by self-
selection, most minorities and all but a handful of those from 
                                                 
58  Quoted in ibid., 124, and Cornforth, Developing Successful Worker 
Cooperatives, 100, 101. 
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working-class origins.”59 Many of these young cooperators move on 
to more conventional jobs after a few years in a collective, desiring 
more money, new outlets for their ambition, and perhaps less labor-
intensive, time-consuming work. But it is not uncommon to find 
middle-aged workers in collectives. 
It’s true that the sometimes-low pay can be considered a 
substantial cost, one of the most negative aspects of the collective 
experience. Tiredness due to long hours is also a common complaint, 
especially from workers who are very active in the business and feel 
that they are taking on an undue share of the burden. Resentment can 
arise toward less active members who are perceived as “free-riding.” 
On the other hand, the more active one is, the more influence one has 
and respect one commands—as long as other workers do not 
perceive one as domineering or undemocratic. As mentioned above, 
collectives tend to be more susceptible to interpersonal conflict than 
conventional businesses are, due to their open, democratic, 
personalized structure.  
None of these costs, however, is irremediable. Wages usually get 
higher, sometimes to union levels or above, after the co-op has been 
in business for a while and has accumulated experience and 
expertise; it is in the early stages or during difficult times that wages 
are lowest. The other problems can be mitigated simply by 
communicating with other members, airing grievances during 
meetings and strategizing about how to deal with them. Most 
cooperators report that meetings can be confrontational, stressful, 
sometimes traumatic, intensely personal, excessively long; but in 
principle it is through the mechanism of periodic general meetings 
that the pitfalls of cooperation can be overcome, or at least mitigated 
so that the benefits of cooperation decidedly outweigh the costs (as 
almost all cooperators report that they do). It must also be 
emphasized, again, that strong bonds frequently develop between 
cooperators, indeed partly because of the relatively intense and 
                                                 
59  Robert Jackall and Joyce Crain, “The Shape of the Small Worker 
Cooperative Movement,” in Worker Cooperatives in America, 94. 
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sometimes difficult nature of the work. Apologists for capitalism 
point to this existence of conflict as a flaw, but in fact it ought to be 
considered a strength. For one thing, it indicates that workers are 
personally committed to their work, unlike in many private 
enterprises. Overt conflict (when it exists) is also more 
psychologically healthy than suppressed conflict, and it is more 
ethical, in that it results from adults’ treating each other as adults, 
with dignity. They confront their problems and try to solve them, 
which means they act as human beings rather than bureaucratic 
automatons who treat each other impersonally. 
One source of “alienation” in conventional enterprises that 
cannot always be remedied in cooperatives is the intrinsically 
unpleasant nature of certain kinds of work. No matter what the social 
relations are, whether cooperative or competitive, sewing, for 
example, is not particularly fun. “It’s hard work…you have to 
concentrate, you can’t just gossip away and it can be boring,” reports 
one worker. Printing may involve “toxic chemicals, noise, oil vapor, 
carcinogens.”60  The industrial work of the old plywood co-ops is 
inherently monotonous: “It’s like being a zombie… You’re doing 
something that’s basically unpleasant. Most jobs are monotony and 
repetition. It can drive you nuts… I go through times when I get so 
depressed.”61 Even Karl Marx conceded that some kinds of work are 
inherently antithetical to freedom, the spontaneous creative 
expression of the human spirit: 
 
…In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only 
where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane 
considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies 
beyond the sphere of actual material production… [The 
realm of material production] remains a realm of necessity. 
Beyond it begins that development of human energy which 
is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, 
                                                 
60 Cornforth, Developing Successful Worker Cooperatives, 104. 
61 Quoted in Greenberg, Workplace Democracy, 82. 
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however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity 
as its basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic 
prerequisite.62 
 
Marx may even have exaggerated here the intrinsically alienating 
features of material work. But his broader point is correct: some 
activities will never, no matter how they’re organized, be the sort of 
thing one chooses to do for their own sake. This is one of the reasons 
why some collectives practice job rotation.  
A problem that may afflict collectives, and to an extent larger co-
ops, but does not affect private enterprises is conflict over goals. 
Workers have to decide whether their main objective is to have high 
wages, to provide employment to as many people as possible, to 
provide a cheap service to political and community groups, to grow 
as a business and spawn new co-ops, or any other objective to which 
some members may be committed. The potential for strife here is 
great. Moreover, even if the members reach a consensus on how to 
prioritize objectives, there remain external constraints on cooperative 
goals and values, such as the need to be efficient and competitive 
against conventional businesses that may not have the same 
problems with capitalization as co-ops do. This necessity is less 
constraining the more “marginal” a cooperative is—for example if it 
serves a niche market where there is not much competition from 
other firms—but co-ops will always have to act like a capitalist 
business to some extent, just to stay afloat.  
Actually, labor productivity is usually higher in cooperatives 
than in conventional enterprises, for obvious reasons. I will return to 
this issue in the section on larger cooperatives; suffice it to say for 
now that cooperators have greater incentives to be productive than 
typical employees do. For one thing, worker-owners can directly 
appropriate, or do as they want with, profits, whereas in capitalist 
firms profits usually go to outside investors. Thus, the connection 
between the success of the capitalist business and the employee’s 
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personal gain is not as direct as it is in a co-op. Cooperators will also 
exert peer pressure on one another to perform well, and the relatively 
high camaraderie present in the work process will have a 
productivity-boosting effect. The work itself, as stated above, is 
more intrinsically rewarding and self-actualizing, especially in 
collectives, and the democratic environment, which allows access to 
information that would be withheld from conventional employees, is 
empowering. Cooperators are not always more productive than 
regular employees, but the incentives for high productivity are great.  
Another argument sometimes made by leftists in favor of 
cooperativism is that it encourages class-consciousness, participation 
in politics and social movements, and in general fosters a “proactive” 
transformation of individual character. The hope is that cooperators 
will carry over their work practices (insofar as they involve 
democratic engagement) into the outside world, and that the co-op 
itself might join and support progressive movements. Unfortunately, 
the data on this are mixed. With regard to collectives, few 
generalizations can safely be made. It’s true that most collectivists 
report that their experiences have raised their self-esteem—
especially if they used to work at a traditional company—and they 
certainly enjoy work more than most employees do. It has not been 
conclusively established, however, that membership in a collective 
inherently raises political consciousness or encourages political 
activity. While it is likely that collectivists have had a higher rate of 
political participation than the population as a whole, that is partly 
because the sort of people who join small co-ops are more likely to 
have a liberal activist’s temperament and values. Also, many such 
co-ops are explicitly political, such as left-wing printing presses and 
bookstores. Even food cooperatives are relatively political, since the 
distribution of food is a political issue. But cooperatives are also 
businesses, and as such might choose not to join a movement or even 
act contrary to progressive interests, for instance by negotiating deals 
with employers that are injurious to the latter’s employees. American 
history is replete with examples of cooperatives alienating the local 
labor movement. Co-ops also might be loath to offend their 
customers by taking overtly political stances. 
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So, individually and collectively cooperators as such might be 
prone to progressive activism (see below) but are not so in any 
stunning way. It seems as though they should be because their 
workplaces are relatively egalitarian and empowering, but one must 
remember the lesson of Marxism: social dynamics are holistic, such 
that individuals and institutions are molded by pressures emanating 
from everywhere in the society. The social structure as a whole 
conditions entities to behave in certain ways, and in a sense it 
reproduces itself.63 Thus, the facts that co-ops have to survive in a 
capitalist context and that cooperators themselves have been shaped 
by broader patterns in the society tend to undermine whatever anti-
capitalist and politically participatory implications there are in 
cooperative production relations. On the other hand, the latter’s 
political potential becomes more potent the more cooperatives 
colonize a given area, building up their own culture, and the more 
they network with each other. For then they might develop political 
agendas, lobby together for favorable legislation, link up with other 
movements in similar structural locations and with similar interests 
and ideals. Such networking is arguably the most important element 
in any attempt to make society a more humane place.
                                                 
63 Louis Althusser called this “structural causation,” different from other 
kinds of causality. It is an obscure notion but a necessary one, which is 
operative not only in society but in nature (albeit in a different way, a more 
deterministic way). Althusser thought that Spinoza was the first Western 
thinker to grasp the importance of structural causation, the first to pose the 
question of how the elements of a whole can be conditioned or determined 
by the whole itself (which, in Spinoza’s pantheistic system, was the entire 
universe, which he called God). See Althusser and Étienne Balibar, Reading 
Capital (London: New Left Books, 1970), especially 182–193, and Alison 
Assiter, “Althusser and Structuralism,” The British Journal of Sociology 35, 
no. 2 (June, 1984): 272–296. Structural causation is closely related to the 
difficult ideas in contemporary philosophy of “downward causation” and 
“emergence.” 
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In general, the larger an organization is, the more complex and 
less directly-democratic its structure is. Indeed, it almost necessarily 
becomes more bureaucratic and hierarchical, because in order to 
function smoothly some specialization of roles is required. A 
business with 100 employees has to have a more differentiated 
structure than a business with 15 employees; for example, it has to 
process much more information, of different kinds. With 
specialization and bureaucratization comes an element of hierarchy. 
There has to be a central organ that collects all the information and 
uses it to make decisions about the organization’s future and its 
relations with the outside world. Theoretically the entire body of 
workers could make these decisions collectively—perhaps everyone 
could receive a packet of information about the firm’s operations, 
study it for a week or two, and then congregate in a general 
meeting—but certain constraints make this unrealistic. As stated 
above, the time constraints may be prohibitive. Also, the information 
that has to be digested may be so technical that most workers are 
unable or unwilling to absorb it, preferring to leave it to specialists 
who have been trained in the particular topic. Or they may simply be 
apathetic and too exhausted at the end of the day to devote hours to 
administrative matters.64 
For many reasons, therefore, some of which are not necessarily 
related to the nature of capitalist social structures, it may be 
necessary to have specialized professionals advising a board of 
directors. In a large cooperative, direct democracy will be the 
exception, representative democracy the rule. The board of directors 
will have to appoint managers—or they can be directly elected by the 
workforce, as the board of directors is—to ensure the smooth daily 
coordination of the business. Workers do monitor each other in many 
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WORKER COOPERATIVES AND REVOLUTION 
38 
large co-ops, but it is not hard to imagine situations in which at least 
a few designated “superintendents” of some sort are necessary (and 
perhaps would be so even in a more egalitarian economy than the 
present). 
The now-defunct plywood cooperatives of the Pacific Northwest, 
whose history will be discussed in the next chapter, illustrate these 
points. In the early 1980s there were 11 such co-ops in Washington 
and Oregon, each owned by between 100 and 300 workers. 
Christopher Gunn summarizes their governance structure as follows: 
 
Owner-members elect their board of directors, and the 
firm’s general manager is appointed by that board. The 
board and the manager administer the routine operations of 
the co-op; policy decisions are made on a one-person, one-
vote basis by all owner-members in semiannual or quarterly 
general meetings [where “there are discussions about 
everything from the manager’s performance to capital-
investment decisions”]. Major decisions are discussed 
extensively by owner-members, who have full access to 
information concerning the co-op’s operation. The core of 
production workers in these co-ops essentially hires and fires 
its manager.65 
 
There is an element of hierarchy in production and decision-
making on the shop-floor, but much less so than in comparable 
capitalist firms. The word “hierarchy” in fact is a bit misleading: 
plywood worker-owners take their “supervisor” much less seriously 
than in conventional mills because his continued employment 
depends on their goodwill, and it is very rare that he will try to fire 
one of them. (Sometimes he is an outsider who has been hired, 
sometimes a worker-owner himself.) There are also few supervisors 
in plywood co-ops, maybe one or two per shift, whereas in a private 
                                                 
65 Christopher Eaton Gunn, Workers’ Self-Management in the United States 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 100, 109. 
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enterprise there have to be six or seven because the workers have 
less of an incentive to work efficiently. The co-op supervisor tends 
not to bother the workers but concentrates on “broader, plant-wide 
issues having to do with the flow of materials and machine-usage.”66 
Plywood cooperators, who often have semiskilled jobs that can 
easily be rotated, frequently organize informal job rotations to 
alleviate monotony or for some other reason. This is not done in 
conventional mills, where “jobs are assigned through precise and 
formal agreements made between management and the union.” 67 
Cooperators also initiate innovations in work procedures and have 
more flexibility in their tasks than at conventional mills. 
Thus, while considerations of efficiency dictate that the 
consensual, spontaneous, “self-actualizing” form of collectives be 
limited in larger co-ops, it can still exist to a much greater degree 
than at private enterprises. One should not think, incidentally, that 
this presence of democracy constrains efficiency, that it signifies a 
compromise between freedom and productivity. Quite the contrary. 
The above description should already have helped dispel that 
impression; moreover, as I mentioned earlier, bureaucracy not 
tempered by democracy can be extremely inefficient, whether it’s in 
a government or a business. Therefore, to compromise between 
participation and hierarchy in a large organization is in fact to 
establish the greatest possible efficiency. I’ll return to this point 
below. 
Companies in the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation, which 
have hundreds or thousands of workers, have a more complex 
governance structure than the plywood co-ops. The general assembly 
of all worker-members in each company meets at least annually to 
elect a governing council (similar to a board of directors) and to 
approve company plans and policies. Members of the governing 
council, who themselves are workers, have four-year terms; they are 
not paid for their council responsibilities but receive their regular 
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salaries. The council appoints and can remove the CEO and must 
approve his choices for senior executives; it meets once or twice a 
month to monitor the management team’s and the company’s 
performance. There is also a “Social Council” that meets monthly, 
composed of representatives elected annually; its role is vaguely 
similar to that of a union, though it is supposed to be more 
cooperative than confrontational vis-à-vis the governing council and 
the management team. It serves as the voice of all the workers, 
communicating with management on such issues as working 
conditions, wages, and health and safety. This structure has worked 
for decades.68  
Each cooperative in Mondragon has its own workplace structure, 
though there are similarities and tendencies that most of them share. 
The firm called Irizar, which manufactures products for trans-
portation, from luxury coaches to city buses, exemplifies these 
tendencies. To encourage innovation and the diffusion of knowledge, 
there are no bosses or departments in Irizar. Rather, it has a flat 
organizational structure based on work teams with a high degree of 
autonomy. (One study remarks that they “set their own targets, 
establish their own work schedules, [and] organize the work process 
as they see fit.”) The teams also work with each other, so that 
knowledge is transmitted efficiently. Participation occurs also in the 
general assembly, which meets three times a year rather than the 
single annual meeting common in other Mondragon firms. Its 
subsidiaries in other countries have at least two general assemblies a 
year, where they approve the company’s strategic plan, investments, 
                                                 
68 William Foote Whyte and Kathleen King Whyte, Making Mondragon: 
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etc. These participatory structures have enabled Irizar to surpass its 
competitors in profitability and market share.69 
The cooperative in south India called Kerala Dinesh Beedi 
(KDB), which has had great success since its inception in the late 
1960s, is worth describing because of its unusual characteristics. 
First of all, it is very large: at times having had over 35,000 worker-
members, it currently has about 9000. It grew out of a conflict 
between the employees and owners of a private company, when the 
owners laid off 12,000 beedi workers in the state of Kerala.70 A left-
wing government had come to power in Kerala in 1967 and was 
committed to implementing recent national legislation that would 
regulate and improve the deplorable conditions of the beedi industry. 
Beedi employers were not happy with these developments; they 
wanted to continue using child labor and also institute a domestic 
“putting-out” system to fragment the workers, whose unions had 
been active in radical social movements for decades and were 
troublesome to the employers. One of the latter essentially declared 
war on the unions and the new leftist government: not only did it 
threaten to relocate to a different state if the government enforced the 
law, but it laid off 12,000 employees.71 
A months-long crisis ensued, until the government and the 
unions decided to create a new cooperative to employ the 12,000 
laid-off workers. Cooperatives had been created before in Kerala, but 
not nearly on this scale. The workers could not afford to put up much 
                                                 
69  Greg MacLeod and Darryl Reed, “Mondragon’s Response to the 
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operatives in a Global Economy: The Challenges of Co-operation Across 
Borders, eds. Darryl Reed and J. J. McMurtry (Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2009), 127–132. Irizar recently left Mondragon, but it 
has kept its cooperative structure. 
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capital, so the government lent them millions of rupees, in addition 
to helping the trade unions accomplish the monumental 
organizational tasks. Government officials even joined the board of 
directors. What is amazing is that despite all this political 
involvement, the government soon “withdrew from any active role in 
the running of the cooperative.”72 Even the endemic Indian problems 
of corruption did not arise, since the government was desperate for 
the cooperative to succeed. 
One study summarizes the structure of KDB: 
 
KDB is a federation of twenty-two “primary 
cooperatives.” Each of the primary cooperatives has six to 
fourteen shop floors. At each, there are generally between 75 
and 125 beedi-rollers. Production takes place at the shop 
floor. Every worker directly participates, informally and 
continually, in the decisions about work arrangements at his 
or her shop floor. Each shop floor has a formal, general body 
meeting only about once every six months. At the general 
body meeting of each group of shop-floor workers (seventy-
five to one hundred twenty-five people) everyone 
participates. These meetings are the fora for discussing 
complaints about conditions of work, disputes with 
supervisors, and problems with the behavior or productivity 
of individual workers. Every shop floor also has a “factory 
committee” that does the day-to-day supervision and 
management of the floor. This involves deciding on matters 
such as ventilation, entertainment, and break times.73 
 
Each primary cooperative has a board of directors elected by the 
members, which supervises the purchase of raw materials from, and 
the sale of finished beedis to, the “central cooperative,” which is the 
point of contact between KDB and the outside world. Its decisions 
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are a function of market demand; it is in charge of quality control, 
pricing, marketing strategy, diversification, the overall structure of 
wages and benefits, etc. The central board of directors is elected by 
the primary cooperatives’ boards of directors. Workers participate 
regularly in meetings with their unions, which then negotiate wages 
and benefits with the central cooperative. There are annual meetings 
of representatives of all the primary cooperatives. 
Shop-floor supervisors cannot hire, fire, transfer, or fine their 
worker-bosses, but they have power nonetheless. They are usually 
senior workers themselves; they’re promoted to their new position by 
the primary cooperative’s board of directors. The supervisors are 
supervised, in turn, by foremen who have been hired by the central 
cooperative. The main function of a supervisor is to help train 
workers whose productivity is low or whose beedis are of low 
quality, but he is also responsible for enforcing workplace discipline 
and, of course, for monitoring individuals’ productivity. Various 
positive incentives have been devised to encourage productivity, and 
as we’ll see, they have been quite effective. 
In short, while every worker cooperative has its own distinctive 
structure, the egalitarian and participatory tendencies I’ve described 
characterize all of them to some degree. These are the most 
important features distinguishing them from capitalist enterprises. 
 
Wages and employment 
 
The pay scales at large cooperatives are either identical to those 
at collectives or somewhat more unequal due to competitive 
pressures. The plywood co-ops paid all their members equally, the 
major exception being the general manager, who was usually a hired 
outsider and received a higher salary than members. 74  In the 
conventional plywood mills, by contrast, the wages of the highest-
paid workers and the lowest-paid differed by a factor of about 2.5.75  
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At Mondragon, until the 1980s the differential between the 
highest- and lowest-paid workers was fixed at 3:1. In recent years, 
with the pressures of globalization and the need to attract skilled 
managers who could receive much more money in private 
enterprises, some positions have been raised to a 6:1 ratio, while the 
CEO of the entire Mondragon corporation earns nine times more 
than the lowest-paid worker.76 
The fact that cooperative pay-scales are always relatively 
egalitarian is intuitive and uncontested. Less clear is whether 
ordinary workers in co-ops tend to be paid more or less than their 
counterparts in capitalist firms. It is known that, generally speaking, 
management is paid less than in capitalist businesses: this can be 
inferred from the smaller pay scale in co-ops. But the data on the 
wages of the average worker are less clear-cut. As we saw above, 
some collectives give their members higher pay and better benefits 
than in comparable private enterprises, while other collectives are 
unable to do so, especially if their capitalist competitors are 
unionized. Larger co-ops more regularly offer higher compensation, 
in many cases much higher than at comparable capitalist 
businesses—but, again, only for low-level or, sometimes, mid-level 
workers. David Herrera reports that “wages at Mondragon, as 
compared to similar jobs at local industries, are 30 percent or less at 
the management levels and equivalent at the middle management, 
technical and professional levels. As a result, Mondragon worker-
owners at the lower wage-levels earn an average of 13 percent higher 
wages than workers in similar businesses.”77  
Kerala Dinesh Beedi provides an even better example of high 
wages: workers earn over three times as much as those in other firms 
(including health benefits, maternity benefits, pensions, and paid 
holidays). While most beedi workers slave away in “small and dingy 
work sites that lack proper bathroom facilities and pose health 
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hazards because of the way the tobacco is kept,” KDB members have 
work sites that are spacious, clean, well-ventilated, and even “have 
entertainment in the form of someone who reads stories or news 
articles to the workers as they are rolling beedis.” Managers, on the 
other hand, earn only about as much as the beedi workers 
themselves, whereas in a capitalist firm of comparable size they 
would probably make 30 or 40 times that level, in addition to having 
luxurious perquisites not offered KDB’s managers.78  
Cooperative Care in Wisconsin, which provides care to the 
elderly, was able to give its 81 members in 2004 relatively high pay, 
workers’ compensation, ten days’ paid vacation, and 50 to 75 percent 
health insurance coverage, all only three years after beginning 
operations.79  Similarly, Cooperative Home Care Associates in the 
Bronx, New York, founded in 1985, offers its 1700 members 
“significantly better pay and working conditions than most home 
health aides.”80  
How are cooperatives able to maintain high wages while 
competing successfully against conventional enterprises? The answer 
lies partly in their high productivity, which I’ll discuss below. Also, 
greater size leads to greater capital accumulation than in collectives, 
which leads to more revenue in a self-reinforcing cycle. Collectives 
often just don’t have enough capital to get the cycle started in a 
meaningful way—although, to repeat, when the annual distribution 
of profits and benefits is taken into account (in addition to wages), 
many collectivists do have a higher income than their conventional 
competitors. 
As regards the trade-off in hard times between wages and 
employment, medium-sized and large cooperatives have the same 
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priorities as collectives: they adjust pay rather than employment. The 
plywood mills, again, illustrate the point. A 1992 study compares the 
responses of three types of firms in the plywood sector—unionized, 
non-unionized, and co-ops—to adverse economic circumstances in 
1980, as contrasted with the expansionary year of 1972. It finds that 
 
employment in the union mills and in the classical [non-
union] mills in 1980 averaged 83.6 percent and 51.3 percent 
of the 1972 values, respectively, whereas employment in the 
co-ops was 115.9 percent of the 1972 level; with respect to 
nominal average hourly earnings, earnings in the union mills 
more than doubled between 1972 and 1980, whereas 
earnings in the co-ops in 1980 were 183.8 percent of their 
1972 levels.81 
 
Thus, employment shrank significantly in the conventional firms 
but actually grew in the co-op, while the earnings of the cooperative 
workers did not grow as fast as those of the union workers. This 
supports my earlier contention that cooperatives have even more 
potential for alleviating unemployment than for providing high 
incomes. 
 
Incentives, job satisfaction, productivity, and the political effects of 
participation 
 
Because sizable co-ops are usually less economically marginal, 
more “mainstream,” than collectives, and the people who work in 
them are more ordinary demographically and have more 
conventional expectations for their jobs, competitive success and 
high compensation are relatively important incentives. High profit-
margins are valued so that members can earn more and (perhaps) the 
business can expand and invest in new technology. After all, most of 
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these co-ops are founded solely to provide employment; the element 
of idealism or passion for a particular cause is rarely as significant as 
it is to many collectivists.  
Owner-members of the plywood co-ops indicated in interviews 
that the reasons they joined the cooperatives were the potential for 
good income and job security. They have “individualistic, property-
holding motivations” that do not change as they experience the 
cooperative relations of production.82 This is in marked contrast to 
most collectivists, who have precisely the opposite motivations—the 
inherently political desire to “escape the rat race” and do something 
they believe in. One obvious reason for the difference is that the 
plywood cooperators have a working-class origin and have known 
long periods of unemployment.83 They think of their participation in 
a co-op as a financial investment: buy a share and get a secure job.  
However, they quickly come to appreciate the control they have 
over their work. While they remain less “idealistic” than the average 
collectivist, their attitude certainly differs from that of the workforce 
in a conventional plant, which tends to suffer from a relative 
“deadening of the spirit, a sense of defeat, hopelessness, and 
abjectness.” The participatory environment of the cooperative 
“fosters an extremely strong sense of collective responsibility and 
mutuality,” which is antithetical to the structure of work in a 
conventional factory. As mentioned above, this sense of mutuality is 
manifested, e.g., in collective and self-supervision and the rather low 
number of designated supervisors. “Everybody pitches in and helps,” 
remarks one worker; “the people stick together, that’s the reason 
we’ve gone so far and production is so high, ’cause everybody works 
together.” Some workers even profess to enjoy their work, despite its 
repetitive and mechanical nature: “There is a certain feeling to know 
that you own part of what you’re working for… I’ve always gone to 
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all the stockholders’ meetings and…I enjoy it. I’ve never had so 
much fun! Hell, we run this operation all by ourselves.”84 
One obvious supposed benefit of cooperatives is that there is less 
conflict between workers and managers than at conventional, 
hierarchical enterprises. Nearly all the data indicate that this is 
indeed the case. Consider, for example, a study published in 2001 
that examines dispute resolution at a cooperative coal mine in Wales 
as compared to how it functioned when the mine was owned and 
operated by the British government, as it had been for years. In the 
early 1990s, with British Coal threatening to close it, 200 employees 
bought it and converted it into a worker cooperative. By law the 
company was required to have managers in charge of safety, finance, 
engineering and so on, but it hired only a third of the managers that 
had been employed by the government even though there was 
approximately the same number of miners. These managers retained 
significant power over the workers, but now their decisions could be 
overruled by the board of directors elected annually by the 
workforce.  
When the mine was government-owned it was severely 
hierarchical and dispute resolution was confrontational: grievances, 
which cropped up continually, were resolved according to a rigid set 
of formal rules, and work stoppages instigated by either management 
or the union occurred frequently. Under cooperative ownership this 
all changed. Worker-owners were more flexible in upholding work 
rules, so that disputes were far less frequent. “Many current issues 
and conditions would have been formally contested under British 
Coal, warranting a grievance or other union action. Today, these 
potential disputes do not develop into grievances. Furthermore, these 
potential disputes are not…simply tolerated; instead, they are no 
longer seen as injurious experiences.” 85  Miners were now not 
unwilling to work overtime without extra pay, or, for example, they 
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would work at an undermanned site, whereas in the past that would 
have resulted in a grievance (because it entails extra work). In 
general, they were more willing to compromise, since their status as 
owners made them disinclined to stop work. Managers too were 
more easygoing and respectful, because power was more dispersed 
than in the past. One worker offers eloquent testimony: 
 
Today, the manager will come out and talk to you. He 
very rarely goes through the pit without saying, you know, 
stopping and talking to everyone. Whereas before, the 
manager used to come down and he wouldn’t talk to you. 
He’d probably tell somebody else who would tell you to do 
something. They felt they were some super-human! You 
know, we were down there and they were up at the top like. 
And it was all, “Do this!” They tell you rather than ask you.  
Today, now, the manager comes down and he’ll ask you, 
“Any chance you could?” You know? “Can you do me a 
favor?” Before it was, “Oh you get and do that!” And 
obviously the respect had gone from the men for the 
management under British Coal.  
Now at the colliery the men have got a lot of respect for 
the manager, because, at the end of the day, he owns as 
much of the colliery as we do. We all have equal-share basis 
and he’s in it for the same reason we are: to get the best out 
of the colliery.86 
 
Admittedly, some research indicates worker discontent at certain 
large cooperatives, including conflict between management and the 
workforce. Mondragon, considered an exemplar of large-scale 
worker cooperation, has not been immune to this. For instance, in 
1989, at a typical co-op with 250 worker-owners, members reported 
to a researcher that they most definitely did not think the firm was 
democratic. They referred to themselves as “working stiffs” and 
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called the managers “bosses.” “We are not different,” they said, 
“from other businesses in any way.” “It doesn’t matter how equal we 
are in theory, in practice we are not.” “What good does it do me that 
they call me a collaborator when they treat me like a subordinate… 
At least in a regular firm you can call the boss a son of a bitch.”87 
Managers at this company considered relations between themselves 
and the workforce to be cooperative, respectful, and democratic; the 
workers, however, disagreed.  
A study in the mid-1980s reported that Mondragon’s supervisory 
structures were virtually identical to those at nearby conventional 
firms, and observed that “the necessity to compete in national and 
international markets leaves insufficient space to implement 
alternative manners of work organization on a large scale.” 88 
Moreover, in recent years there have been major organizational 
changes considered necessary to maintain international 
competitiveness, so that now pay-scales are less flat, management 
councils have more power, and non-cooperative subsidiaries are 
being acquired in China, Brazil, and other countries.  
There is no question that the need to compete in a capitalist 
world forces large co-ops to compromise their principles. This has 
always been a criticism leveled at them by Marxists and other 
radicals. Nevertheless, it does not appear that they necessarily have 
to degenerate into semi-capitalist corporations, nor that they ever 
have the same adversarial relations between management and the 
workforce as conventional firms do. Even in the example mentioned 
above from Mondragon, the author of the study notes that relations 
are more harmonious in the co-op than in a comparable capitalist 
company. As long as most of the workers own the firm and 
participate in governance, and especially if efforts are made to instill 
a culture of cooperation at both the shop-floor level and the 
enterprise level, there will be meaningful differences between 
cooperative and conventional firms. These differences may even be 
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strictly economic: the co-op will quite possibly be more productive 
than its capitalist counterparts, because of incentives and the 
diverting of resources away from unproductive supervision and the 
need to contain conflict (which is a constant imperative in the 
average capitalist business). 
For example, I noted above that fewer supervisors were needed 
in the plywood cooperatives, and the worker-owners were unusually 
committed to the success of the enterprise. (The same was true of the 
cooperative mine just discussed.) This resulted in higher 
productivity-rates—measured by the physical volume of output per 
hour, the quality of the product, and economy of material input use—
than in privately owned mills, as much as 50 percent higher. A 
relatively low amount of capital per worker was required, and the 
hourly return to workers was often 50 percent higher than union 
averages.89  
The case of Kerala Dinesh Beedi is even more impressive. 
Despite its competitors’ significantly lower labor costs, it has been 
able to compete successfully for decades. How is this possible? One 
area of advantage is its far fewer managers and their relatively low 
compensation. But KDB’s labor costs remain high even so. Another 
advantage is that there have been no major labor disputes in its 
history—a fact that is stunning in itself, since disputes are common 
and costly in the region as a whole. Also, as noted earlier, shop-floor 
conditions are very efficient, with workers monitoring each other and 
sharing information willingly. A particularly decisive strength is the 
uniformly high quality of KDB’s beedis, which customers 
appreciate. Workers at other companies have an incentive to be hasty 
and careless in their beedi-rolling because they are paid on a 
piecework basis, and monitoring is difficult. KDB workers, who are 
happier, healthier, and better-paid, are more careful.90  
Examples of such productivity could be multiplied. But that 
would merely provide further illustrations of the intuitively 
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reasonable point that labor will tend to be more productive in co-ops 
than in conventional businesses. One author concludes, on the basis 
of a meta-analysis of 43 previous studies, that (1) worker 
participation in decision-making in co-ops has a “small, positive, and 
statistically significant association with productivity, rejecting the 
traditional view that democratic management of the firm is 
associated with reduced efficiency”; (2) profit-sharing in 
cooperatives is very strongly associated with increased productivity, 
while the association is less pronounced in capitalist enterprises; (3) 
worker-ownership in co-ops has a small but statistically significant 
association with productivity, whereas in capitalist firms there is 
virtually no correlation (probably because employees typically own 
only a small proportion of assets). 91  A study in 1994 found that 
“employee involvement programs are invariably positively 
associated with desirable outcomes (such as greater work effort and 
higher productivity), whereas measures of performance pay are less 
robustly associated with these outcomes.”92 More recent studies have 
concluded that there is often a gain in productivity with employee 
stock-ownership plans—again, a result compatible with the 
hypothesis that worker cooperatives will tend to have high labor 
productivity.93  
A number of reasons can be thought of to explain these results, 
most of which have already been mentioned. Cooperatives have 
lower absentee rates and less worker turnover than their conventional 
competitors. (For instance, the annual rate of turnover in the 
Mondragon cooperatives in 1974 was two percent, while in 
comparable capitalist firms it was 14 percent.) 94  Members show 
relatively high individual work effort, tending to act as their own 
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supervisors, at least to a greater degree than employees do elsewhere. 
Job rotation, where it happens, enhances the attractiveness of the 
work. And there are greater incentives to help one another than in a 
competitive environment.  
Does all this have implications for political consciousness and 
participation? It seems to, but less so than one might hope. I noted 
above that collectivists tend to be relatively politically conscious and 
active but that the reasons for this are not clear. The situation is even 
more ambiguous with regard to larger cooperatives. Edward 
Greenberg’s conclusions about the plywood industry are illustrative. 
He addresses four claims made by leftists: “workplace democracy 
encourages participation in other social institutions outside of the 
workplace; helps create citizens who are endowed with a sense of 
their own political efficacy; increases participation in normal 
political life; and creates a sense of community and cooperation as 
well as a commitment to the public interest.”95 Few of his findings 
are encouraging. 
For example, worker-owners were actually a little less likely to 
participate in organizations outside the workplace than conventional 
employees. This could be due to the fact that many of the latter 
belong to unions, unlike the former, which may foster political 
consciousness and activism. On the other hand, Greenberg finds that 
over time the cooperators did increase their participation in social 
institutions, though not to above the level of ordinary employees. 
They also didn’t have any greater sense of political efficacy than 
regular workers. More encouragingly, members were significantly 
more politically involved than conventional workers and were more 
likely to increase their participation over time—but at the same time 
they were more likely to think that “Society is best off when each 
individual looks out for his own well-being and not the well-being of 
others,” and in fact to agree with this statement more the longer they 
worked in a co-op. So their political participation was not necessarily 
a sign of public-spiritedness. Nor were they class-conscious in a 
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good way: they were relatively likely to call themselves middle-class 
rather than working-class, and a relatively high proportion identified 
themselves as Republican. (This was during the Reagan years.)96 
Greenberg concludes: 
 
Clearly…without powerful countervailing forces to the 
market mechanism, democratic, self-managed enterprises 
drift inexorably toward enterprise egoism and membership 
behavior as collective capitalists. Without a working-class 
party, a cooperative or egalitarian culture, a socialist 
ideology, a revolutionary movement, or a government 
committed to economic democracy, the logic of the market 
is determinative and blocks the larger promise of self-
management…97 
 
Especially in a large cooperative, whose members are typically 
more concerned with having money and a secure job than 
collectivists are, the market mentality can prove stronger than the 
democratic, egalitarian, workers’ social-movement mentality.  
As always, there are many counterexamples. Equal Exchange, 
with about 100 members, is politically progressive, committed to 
such causes as Fair Trade. Inspired by Mondragon and the 
cooperatives of northern Italy, it has also begun donating a portion of 
its earnings to a fund for the development of new co-ops.98 Rainbow 
Grocery in San Francisco, owned by about 150 workers, likewise 
functions as a center of progressivism, in the tradition of many 
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natural-food stores. Kerala Dinesh Beedi has a long history of radical 
political activism going back to even before its formation. The region 
of Kerala has bred left-wing social movements since early in the 
twentieth century; KDB’s labor unions are militantly Marxist. 
Such examples support Greenberg’s point that progressive 
political activism, while not guaranteed by a cooperative workplace, 
is not only compatible with it but potentially encouraged by it as 
long as the business either maintains ties with cooperative 
institutions or is run by workers committed to radical ideologies. 
Unionization of employees in conventional companies likewise 
fosters political consciousness and action; there is no particular 
reason, therefore, why cooperatives cannot affiliate with unions and 
assist them politically, and vice versa. This has been common 
practice in Europe for a long time, was so in the United States for 
much of the nineteenth century, and, as we’ll see later, is starting to 




I have yet to address a number of important matters in relation to 
cooperatives of all sizes. First, in what sectors is it most common to 
find them? All the research indicates that it is the labor-intensive, 
service areas of the economy. Food stores, bookstores, print shops, 
restaurants, repair services—all risky areas for small business. 
Historically, U.S. cooperatives have had “a strong craft orientation, 
with fields of activity including metal foundries, barrel-making, 
shingle-making, and plywood.” 99  Many Western European 
cooperatives operate in construction and certain labor-intensive 
branches of manufacturing. Some Mondragon and Italian 
cooperatives, however, are very capital-intensive, which is possible 
because of the networks they have established with each other. Also, 
cooperatives are relatively common in the somewhat capital-
intensive industry of transportation—a number of taxi companies 
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have been cooperatives—which is probably because the physical 
assets needed (such as vehicles) can easily be resold at close to their 
purchase price if the business fails, so that there is relatively little 
risk in lending money to the co-op.100 
The main problem, then, is that most cooperators or would-be 
cooperators have limited access to financial capital. Why is that? 
Sometimes they decide to seek capital only from their members; in 
this case, the reason for undercapitalization is self-evident. One 
reason they might shun bank loans is if banks charge high interest-
rates. Sometimes banks will require that each member provide 
collateral to guarantee the loan, a risk that some workers might not 
be willing to undertake. 101  Two reasons why traditional lenders 
might be reluctant to lend to worker-run enterprises are  
 
because of heightened levels of (a) moral hazard and (b) 
transactions costs. The moral hazard argument is that lenders 
bear most of the risk of failure in situations in which workers 
can easily move to new jobs in the event of the firm’s 
failure. As for the higher transactions costs, the argument is 
simply that it is easier and quicker to deal with a single 
borrower (or the borrower’s delegate who has authority) than 
to deal with a group that has to use a democratic process to 
make decisions.102 
 
Overseeing the activities of an enterprise with a small number of 
decision-makers is easier than if every worker is a director and 
owner. Even the initial loan is then relatively difficult to arrange: the 
bank has to deal with the elected board of directors, drawn from the 
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ranks of the workers, who have often had no experience arranging 
bank loans. Sometimes “the bank must ultimately go to a 
shareholders’ meeting and explain the terms of a loan to them, an 
unfamiliar experience for the lending officer and not always a 
pleasant one.” Apart from this, “the bank’s worst fears are that the 
co-op will distribute the loan among its workers and then declare 
bankruptcy.” It’s not surprising, therefore, that banks might attach 
onerous conditions to loans.103 
An additional advantage, from the perspective of lenders, of 
undemocratic firms is that it is easier for the lender to influence the 
policies of such firms, for instance by preventing them from 
undertaking excessively risky or excessively conservative projects. 
One author remarks that with cooperatives “there is no guarantee of a 
single owner or officer who always represents the workers, given the 
democratic management. As a result, the financial community cannot 
obtain the leverage over cooperatives seeking to borrow that they can 
over capitalist firms.”104  
Equity financing, on the other hand, is unappealing to 
cooperators because it may mean relinquishing control to outside 
investors, which is a distinctly capitalist practice. Investors are not 
likely to buy non-voting shares; they will probably require 
representation on the board of directors because otherwise their 
money could potentially be expropriated. “For example, if the 
directors of the firm were workers, they might embezzle equity 
funds, refrain from paying dividends in order to raise wages, or 
dissipate resources on projects of dubious value.”105 In any case, the 
very idea of even partial outside ownership is contrary to the 
cooperative ethos. 
A general reason for traditional institutions’ reluctance to lend to 
cooperatives, and indeed for the rarity of cooperatives whether 
related to the difficulty of securing capital or not, is simply that a 
society’s history, culture, and ideologies might be hostile to the “co-
                                                 
103 Pencavel, Worker Participation, 38. 
104 Dow, Governing the Firm, 187. 
105 Ibid., 188. 
WORKER COOPERATIVES AND REVOLUTION 
58 
op” idea. Needless to say, this is the case in most industrialized 
countries, especially the United States. The very notion of a workers’ 
cooperative might be viscerally unappealing and mysterious to bank 
officials, as it is to people of many walks of life. Stereotypes about 
inefficiency, unprofitability, inexperience, incompetence, and anti-
capitalism might dispose officials to reject out of hand appeals for 
financial assistance from co-ops. Similarly, such cultural 
preconceptions may be an element in the widespread reluctance on 
the part of working people to try to start a cooperative. They simply 
have a “visceral aversion” to, and unfamiliarity with, the idea—
which is also surely a function of the rarity of co-ops itself. Their 
rarity reinforces itself, in that it fosters a general ignorance of co-ops 
and the perception that they’re risky endeavors. Additionally, insofar 
as an anti-democratic passivity, a civic fragmentedness, a half-
conscious sense of collective disempowerment, and a diffuse 
interpersonal alienation saturate society, this militates against 
initiating cooperative projects. It is simply taken for granted among 
many people that such things cannot be done. And they are assumed 
to require sophisticated entrepreneurial instincts. In most places, the 
cooperative idea is not even in the public consciousness; it has barely 
been heard of. 
Business propaganda has done its job well.106 But propaganda 
can be fought with propaganda. In fact, this is one of the most 
important things that activists can do, this elevation of cooperativism 
into the public consciousness. The more that people hear about it, 
know about it, learn of its successes and potentials, the more they’ll 
be open to it rather than instinctively thinking it’s “foreign,” 
“socialist,” “idealistic,” or “hippyish.” If successful cooperatives 
advertise their business form, that in itself performs a useful service 
for the movement. It cannot be overemphasized that the most 
important thing is to create a climate in which it is considered normal 
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to try to form a co-op, in which that is seen as a perfectly legitimate 
and predictable option for a group of intelligent and capable 
unemployed workers. Lenders themselves will become less skeptical 
of the business form as it seeps into the culture’s consciousness. 
It’s true that people sharing a common culture or ethnicity, 
especially if they have emigrated to or live together in a diverse 
society, are more likely to start cooperatives. It was the Basques of 
northern Spain who started Mondragon, at a time when they were 
fiercely antagonistic toward Spanish (Francoist) society. The 
plywood co-ops were organized by Scandinavians in a community 
that benefited from high levels of trust. This theme of “cultural 
homogeneity” supports the hypothesis mentioned earlier that 
heterogeneity is not conducive to the formation and success of 
worker cooperatives. A heterogeneous co-op may succeed, but 
insofar as its heterogeneity undermines levels of trust, it threatens the 
co-op’s survival. Ultimately, though, the most important 
precondition, particularly in small cooperatives, seems to be that 
individuals have a democratic attitude, commitment to the project, 
and some degree of interpersonal skills. 
One obstacle to forming a co-op is the challenge of gathering a 
group of interested, capable, and like-minded people, people 
interested in starting the same kind of business, who can work well 
together and have enough information and initiative to do the 
difficult preliminary work. A single entrepreneur is unlikely to want 
his business to be a cooperative, since that would reduce his revenue 
and control. Hopeful cooperators will probably be workers who 
place a high value on job security or people committed to 
cooperation for ideological reasons. But such people are not likely to 
have a great deal of money to invest in a business, and they will be 
wary of putting thousands of dollars into one venture. Regular 
investors, of course, diversify their wealth for precisely this reason, 
this aversion to risk. It would seem, then, that risk-tolerant people 
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would be most interested in forming a co-op—and such people are 
relatively rare.107  
Employee buyouts of capitalist enterprises are not very common 
either. They usually happen, if at all, only when a company is in 
financial straits and workers want to save their jobs. One possible 
reason they’re somewhat rare even in the case of failing firms is that 
they are more likely to occur if the employees are unionized, and 
unionization rates are low in the United States. Buyouts require a lot 
of work from a few leaders. Also, workers might not be able to agree 
among themselves on the many decisions that have to be made, some 
preferring a cooperative and others control by outside investors. 
When takeovers do occur, often the company is in such bad shape 
that even in a restructured form it fails within a few years.108 
All these considerations are reasons why the formation rate of 
worker cooperatives is low. And this is the biggest problem for 
cooperatives, this low rate of formation. But once they do form, 
other problems can arise. A commonly cited one is that cooperators 
may lack business experience and know-how. Many of the co-ops 
formed in the 1960s and 1970s failed because they were started by 
youthful idealists who cared little about the technical details of 
running a business.109 They ignored accounting problems until it was 
too late. Even if the workers are competent, it might be difficult to 
attract managers or specialists if they are needed, since the pay is 
likely to be low. Another pitfall is that the stress and the personal 
intensity of work in cooperatives, especially collectives, might prove 
too much. People might find that they cannot work together or prefer 
an ordinary, possibly less stressful job, and the collective may 
dissolve. 
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The severity of these problems is debatable—for example, 
Beatrice Webb was wrong to think that cooperatives will inevitably 
suffer from poor management because of an inability to attract 
skilled professionals110—but other commonly cited hazards are in 
practice even less problematic. It doesn’t appear to be widely true 
that democratic decision-making leads to great inefficiencies; on the 
contrary, I have argued that it can promote high productivity and 
work-discipline, and in those cases when direct democracy is 
impracticable it is easy to substitute representative democracy. Nor is 
it true that worker-owners tend to shirk or that monitoring is 
difficult; more often, the opposite is the case.111  
On the other hand, the possibility of degeneration into a 
capitalist enterprise is real. Ironically, this can result from the co-
op’s success. If the business wants to expand it might choose to hire 
labor rather than admit new members, because, under certain legal 
structures, if it adds new shares (each of which is to be bought by a 
new member) that reduces the value of the current members’ shares. 
Ultimately, then, the co-op might end up having more wage-laborers 
than members. As we’ll see in the next chapter, some of the plywood 
cooperatives degenerated in this way. Others, and many co-ops in the 
nineteenth century, degenerated by being sold to outside investors. 
That is, as “members approach[ed] retirement age and [became] 
more interested in wealth maximization than working conditions or 
other consumption benefits derived from firm membership,”112 each 
member would sometimes sell his valuable share to an investor 
(because it was too expensive for less wealthy prospective workers 
to buy). Or, in some cases, the members collectively sold the whole 
business to investors.  
The possibility of degeneration diminishes if the co-op uses the 
proper legal structure. The best structure is that of the Mondragon 
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companies, which do not allow workers to own a tradable share of 
equity. Instead, in addition to their wages they each have an internal 
capital account the value of which depends on the business’s 
performance and on the number of hours the member works. A new 
member has to pay a large entrance fee, most of which is credited to 
his internal account. He receives interest at the end of every fiscal 
year, but he cannot withdraw the annually accumulating principal 
from his account until retirement. Almost all profits are divided 
between these individual accounts and a collective account that helps 
ensure the company’s survival. No buying or selling of shares takes 
place in this scheme, so it’s difficult for the firm to lose its worker-
controlled status. Not until 1982, however, did the internal-capital-
accounts legal structure exist in the United States (and then only in 
Massachusetts); prior to that, worker cooperatives had to make 
convoluted use of other categories, which sometimes made them 
vulnerable to degeneration.113  
In any case, the survival rates of contemporary cooperatives put 
the lie to traditional theories of cooperatives’ unsustainability, for 
they appear to have higher rates of survival than conventional firms. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the death rate for co-ops in France 
(due either to dissolution or to conversion into a capitalist firm) was 
6.9 percent; the comparable rate for capitalist competitors was 10 
percent. A study in 1989 found much higher failure rates for 
capitalist companies than cooperatives in North America.114 A study 
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conducted by Quebec’s Ministry of Industry and Commerce in 1999 
concluded that “Co-op startups are twice as likely to celebrate their 
10th birthday as conventionally owned private businesses.”115 A later 
study by the same organization found that “More than 6 out of 10 
cooperatives survive more than five years, as compared to almost 4 
businesses out of 10 for the private sector in Québec and in Canada 
in general. More than 4 out of 10 cooperatives survive more than 10 
years, compared to 2 businesses out of 10 for the private sector.”116 
These data sufficiently demonstrate the viability of cooperatives.  
Indeed, their viability tends to be proportional to their 
cooperativeness: 
 
Broadly speaking, it is those clusters of producer 
cooperatives with the most cooperative features…that have 
the longest life, the best economic performance, and the best 
record of maintaining a cooperative structure over time… A 
great number of cooperatives succumb to the demands for 
efficiency by progressively negating their cooperative 
character. The historical record suggests that in the end these 
firms will end up with neither cooperation nor efficiency. 
The key to successful, long-lived cooperatives seems to be 
precisely greater cooperation and a concomitant responsive-
ness to the economic and labor conditions of the 
marketplace.117 
 
The reasons for cooperatives’ success should be obvious by now, 
but they are worth reiterating: “The major basis for cooperative 
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success…has been superior labor productivity. Studies comparing 
square-foot output have repeatedly shown higher physical volume of 
output per hour, and others…show higher quality of product and also 
economy of material use.”118 Hendrik Thomas concludes from an 
analysis of Mondragon that “Productivity and profitability are higher 
for cooperatives than for capitalist firms. It makes little difference 
whether the Mondragon group is compared with the largest 500 
companies, or with small- or medium-scale industries; in both 
comparisons the Mondragon group is more productive and more 
profitable.”119 As we have seen, recent research has arrived at the 
same conclusions. It is a truism by now that worker participation 
tends to increase productivity and profitability. 
Research conducted by Henk Thomas and Chris Logan 
corroborates these conclusions. “A frequent but unfounded 
criticism,” they observe, “of self-managed firms is that workers 
prefer to enjoy a high take-home pay rather than to invest in their 
own enterprises. This has been proven invalid…in the Mondragon 
case… A comparison of gross investment figures shows that the 
cooperatives invest on average four times as much as private 
enterprises.” After a detailed analysis they also conclude that “there 
can be no doubt that the [Mondragon] cooperatives have been more 
profitable than capitalist enterprises.” 120  Recent data indicate the 
same thing.121  One particularly successful company, Irizar, which 
was mentioned earlier, has been awarded prizes for being the most 
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efficient company in its sector; in Spain it has ten competitors, but its 
market share is 40 percent. The same level of achievement is true of 
its subsidiaries, for instance in Mexico, where it had a 45 percent 
market share in 2005, six years after entering the market. An author 
comments that “the basis for this increased efficiency appears to be 
linked directly to the organization’s unique participatory and 
democratic management structure.”122 A major reason for all these 
successes is Mondragon’s federated structure: the group of 
cooperatives has its own supply of banking, education, and technical 
support services. The enormous funds of the central credit union, the 
Caja Laboral Popular, have likewise been crucial to Mondragon’s 
expansion. It proves that if cooperatives have access to credit they 
are perfectly capable of being far more successful than private 
enterprises. 
It’s worth noting, incidentally, that most private corporations are 
fantastically inefficient, although their inefficiency is disguised by 
collusion with the government: 
 
Contrary to their claims of efficiency, most large 
corporations…spend an inordinate portion of society’s 
resources on advertising, executive perks and salaries, 
transportation and communications to far-flung corporate 
empires, and lobbying expenses. Most depend for their 
profits and survival on a complex regime of public subsidies, 
exemptions, and externalized costs, including the indirect 
subsidies they gain when allowed to pay less than a living 
wage, maintain substandard working conditions, market 
hazardous products, dump untreated wastes into the 
environment, and extract natural resources from public lands 
at below-market prices. Ralph Estes…estimates that in 1994 
corporations extracted more than $2.6 trillion a year in such 
subsidies in the United States alone—roughly five times 
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their reported profits… It is one of the basic principles of 
efficient market function that the full costs of a product or 
service be borne by the seller and passed on to the buyer. Yet 
many corporations would be forced to close their doors or 
restructure if they had to bear the true full costs of their 
operations.123 
 
Americans sometimes think of large size almost as an end in 
itself, or at least as necessary for economic efficiency. But this is not 
always the case. In some industries, economies of scale do exist. But 
large size tends to entail bureaucratic inefficiencies, environmental 
destruction, allocative inequalities, political corruption, in general 
significant negative externalities. 124  Consider, by contrast, the 
Emilia-Romagna region of northern Italy, “widely recognized as one 
of the world’s leading examples of a successful cooperative 
economy, with [40 percent] of the region’s GDP deriving from 
cooperative enterprises.”125 The region of four million people, one of 
the richest and most developed areas in Europe despite its poverty 
only a few decades ago, has between 10,000 and 20,000 cooperatives 
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(accounts vary) and 400,000 enterprises, making for a dense network 
of small and medium-sized firms. The major sectors are retail, 
manufacturing, and construction.126 Emilia-Romagna’s success is due 
to the unique structure of its economy, sometimes called the Emilian 
Model: cooperative principles govern “the joint production and 
distribution of goods and services by private firms,” most of which 
are not themselves cooperatives. Highly specialized small firms 
cooperate to produce a given product; most of the firms are 
subcontractors for the one that produces the finished good.127 At the 
same time, Mondragon’s system of “secondary cooperatives,” such 
as the Caja Laboral, that provide support to primary cooperatives has 
been replicated, so that small businesses share “service centers” for 
“research & development, education & training, marketing & 
distribution, financing, technology transfer, workplace safety, 
environmental regulation, and a host of other services that help small 
and medium-sized firms to compete in a global marketplace. …What 
all these centres have in common is that they replicate the advantages 
of large corporate structures for the collection and application of 
global knowledge for production, while maintaining the strengths 
which are unique to small enterprise.”128 Long-term support from the 
historically leftist regional government has been essential to the 
development of the Emilian Model. 
In short, there are many ways in which cooperatives can be made 
to work. Even isolated co-ops can be successful if they have access 
to capital. As we have seen, cooperatives typically fare as well as or 
better than capitalist enterprises in relation to longevity, productivity, 
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wages (sometimes), working conditions, democratic organizational 
structures, the potential for ensuring long-term employment, and 
even profitability (if they have enough capital). Their rarity is due to 
their low rate of formation, which is due in large part to difficulties 
in securing capital, but also to a lack of will or knowledge among the 
populace. People have to be educated on the possibilities open to 
them, shown where to look for resources, how to start a business 
together. Starting a business is hard work; it requires initiative, 
resourcefulness, and intelligence. But it is done all the time, though 
usually by capitalist-minded entrepreneurs; there is no reason to 
think that a small group of cooperators cannot do the same thing, 
especially if assisted by any of the dozens of organizations in the 
U.S. that exist for this purpose. Policy changes would help too—and 
have been forthcoming recently, as when the Small Business 
Administration started providing loans to worker cooperatives. 129 
There is still a long way to go, though, especially considering that 
the hostility of the American government (on federal and state 
levels) as compared to the governments of Italy and France has 
historically been a major impediment to the formation of worker 
cooperatives in the U.S. Even today, the federally chartered National 
Cooperative Bank tends not to lend to worker co-ops. A priority of 
activists should be (and is) to change such policies. In fact, 
governments committed to the reduction of current high rates of 
unemployment would be well-advised to facilitate proactively the 
formation of cooperatives of all kinds. 
In some cases, they are already doing so. Influenced by a 
coalition of community groups, the New York City Council passed a 
historic budget in the summer of 2014 that created a $1.2 million 
fund for the growth of worker-owned cooperatives. Richmond, 
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California has hired a cooperative developer and is launching a loan 
fund; Cleveland, Ohio has been actively involved in starting a 
network of cooperatives, as we’ll see in the next chapter; and 
Jackson, Mississippi elected a mayor (Chokwe Lumumba) in 2013 
on a platform that included the use of public spending to promote co-
ops. On the federal level, progressive politicians like Bernie Sanders 
are working to get the government more involved in supporting 
employee ownership.130 
So there is cause for optimism. Hopefully this chapter has 
convinced skeptical readers that co-ops have great potential, and that 
if they are rare now it is not because of inherent flaws in the model. 
With education, technical support, policy changes, and capital—all 
of which, it is worth remembering, have been crucial to the global 
success of capitalist businesses—cooperativism could be the next 
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WORKER COOPERATIVES IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 
 
Despite its reputation for individualism and unbridled capitalism, 
the United States has a history rich in cooperation and communalism. 
From the colonial era to the present—and among the indigenous 
population for millennia—local communities have engaged in self-
help, democracy, and cooperation. Indeed, the “individualistic” 
tradition might more accurately be called the “self-help” tradition, 
where “self” is defined not only in terms of the individual but in 
terms of the community (be it family, township, religious 
community, etc.). Americans are traditionally hostile to overarching 
authorities separate from the community with which they identify, a 
hostility expressed in the age-old resentment towards both 
government and big business. The stereotype, based on fact, is that 
Americans would rather solve problems on their own than rely on 
political and economic power-structures to do so. The following 
brief survey of the history substantiates this claim. While my focus is 
on worker cooperatives, I will not ignore the many and varied 
experiments in other forms of cooperation and communalism. 
Certain themes and lessons can be gleaned from the history. The 
most obvious is that a profound tension has existed, constantly 
erupting into conflict, between the democratic, anti-authoritarian 
impulses of ordinary Americans and the tendency of economic and 
political power-structures to grow extensively and intensively, to 
concentrate themselves in ever-larger and more centralized units that 
reach as far down into society as possible. Power inherently tries to 
control as much as it can: it has an intrinsic tendency toward 
totalitarianism, ideally letting nothing, even the most trivial social 
interactions, escape its oversight. Bentham’s Panopticon is the 
perfect emblem of the logic of power. Other social forces, notably 
people’s strivings for freedom and democracy, typically keep this 
totalitarian tendency in check. 
In fact, the history of cooperation and communalism is a case-
study in the profound truth that people are instinctively averse to the 
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modes of cutthroat competition, crass greed, authoritarianism, 
hierarchy, and dehumanization that characterize modern capitalism. 
Far from capitalism’s being a straightforward expression of human 
nature, as apologists proclaim, it is more like the very antithesis of 
human nature, which is evidently drawn to such things as free self-
expression, spontaneous “play,” 131  cooperation and friendly 
competition, compassion, love. The work of Marxist historians like 
E. P. Thompson shows how people have had to be disciplined, their 
desires repressed, in order for the capitalist system to seem even 
remotely natural: centuries of indoctrination, state violence, 
incarceration of “undesirables,” the bureaucratization of everyday 
life, have been necessary to partially accustom people to the 
mechanical rhythms of industrial capitalism and the commodification 
of the human personality. 132  And of course resistance continues 
constantly, from the early nineteenth century to the present day. 
“Wage-slavery,” as workers in the nineteenth century called it, is a 
monstrous assault on human dignity, which is why even today, after 
so much indoctrination, people still hate being subordinated to a 
“boss” and rebel against it whenever they can. The history of worker 
cooperatives in particular shows that commitment to the ideals of 
workplace democracy, indeed worker ownership and control, is just 
below the surface of mass consciousness. A spark could light a fire. 
From this history one can draw another lesson, more limited in 
scope: most cooperatives have been formed during economic 
contractions or waves of political and social movements. On the 
other hand, many cooperatives, like all kinds of businesses, have 
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succumbed to economic contractions. The best way to prevent that is 
by building up a thick mesh of institutional networks, cooperative 
federations, and ideologically friendly banks. Fortunately, this is 
happening now. As it continues, moreover, society will no longer 
have to wait for recessions to stimulate the creation of new co-ops; 
they will be born continually around the world, as organizers spread 
the gospel and help provide the capital. Effectively there will be a 
continuous social movement. 
This also suggests that another pitfall of earlier movements has 
finally been overcome: each generation of past cooperators often had 
to begin anew, relearning the lessons of their forebears, because most 
cooperative institutions did not extend sufficiently in time or in 
space. Even if knowledge and capital could be accumulated over 
many years—which they usually could not—the means of 
coordinating a continent-wide movement did not exist. Now they do, 
increasingly so every year. 
More generally, a lesson of the history of radical social 
movements is that advances in freedom or against power-structures 
do not occur as quickly as activists would like or expect them to. 
Radicals in the 1880s, 1910s, 1930s, 1960s, and so on, thought that 
society was on the cusp of a social revolution. Strictly speaking, 
though, society is never on the “cusp” of a social revolution, because 
these things take an inordinate amount of time. I’ll return to this 
subject in the next chapter; suffice it to say that the history of 
cooperativism is an excellent illustration of the slowness of systemic 
change, the necessity for revolutionists to be dedicated to decades of 
slow, patient organizing as opposed to sweeping assaults on the 
fortress of capitalism. To use Antonio Gramsci’s terms, the “war of 
position” is more important than the “war of maneuver” 133 —
precisely because, with regard to a social revolution, the war of 
maneuver should be seen not as separate from and subsequent to the 
war of position, as Gramsci saw it, but as a component in the latter. 
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Radicals should always be testing the strength of reactionary power-
structures, pushing against them directly through political 
“maneuvering” to enact reforms that erode their power and 
conservatism, while at the same time educating and organizing the 
multitudes partly as a basis for these political actions. This is the 
process through which most genuine, long-term progressive 
achievements have been won, as opposed to abortive “revolutions” 
like Lenin’s in 1917 (which led to Stalinism). In the long run, 
Leninist impatience does not work. 
 
Anti-capitalist movements in the U.S. were fitful and sporadic 
prior to the Civil War, although horror at the excesses of early 
industrialism was widespread even among the privileged, and the 
miseries of the lower classes in urban and rural areas fostered a 
seething discontent that exploded in events like the Flour Riot of 
1837, Dorr’s Rebellion in the 1840s, the Anti-Renter movement in 
the Hudson Valley around the same time, innumerable strikes by 
factory workers, and the formation of the world’s first 
Workingmen’s Parties in New York and other states. 134  The 
frequently wretched work conditions of the first half of the 
nineteenth century are well known.135 Less well known are the early, 
tentative experiments in alternative social and economic 
arrangements. In the very early nineteenth century workers 
occasionally formed cooperatives while on strike, or after a strike 
had failed. In Baltimore, a cooperative shoemakers’ manufactory 
was organized in 1794; in 1806, Philadelphia shoemakers organized 
another cooperative manufactory. Such actions became increasingly 
common in the early labor movement, especially among artisans and 
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craftsmen.136 A less oppositional sort of cooperativism was practiced 
by immigrants from Europe, as it would be in later waves of 
immigration as well: they formed communities in cities on the east 
coast in which mutual-aid structures were essential to survival.  
At the same time, communalism of both secular and religious 
varieties was trying to gain a foothold in the U.S. Communalism has 
been a recurring phenomenon in American history, from the early 
seventeenth century to the 1970s and beyond: a group of like-minded 
people get together and establish a community on the fringes of 
American society, away from the capitalist rat-race. Quakers, 
Shakers, Mormons, Rappites, Christian Socialists, and other religious 
groups founded cooperative communities in the late eighteenth 
century and early to mid-nineteenth century, usually with at most a 
few hundred members. Some of them were quite successful, lasting 
decades; others ended after a few years because of personality 
clashes or organizational problems.137 
Secular communalism was not wildly successful either. The 
British businessman Robert Owen came to the U.S. in 1825 to spread 
his new socialist ideas and start experimental communities at New 
Harmony, Indiana and other locations. With 900 people, New 
Harmony did impressively well for a while—so well, in fact, that 
Owen prematurely changed its status and structure into that of a 
commune, with means of survival held in common and remuneration 
based on need rather than work. This enterprise failed miserably: the 
township was too diverse, consisting, as Owen’s son said later, of “a 
heterogeneous collection of radicals, enthusiastic devotees to 
principle, honest latitudinarians, and lazy theorists, with a sprinkling 
of unprincipled sharpers thrown in,” and infighting spelled its doom. 
The whole Owenite movement effectively collapsed in 1828.138 
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A second wave of communalism began in the 1840s, when 
Charles Fourier’s ideas were put to the test. Horace Greeley, a 
disciple of Fourier, summarized these ideas eloquently: 
 
Not through hatred, collision, and depressing 
competition; not through war, whether of nation against 
nation, class against class, or capital against labor; but 
through union, harmony, and the reconciling of all interests, 
the giving scope to all noble sentiments and aspirations, is 
the renovation of the world, the elevation of the degraded 
and suffering masses of mankind, to be sought and 
effected.139 
 
Associationists, as they were called, hoped that “phalanxes,” 
Fourier’s ideal communities, would eventually sprout all over the 
country and transform it from a competitive to a harmonious, 
cooperative society. Owen’s followers had focused on cooperative 
agriculture, but Fourier’s emphasized industry, since times had 
changed since the 1820s. Dozens of phalanxes with at least a 
hundred members each were founded in the eastern half of the 
country. But after a few years the old problems with Owen’s 
movement returned: most poor people couldn’t afford to found 
phalanxes, even after combining their resources, and the phalanxes 
they did form usually remained poor, “strangled by debts they had 
undertaken.” 140  Participants expected the new communities to 
magically solve their economic problems; when they didn’t, and in 
fact added such new stress to life that many people “burned out,” the 
movement lost its vitality and collapsed (after ten years or so). 
Concomitant with Associationism was a renewed union worker 
cooperative movement. After the case Commonwealth v. Hunt, 
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decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1842, established 
that labor unions had the right to exist, unions grew quickly 
throughout the east. Strikes erupted in the late 1840s in response to 
wage cuts brought on by a depression, and cooperatives were formed 
in the wake of these strikes. For instance, the iron molders of 
Cincinnati struck in 1847, lost, and then organized a successful 
cooperative foundry: the 47 members collected $2100 with which to 
buy land, and philanthropists from Cincinnati erected buildings for 
the new business. 141  Unions established cooperatives in many 
states—often as a response to failed strikes—and among such 
diverse groups as glassblowers, cabinetmakers, barrel-makers, 
seamstresses, tailors, and hat-finishers. 142  Europeans who had 
emigrated after the failed revolutions of 1848 also started many 
cooperatives in eastern cities. On the whole, however, this wave of 
cooperativism was over by the mid-1850s, having succumbed to a 
lack of resources and fierce capitalist competition. The depression of 
the mid-1850s also wreaked havoc on cooperatives, and the Civil 
War eliminated most of the few that still remained. 
But before that final catastrophe happened, consumer 
cooperatives made their first major appearance in the U.S., between 
1845 and 1860. In a consumer cooperative, as opposed to a worker 
cooperative, “the customers are the voting members who band 
together to acquire consumer goods directly from producers and 
eliminate the profits of middlemen [i.e., retailers]. The workers in the 
cooperative may or may not be members.”143 Consumer co-ops are 
more capitalistic than worker co-ops in that, while the property is 
collectively owned by consumer-members, managers exist 
(appointed by a board of directors elected by the membership) who 
hire and fire workers as in a capitalist enterprise. Nevertheless, the 
co-op has definite advantages over the private enterprise, not the 
least of which is that it can sell goods more cheaply, at close to cost, 
by eliminating the middleman. This is what the Working Men’s 
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Protective Unions did, approximately 800 of which were established 
in New England and Canada between 1845 and 1860, servicing 
30,000 to 40,000 members and tens of thousands of non-members.144 
The movement was stimulated by the harsh economic climate for 
working people of the 1840s, and also by the energy of radical 
European immigrants who carried the frustrated hopes of the 1848 
revolutions to America. The hundreds of stores provided cooperative 
employment and inexpensive goods, and devoted much of their 
financial surplus to insurance for the aged and the sick. And yet the 
movement lasted only a few years because of the aforementioned 
problems of debt, lack of resources, and economic depressions in the 
1850s. It also fatally incurred the wrath of capitalists for selling 
goods too cheaply: private enterprises used the tactics of price-
slashing and blacklisting to drive the co-ops out of business, after 
which prices were raised again.145 
The Rochdale consumer-cooperative movement in England, 
which began around the same time as the Protective Unions in the 
United States, avoided some of the latter’s mistakes, particularly the 
mistake of selling goods much more cheaply than conventional 
businesses did. Instead, the Rochdale cooperators pioneered a device 
that has been used to great effect ever since: rather than every 
customer’s paying a low price, “regular” prices were charged but 
rebates periodically given to members (greater rebates going to those 
who purchased goods more frequently).146 This mollified capitalist 
competitors. At the same time, the Rochdale group was better able to 
secure financing for its operations by relying not merely on small 
membership fees, as in the Protective Unions, but also on shares of 
equity sold to members, who thereby could earn a fixed dividend of 
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no more than five percent. 147  Another important contribution of 
Rochdale was to formulate concrete principles of cooperation that 
have been embraced by cooperators for 150 years. Among them are 
the following: voluntary and open membership; democratic member 
control; member economic participation, such that capital is 
equitably contributed to the business; autonomy and independence; 
education and training (of members and the general public, to spread 
the ideology of cooperation); cooperation among cooperatives; and 
concern for community. Hundreds more cooperative stores opened in 
America after the Civil War, most of them modeled on the Rochdale 
system rather than the failed Protective Unions. 
It is after the Civil War, during the “second industrial 
revolution,” that the history of cooperativism becomes really 
exciting, full of promise and tragedy. Organizations like the National 
Labor Union, the Sovereigns of Industry, the Knights of St. Crispin, 
and the Knights of Labor enthusiastically supported cooperation and 
proselytized for it. Around the time of labor’s Great Upheaval (the 
late 1870s and 1880s), thousands of cooperative stores and 
workshops were born around the country, especially in the east. 
Hundreds of thousands of laborers and artisans had faith in 
cooperation—at least in the long run—as an escape from industrial 
misery, low wages, and periodic unemployment, hoping to mold 
society anew in the image of a “republic of labor,” which would be a 
continuation and fulfillment of the Founding Fathers’ republican 
political vision. Labor reformers thought that in order for liberty, 
equal rights, and the pursuit of happiness to flourish, social 
conditions would have to be revolutionized: cooperation would have 
to supersede “wage-slavery,” so that economic reality could be made 
consistent with America’s democratic form of government. “The 
principles of Co-operation,” wrote a reformer in the late 1860s, “are 
more in harmony with the principles of our form of government than 
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our present social system.”148 The dream of this cooperative utopia 
inspired reformers for decades. 
For example, in the late 1860s the newly formed National Labor 
Union, a loose federation that had over 300,000 members before it 
collapsed in 1873, endorsed cooperation and sponsored the creation 
of many cooperatives. William Sylvis, its president, declared that 
“Of all the questions now before us, not one is of so great 
importance, or should command so large a portion of our 
consideration, as co-operation… Co-operation is the only true 
remedy for low wages, strikes, lock-outs, and a thousand other 
impositions and annoyances to which workingmen are subjected.”149 
The NLU even petitioned Congress to spend $25 million on 
establishing cooperatives. Many local unions in New England 
organized co-ops to support strikes or in the case of a lockout, but 
continued to operate them after the strike or lockout had ended. For 
instance, between 1866 and 1876, iron molders established at least 
36 foundries and shoemakers at least 40 workshops, most of which 
were responses to failed strikes or lockouts. In fact, nearly all the 
important trades assayed cooperation in the years after the Civil War, 
including bakers, coach-makers, coal miners, shipwrights, 
machinists, blacksmiths, plumbers, tailors, printers, and many 
others.150 
The Knights of St. Crispin, a shoemakers’ union (excluding 
unskilled labor) that was founded in 1867, were equally zealous in 
their propagandizing for cooperative work. They were among the 
most powerful unions in the world: with over 50,000 members, by 
December, 1870 they had scores of lodges in Massachusetts, New 
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York, New Hampshire, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Indiana, 
Wisconsin, New Jersey, and California. Like other national unions of 
the period they were decentralized, and so they mostly left it to the 
initiative of local branches to found co-ops. But it was recommended 
that every lodge consider starting a cooperative workshop and a 
store. In Massachusetts, by 1869 the Crispins had organized between 
30 and 40 cooperative stores; in the following years they organized 
workshops in New England, New York, New Jersey, and other 
states.151 The Crispins disappeared in the late 1870s, but the Knights 
of Labor would go on to form cooperative shoe shops in the 1880s.152 
The methods of financing and organizing all these workshops 
and stores varied. Since the labor movement was highly 
decentralized at the time, the initiative usually lay with the local 
branches of unions. These comprised mostly skilled workers and 
craftsmen hostile to unskilled labor and the development of industry 
because it threatened to deprive them of their livelihood and the 
pride they took in their work. (Mass unionization of “unskilled” 
workers did not come into its own until the late 1930s, with the 
founding of the CIO. Craft unions, organized by occupation rather 
than industry, were the norm at the end of the nineteenth century.)  
So how did these craftworkers start all their co-ops? The main 
obstacle was and is the need for capital. One common tactic was to 
require workers to purchase shares of stock, which would earn a 
small dividend. Perhaps after a failed strike at a capitalist business, a 
dozen carpenters in a union would get together and decide to form a 
co-op. Often they wrote letters for advice to labor leaders like 
William Sylvis, John Samuel, and Thomas Phillips, inquiring, for 
example, as to whether it was better to distribute profits on the basis 
of shares owned or of labor performed. They might start a retail store 
as a way to accumulate capital for production. In the 1880s, local and 
district assemblies of the Knights of Labor oversaw the creation of 
cooperative businesses, and it became common practice to open a 
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store first. Victor Drury, a French immigrant influential in the labor 
movement, recommended that products be sold in the store at 
slightly above cost, only until 
 
we could sell at cost those commodities which we should 
produce ourselves as soon as we begin to manufacture. So 
soon as we could find sale for sufficient of the products of 
any of the industries we have mentioned to employ a few 
producers, we should establish a workshop or centre of 
production. For instance, if we sold sufficient bread and 
pastry to employ four or five bakers, we should immediately 
establish a bakery… We should then call upon the Trades’ 
Unions to furnish us with the most skilled and capable men 
in their special industries to direct these centres of 
production.153 
 
Drury was a member of the Knights of Labor’s District 
Assembly 49 in New York, which organized many cooperatives that 
were managed by a designated committee. It sold shares in an 
organization called the Solidarity Co-operative Association, which 
invested over $6000 in various enterprises. No interest was paid to 
the shareholders, nor did they have any control over the management 
of the firms; instead, the association would buy back the shares later 
and reinvest 50 percent of its profits in cooperation. By 1887, the 
Solidarity Association was running eight businesses, one of which 
had capital of $67,000 and employed over 100 workers.154 
Most of the cooperative businesses of the 1860s and 1870s—like 
many private enterprises—succumbed to one of the several 
depressions that rocked the nation in those decades, such as the 
severe slump of 1873. But the Knights of Labor picked up where the 
National Labor Union and the Sovereigns of Industry (among other 
                                                 
153  Victor Drury, The Polity of the Labor Movement (Philadelphia: 
Frederick Turner, 1885), 61, 62. 
154 Leikin, The Practical Utopians, 83. 
HISTORY AND POSSIBILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
83 
groups) had left off, and it was in the 1880s that cooperativism had 
its greatest successes.  
The Knights of Labor originated in the late 1860s and early 
1870s in Philadelphia, but slowly expanded into the rest of 
Pennsylvania and finally became a national organization with 
750,000 members. It encompassed many trade unions and was 
organized geographically rather than by occupation. “The Knights 
attempted to organize all American productive workers into ‘one big 
union’ regardless of skill, trade, industry, race or sex and were 
divided into local, district and national assemblies, with a centralized 
structure”155—although substantial autonomy was granted to local 
assemblies, which took the initiative in establishing hundreds of 
cooperative stores and factories. The national leadership was less 
energetic on this score than local leadership. The overarching 
purpose of the organization was, as its longtime leader Terence 
Powderly said, “to associate our own labors; to establish co-
operative institutions such as will tend to supersede the wage-system, 
by the introduction of a co-operative industrial system.”156 To this 
end, the Knights lobbied politically, engaged in numerous strikes, 
lent their support to other radical social movements, and, of course, 
organized co-ops. Masses of workers genuinely believed that they 
could rise from being “rented slaves” to become cooperators in 
control of their work and wages, living in revitalized and stabilized 
communities, no longer subject to periods of unemployment. 
Cooperation was a religion for some of them. 
In 1880 the delegates to the General Assembly of the Knights of 
Labor earmarked 60 percent of regular dues for cooperatives; in the 
following years they also levied a compulsory monthly tax on 
members and subsequently a voluntary one. But in 1884 the 
Cooperative Fund was still only $974.52.157 On the other hand, the 
national leadership was willing to spend $20,000 over several years 
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to support a coal mine that had been started by eight miners in 1883 
after they leased a forty-acre plot. They ran into financial troubles 
and appealed to the Knights’ Executive Board, with the result that 
this Indiana mine became the first major production cooperative to 
be run directly by the central organization. As John Curl states, “the 
Knights intended the mine to be the first link in the economic 
backbone of the new society they planned to build.”158 However, 
after buying the land, equipping the mine, and laying railroad tracks 
to it, the Knights discovered that the railroad company would not 
connect their switch to the main track for nine months. Later they 
found out that they would have to provide their own switch engine, 
which they could not afford. Such problems accumulated, and in the 
end the Knights leased the mine and finally sold it. 
As already noted, more successful than these centralized efforts 
were the hundreds of projects initiated by local assemblies or unions. 
Minneapolis in the 1880s was a particularly exciting place for 
cooperators, who were running 35 or 40 businesses.159 There were 
eight cooperative barrel factories, eight building-and-loan 
associations, two print shops, and one grocery store, shirt factory, 
house construction company, library, cigar factory, dry-goods store, 
laundry, and a 250-acre cooperative colony miles from the city. Most 
of these businesses were started between 1882 and 1886, when the 
Knights had a strong presence in the city, though some of the barrel-
making factories dated from the ’70s. These came to dominate the 
city’s barrel industry; in 1887 they grossed over a million dollars’ 
worth of business and employed 368 journeymen-owners out of 593 
coopers in the city. Evidently their methods of capitalization served 
them well: each of the sixteen original members of the first factory 
(in 1874) bought a $15-share initially and paid $5 to the business 
every week thereafter, which eventually allowed them to buy a shop 
near the railroad. New members had to buy shares, which they could 
purchase from departing members (if there were any). Through these 
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simple means, and the high demand for barrels among millers, the 
business was able to expand and spawn others, until a veritable 
cooperative community developed that maintained admirable 
cohesiveness despite the mixture of ethnicities—German, Swedish, 
Norwegian, Irish, Italian, and American.  
It’s worth quoting Albert Shaw, a nineteenth-century historian, 
on the salutary effects of cooperation among the Minneapolis 
coopers: 
 
Coöperation has developed business capacity in the men 
which they were not aware of possessing because they had 
never tested it. The conduct of the shops from the 
governmental point of view may well encourage one’s belief 
in democracy. Sound judgment almost invariably prevails… 
Dissension is almost unknown. Differences of opinion are 
not infrequent, but the will of the majority is acquiesced in 
without strain… The coopers themselves are emphatic in 
saying that the moral effects of their coöperative movement 
constitute its highest success. It has unquestionably wrought 
a transformation in the character of these craftsmen. They 
are no longer a drunken, disreputable guild, figuring in the 
police courts and deserving the disfavor of the community. 
They have become a responsible and respectable class of 
citizens…160 
 
The key to their economic success, of course, was institutional 
support. This is always essential to the success of any oppositional 
movement. A rich network of mutually supporting institutions is 
necessary, helping each other with finances, publicity, organizational 
and recruiting work, “moral support,” etc. It is necessary to build a 
genuine community outside the mainstream. The Minneapolis 
coopers had this community, as testified by Shaw: 
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In Minneapolis there are men who are earning their 
living in a cooperative cooper shop, paying for their home 
through a cooperative building and loan association, buying 
their groceries at a cooperative store, and having their 
washing done in a cooperative laundry. Some of them 
perchance enjoy the advantages of membership in a 
cooperative neighborhood improvement association, obtain 
books and magazines from a cooperative reading club or 
library association, and so on. Many of them belong to 
societies and orders which have as their most practical 
feature a system of cooperative life and accident 
insurance.161 
 
However, the experience of the cooperative coopers is 
illuminating also with regard to the challenges they faced. For 
example, they had an ambivalent relationship with the labor 
movement and the Knights of Labor. On the one hand, the Knights 
provided institutional support and leadership. Indeed, the main 
reason cooperation failed in Minneapolis after 1887 was the 
organizational decline of the Knights. 162  On the other hand, the 
cooperators were running a business and so did not always have the 
same interests as the journeymen coopers, the wage-laborers, who 
were employed in conventional workshops with bosses. At times 
they acted in solidarity with their fellow workers, while at other 
times their business interests put them at odds with the labor 
movement. Some of the cooperators even hired journeymen and 
machine operators in their shops and so became employers 
themselves. The Knights actually expelled the members of one co-op 
from the local Assembly for acting too independently vis-à-vis 
ordinary workers. Such conflicts are, as we saw in the last chapter, 
always a possibility given the ambiguous nature of the worker 
cooperative.163 
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As the Knights expanded over the continent—especially after 
1885, when they won a major nationwide strike against Jay Gould’s 
railroad company—worker cooperatives followed in their wake, at 
least 334 of them between 1880 and 1888 (according to one 
study), 164  in 35 of the 38 states. Many were a response to the 
depression of 1883–85, when wages were cut an average 15 percent, 
causing workers to look to other sources for income. 165  The 
businesses they started were not “factories” as we understand the 
term, with its connotations of mass production and assembly-line 
workers, but rather workshops in which skilled craftsmen or semi-
skilled workers supervised themselves and each other, sometimes 
with an almost obsessive concern for democratic procedures. The 
minutes of general meetings attest to this preoccupation with 
democracy, given the insistence on having formal votes on almost 
every conceivable matter.166 Workers were always very reluctant to 
fire a fellow worker, and it seems to have happened in only the most 
exceptional cases.  
Indeed, aside from their predictable sexism and racism, the 
attitudes and behavior of cooperators in the Gilded Age seem not to 
have differed substantially from those of cooperators eighty or a 
hundred years later, at least with respect to relationships in the 
workplace itself. There was the same emphasis on freedom and 
democracy, on realizing the inherent dignity of work, and the same 
struggle to reconcile cooperative ideals with the pressures of the 
market and hostility of conventional businesses. There was also a 
progressive desire to organize women, or for women to organize 
themselves: in Chicago, for example, women in the Knights of Labor 
organized twenty cooperatives in the clothing industry. Forty women 
established one such co-op after being locked out by their employer; 
they bought shares of stock for ten dollars each, distributed the 
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profits equally among the workforce, and worked only eight hours a 
day.167 
There were, however, major differences between the respective 
upsurges of cooperativism in the 1880s and the 1960s, centered 
around the fact that the earlier one was part of a broad-based labor 
movement, unlike the later. Thus, the skilled and semi-skilled 
cooperators during the 1870s and 1880s explicitly used cooperatives 
as a way to guarantee employment, and arguably they were more 
ambitious, with their revolutionary hopes for a cooperative 
commonwealth. Their ideology, of course, was not the educated 
middle-class countercultural and anti-authoritarian one of the 1960s’ 
youth movements but “laborist,” “producerist,” devoted to the 
Jeffersonian ideal of a republic of free laborers, mostly artisans and 
craftsmen. Some scholars have argued that this fact proves the 
Knights of Labor were “backward-looking” rather than truly 
revolutionary—that the future lay in mass production, not skilled 
labor or artisanry168—but this criticism seems partly off the mark. It 
is true that the Knights were hostile to mechanization, just as 
workers have been in the era of the AFL-CIO, because in both cases 
it threatened to put them out of a job or to result in the lowering of 
wages and the deskilling of work. If this aversion to the degradation 
and mechanization of work is reactionary, so be it. But it is also a 
source of such revolutionary demands as democratization of 
production relations, cooperative organization of the economy, 
public ownership of industry, destruction of the capitalist class and 
its frequent tool the state, and other hopes cherished by millions of 
workers in the late nineteenth century. 
                                                 
167 James Green, Death in the Haymarket (New York: Pantheon Books, 
2006), 152. 
168 Needless to say, it is a caricature of the Knights’ position to say they 
wanted an economy entirely of small artisanal workshops and small 
producers. Rather, they desired public control of transportation and 
communication systems and cooperative administration of mines and other 
massive industrial facilities.  
HISTORY AND POSSIBILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
89 
In reality, the Knights of Labor were radical and conservative at 
the same time. They were genuinely progressive in their political 
positions, such as abolition of child labor, support for the eight-hour 
day, advocacy of public ownership of the railroads, water systems 
and utilities, support for the women’s movement and “equal pay for 
equal work,” attempt to organize all workers into “one big union,” 
and so forth. They were conservative insofar as they still exalted the 
ethos of artisanry and rejected, in their prescriptions for a future 
economic system, nationwide socialist institution-building, 
something like the plan put forward by Henry Sharpe when he was 
president of the Knights of Labor’s Cooperative Board in the mid-
1880s. He saw that large-scale and long-term cooperativism could 
not work as long as co-ops remained isolated units in a market 
economy. Dependence on wages could not be superseded that way; 
competition would always remain a fact of life, as would, therefore, 
the downward pressures on wages, the necessity to mechanize and 
expand, the subjection to the business cycle, etc. Instead, the Knights 
of Labor had to create their own self-sufficient world of 
cooperation—“a great industrial union, self-employing, self-
sustaining, self-governing.” The members, he said,  
 
should be taught to look upon themselves as a “people,” or, 
so to speak, as a nation, and the legislative, the executive, the 
judiciary, the industrial, the police, the insurance, the 
educational and the charities departments should all be well 
defined, properly officered and actively employed. It is high 
time that members be found whose special aptitudes incline 
them toward one or the other of the departments, and who, 
finding therein a field for their activities, develop their 
aptitudes still further and become specialists. 
 
In effect, he was advocating state socialism. While his vision 
was impracticable and arguably morally objectionable, it had at least 
one virtue: as Steven Leikin says, it accepted “the organizational 
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realities of the new industrial economy.” 169  It anticipated the 
elaborate bureaucratic structures of the twentieth-century state, and 
hence was in no sense “conservative” or “reactionary.” But the 
Knights refused to take cooperation to these limits. They would not 
consent even to compulsory taxes, much less to Sharpe’s vision of 
centralized authority. Insofar, therefore, as they desired a cooperative 
society but would not make an all-out assault on capitalism or 
commit to building a network of alternative economic institutions, 
they can perhaps be called unrealistic and conservative. Similarly, 
inasmuch as bureaucracy, statism, and mass production represented 
“progress,” the Knights, like anarchists and left-Marxists, were 
indeed ambivalent towards progress. 
As it turned out, Sharpe was right. Cooperation succumbed to 
market forces, but even more to the war waged on it by the business 
classes. By 1887 the latter were determined to destroy the Knights, 
with their incessant boycotts, their strikes (sometimes involving 
hundreds of thousands), their revolutionary agitation, and their labor 
parties organized across the country. In the two years after the 
infamous Haymarket bombing in Chicago and the Great Upheaval of 
1886, in which 200,000 trade unionists across the country went on a 
four-day-long strike for the eight-hour day but in most cases failed—
partly because Terence Powderly, the leader of the Knights, who had 
always disliked strikes, refused to endorse the action and encouraged 
the Knights not to participate—capitalist repression swept the nation. 
Joseph Rayback summarizes: 
 
The first of the Knights’ ventures to feel the full effect of 
the post-Haymarket reaction were their cooperative 
enterprises. In part the very nature of such enterprises 
worked against them. The successful ventures became joint-
stock corporations, the wage-earning shareholders and 
managers hiring labor like any other industrial unit. In part 
the cooperatives were destroyed by inefficient managers, 
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squabbles among shareholders, lack of capital, and 
injudicious borrowing of money at high rates of interest. Just 
as important was the attitude of competitors. Railroads 
delayed the building of tracks, refused to furnish cars, or 
refused to haul them. Manufacturers of machinery and 
producers of raw materials, pressed by private business, 
refused to sell their products to the cooperative workshops 
and paralyzed operations. By 1888 none of the Order’s 
cooperatives were in existence.170 
 
Thus, by 1888 it had become evident that a national cooperative 
movement could not succeed in America, at least not in the absence 
of sustained, massive and violent attack on the wage-system, far 
more massive and well-organized than the Knights’ movement had 
been. As Henry Sharpe said, what they were doing was not realistic. 
Small workshops with little capital and obsolete machinery in an age 
of rapid industrialization; insufficient institution-building to give 
financial and material support to co-ops; enslavement to the market 
at a time when competitors would stop at nothing to suppress 
working-class moves toward independence. Especially with the weak 
leadership of Terence Powderly and the mass desertion of former 
Knights after 1886, as they lost strike after strike, the great dream of 
building a national cooperative economy was effectively over. 
Farmers in the South, West, and Midwest, however, were still 
building a major movement to escape from the control of banks and 
merchants lending them supplies at usurious rates; agricultural 
cooperatives—cooperative buying of supplies and machinery and 
marketing of produce—as well as cooperative stores, were the 
remedy to these conditions of virtual serfdom. While the movement 
was not dedicated to the formation of worker co-ops, in its own way 
it was at least as ambitious as the Knights of Labor had been. In the 
late 1880s and early 1890s it swept through southern and western 
states like a brushfire, even, in some places, bringing black and white 
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farmers together in a unity of interest. Eventually this Farmers’ 
Alliance decided it had to enter politics in order to break the power 
of the banks; it formed a third party, the People’s Party, in 1892. The 
great depression of 1893 only spurred the movement on, and it won 
governorships in Kansas and Colorado. But in 1896 its leaders made 
a terrible strategic blunder in allying themselves with William 
Jennings Bryan of the Democratic party in his campaign for 
president. Bryan lost the election, and Populism lost its independent 
identity. The party fell apart; the Farmers’ Alliance collapsed; the 
movement died, and many of its cooperative associations 
disappeared. Thus, once again, the capitalists had managed to stomp 
out a threat to their rule.171 
They were unable to get rid of all agricultural cooperatives, 
however, even with the help of the Sherman “Anti-Trust” Act of 
1890.172 Nor, in fact, did big business desire to combat many of them, 
for instance the independent co-ops that coordinated buying and 
selling. Small farmers needed cooperatives in order to survive, 
whether their co-ops were independent or were affiliated with a 
movement like the Farmers’ Alliance or the Grange. The 
independent co-ops, moreover, were not necessarily opposed to the 
capitalist system, fitting into it quite well by cooperatively buying 
and selling, marketing, and reducing production costs. By 1921 there 
were 7374 agricultural co-ops, most of them in regional federations. 
According to the census of 1919, over 600,000 farmers were 
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engaged in cooperative marketing or purchasing—and these figures 
did not include the many farmers who obtained insurance, irrigation, 
telephone, or other business services from cooperatives.173  
From the 1890s to the 1920s, cooperation had its home mainly in 
the agricultural sector. The sheer number of regional and national 
organizations devoted to cooperation in agriculture testifies to this. 
There was the National Farmers Union, the American Society of 
Equity, the Non-Partisan League in North Dakota, the Farmer-Labor 
Exchange, the Farmers’ Equity Union, the National Grange, Farm 
Bureaus all over the country—which in 1920 led to the American 
Farm Bureau Federation—to educate farmers on business methods 
and cooperation, many regional associations such as the California 
Fruit Growers Exchange (which became Sunkist), the California 
Associated Raisin Growers (now called Sunmaid), and the Missouri 
Farmers Association, and in the 1920s there emerged a variety of 
Communist farm organizations. Many of these associations had the 
financial and political support of the federal government, state 
governments, and business groups, who recognized that the 
atomistic, competitive model of classical capitalism was 
inappropriate to agriculture.174 The passage of the Capper-Volstead 
Act in 1922 was of great importance for marketing co-ops, since it 
determined that they did not violate the Sherman Act’s prohibition of 
organizations in restraint of trade. Because of this exemption, 
marketing co-ops no longer had to worry about the sort of legal 
harassment they had endured for years.175 
Consumer cooperativism, however—not to mention worker 
cooperativism—was not having much success around the turn of the 
century. In 1896 the American Federation of Labor decided to 
support consumer co-ops, but they did not become a priority of the 
labor movement. Many immigrant groups ran co-ops in the East and 
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Midwest, and in the West there were several thriving associations, 
such as the Pacific Cooperative League, the Pacific Coast 
Cooperative Union, and the California Rochdale Company; but aside 
from these Western movements, and some Midwestern federations, 
there was little coordination or communication between co-ops.176 
The Cooperative League of America was founded in 1916 with the 
mission of coordinating consumer cooperativism (although 
eventually it expanded its activities to apply to all co-ops). It joined 
the International Cooperative Alliance in 1917, and it exists today as 
the National Cooperative Business Association. 
From the 1890s to the 1930s, worker cooperatives were almost 
entirely ignored by the labor movement. Neither the AFL nor the 
IWW had much interest in them; nor did the Socialist or the 
Communist Parties, nor even the Cooperative League. Labor 
activists seem to have learned their lesson from the fate of the 1880s’ 
co-ops. Not until the Great Depression and its self-help movement 
would there be a resurgence of a type of producer cooperativism, and 
this time the movement would be even more spontaneous and 
decentralized than it had been under the Knights of Labor. Consumer 
co-ops, too, would make a comeback; they had not fared well during 
the 1920s. 
The self-help cooperative movement, which flourished between 
1931 and 1935 but lasted in some form until 1938, originated not in 
production but barter. It involved the exchange of goods and 
services, with cooperators sometimes performing labor services on 
farms in exchange for meals. Productive associations, vaguely 
similar to worker co-ops, arose after 1934, oriented around such 
activities as butchering, plumbing, flour milling, logging and 
sawmilling, carpentry, dentistry, printing, coal mining, shoe-
repairing, etc. Over the course of the movement, more than half a 
million families were affiliated with 600 self-help organizations in 
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37 states; about 250 of these were productive associations.177 The 
cooperatives thrived particularly around Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
Seattle, Salt Lake City, Denver, and Minneapolis.178 
The production cooperatives differed in at least one crucial 
respect from ordinary worker co-ops: they relied heavily on 
government funding and government assistance—$4,730,000 worth 
of funding. In 1933 a Division of Self-Help Cooperatives was set up 
in the Federal Emergency Relief Administration to administer the 
grants and set the rules that cooperatives receiving money would 
have to follow. One significant rule stated that no cooperatively 
produced goods could be sold on the open market. “In effect, a self-
help economy was created which functioned separately from the 
open-market economy. These rules reflected the government’s desire 
to allow the cooperative sector to operate as long as the free market 
was not disturbed.”179  Evidently the government was comfortable 
with cooperatives insofar as they had a stabilizing influence on 
society and would provide a safe outlet for discontent. 
The economic performance of the co-ops was not quite stellar, 
but it was not shabby either. Many or most of the workers were in 
their fifties or older—people who had particular difficulty finding 
employment—and so were less productive than the average 
employee in a comparable capitalist business. The cooperatives 
tended to be relatively small, and grew but slowly. They were, 
however, a very cost-effective way for the government to provide 
relief to the unemployed, because it seems that, had these co-ops not 
existed, the government would have spent far more on relief than it 
did. (Families who were eligible for relief did not apply for it, 
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instead relying on their cooperative income.) In addition, they 
provided a useful service as “rehabilitation” for the unemployed, 
who derived psychological benefits from working when otherwise 
they would have been idle and discouraged. Therefore, whatever one 
thinks of the government’s motives in supporting the co-ops, and 
their systemically stabilizing effects, it can hardly be denied that they 
performed a valuable function for the families affected. 
In the end, the main lesson of the self-help co-ops may be that 
government assistance can be of great use to cooperators and societal 
innovators, but they should be careful not to become too dependent 
on it. For then they are subject to the whims of bureaucrats, 
policymakers, and politicians, who may withdraw legislative and 
financial assistance if the political winds change. Government 
funding of self-help was not guaranteed and policies changed 
erratically, not always to the benefit of the co-ops. In any case, the 
movement lost much of its momentum after the Works Progress 
Administration was set up in 1935, providing employment for 
millions and thus obviating the need for the cooperatives. 
The government also promoted cooperatives under the aegis of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority, in the mid- to late 1930s. As is well 
known, the TVA was conceived as a grand experiment in social 
reconstruction. It turned out to be quite successful, in no small part 
because of the fertilizer and electric cooperatives that the 
government helped set up. Indeed, the TVA served as the “incubator 
of the federally promoted and financed rural electrification program” 
that began in 1935, when only ten percent of the country’s farms 
were electrified. Dozens of electrical power cooperatives had already 
been set up in the Midwest between 1914 and 1930, but it was only 
with the Rural Electrification Administration that the problem was 
tackled on a large scale. In December 1935, 789,000 farms were 
being served by public and private utility systems; five years later, 
largely as a result of the REA, the number was 1,871,942. By 1940 
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more than half of rural America was still not electrified, but in the 
coming decades the job was completed.180 
Agricultural cooperation thrived during the 1930s, again due to 
New Deal initiatives. In 1933 the Farm Credit Administration set up 
Banks for Cooperatives, a program that created a central bank and 
twelve district banks; it “became a member-controlled system of 
financing farmer cooperatives, as well as telephone and electric 
cooperatives.”181 For the rest of the century, Banks for Cooperatives 
would prove an invaluable resource. Already by 1939 its financial 
assistance made it possible for half the farmers in the United States 
to belong to cooperatives. 
With World War II and the end of the New Deal, and especially 
in conservative postwar America, cooperation in all spheres but 
agriculture plummeted. The political left went off to fight Hitler as 
the center gained control of the government and many unions. After 
the war the CIO was purged of Communists, dealing a huge blow to 
the labor movement. Through reactionary legislation like the Taft-
Hartley Act, military and police violence against unions, imperialist 
foreign policy, so-called “McCarthyite” fear-mongering, massive 
propaganda campaigns, and other such devices that created a center-
right consensus in the 1950s, the labor and cooperative movements 
were severely damaged. It was essentially a war of big business and 
conservative Republicans against the social and political legacy of 
New Deal America, a war in which centrist politicians and even 
liberal Democrats were complicit, due in large part to the supposed 
exigencies of the Cold War.182 
Nevertheless, all was not quiet on the worker-cooperative front. 
In Washington and Oregon a number of large cooperatives had been 
and were still being organized; these were the plywood co-ops 
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discussed in the last chapter. They would go on to become the 
longest-lived cluster of cooperatives in the United States, lasting 
from the 1920s to the early 2000s (although dwindling in later 
years). The first one was called Olympia Veneer, organized in 1921: 
a bank loan of $25,000 was secured, and 125 shares of equity were 
sold at $1000 each to loggers, carpenters, and mechanics, in order to 
finance construction. The business did well, and shares were sold at a 
high price to outsiders. Soon the worker-owners were earning one-
and-a-half times the pay of employees in conventional enterprises, 
due to their higher productivity. Over time the co-op degenerated 
into something like a capitalist corporation, since non-member 
employees were hired and non-workers could buy shares. By 1952, a 
thousand non-owners were employed and the original plant had been 
sold to a conventional lumber company; in 1954 Olympia was sold 
to U.S. Plywood Corporation.183 
More plywood co-ops were formed just before World War II, 
and 21 were organized between 1949 and 1956. Over the course of 
their lifetime, the size of their workforces would be between 60 and 
500. In the 1940s and ’50s the cooperatives accounted for 20 to 25 
percent of total production capacity in the industry; in later decades 
their relative share declined as many more conventional firms were 
created and almost no new co-ops. On the whole, though, they 
continued to perform very well, as well as or better than their 
conventional competitors even during severe slumps in the industry. 
Their decline in the 1990s did not reflect problems with their 
cooperative organization but rather the overall decline of the regional 
industry. Conventional mills succumbed too.184 
 Why were the plywood co-ops so successful? One reason is that 
they were formed in the growth period of a major new industry.185 As 
stated above, the cultural origins of the cooperators surely played a 
role too: the Scandinavian people—who settled the Pacific 
Northwest—have traditionally sought cooperative solutions to 
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problems. Also, the region had already had much experience with 
consumers’ and producers’ co-ops. These last two reasons point to 
the importance of a “collective memory,” a cultural memory, to the 
resilience of an oppositional culture. 186  Examples are legion: the 
Knights of Labor was defending an artisanal, pre-industrial, 
Jeffersonian-republican ethos; the Italian working-class anarchists in 
Northeast urban communities at the turn of the twentieth century had 
recently emigrated from rural areas in Italy with rich communal 
traditions they carried over to the New World, and which served as a 
foundation for radical opposition to industrial capitalism;187 in the 
1960s, SNCC had success organizing a civil rights movement in the 
South because it tapped into local traditions of participatory 
democracy, religion, empowerment through music and ritual, and 
small-town mutual respect and dialogue. 188  Even in the 1990s, 
Mayans in North Carolina who had recently emigrated from 
Guatemala waged a long battle against their employer Case Farms, 
nourished and encouraged by their collective memories of rural 
community, mutualism, agricultural cooperation, and immersion in 
the Catholic church. 189  All these dissidents derived their strength 
from the “radicalism of tradition” as it came into conflict with 
industrial society.190 
That fact would seem to have a discouraging implication with 
respect to the viability of contemporary and future struggles against 
capitalism, namely that they will not be very “resilient” because, in 
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many parts of the world, the possibility no longer exists of grounding 
them in “tradition,” a “collective memory,” “precipitates of past 
historical experience.”191 These precipitates, after all, have largely 
been erased by late capitalism. However, I think the conclusion is 
unwarranted. As will be evident from the following chapter, I think a 
good way to conceptualize radical movements is by dividing them 
into those that proceed in large part from the “radicalism of 
tradition” and those that do not obviously draw sustenance from past 
historical experience but instead grow out of mature capitalism itself. 
These two categories are of course merely ideal-types, and actual 
social movements might not always fall clearly under one or the 
other. But examples of the “non-traditional” kind of movement 
would be the anti-war, the feminist, the environmental, and the Black 
Power movements of the late 1960s. Currently, the vast global 
movement symbolized by the World Social Forum is, on the whole, a 
clear case of the “mature” sort of anti-capitalist radicalism, the 
unequivocally progressive sort (as opposed, for instance, to the 
Knights of Labor, which was in some respects reactionary). These 
latter-day movements have been quite resilient, some lasting decades 
and instigating major changes in culture and politics. 
Karl Marx had little to say about the traditional, “primitive” sort 
of radicalism,192 and in fact the utilitarian, Enlightenment-derived, 
rationalistic and economistic bias of Marxism makes this theory not 
a wholly adequate framework for understanding them. At least as a 
sweeping theory, historical materialism tends to downplay the 
significance of “culture” and cultural residues, just as it has little 
interest in the psychological motivations that actually guide actors, 
emphasizing instead the latters’ structural locations in the economy 
and the utilitarian interests that these locations dispose them to 
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pursue. 193  This framework has its deficiencies, but it is more 
appropriate to the analysis of “modern” radical movements than 
“archaic” ones. In particular, it is a powerful tool for interpreting, 
first, “modern” struggles between capital and labor, with regard to 
which considerations of culture and tradition are decidedly 
subordinate to the objective facts of structural location, 194  and 
second, the future evolutionary transition to a post-capitalist society. 
It is precisely the latter that Marx intended his theory to explain. 
Archaic cultural residues will be less relevant to this evolution, 
which, if it happens, will be propelled overwhelmingly by the 
economic conditions of late capitalism. 
In another sense, however, “collective memory” has always been 
and will always be essential to every oppositional movement, 
inasmuch as the movement has to educate itself, remember its past 
experiences and learn from them, maintain and expand on its 
institutional innovations, build up economic, social, and cultural 
bases of resistance. The plywood cooperators came from a 
subculture that had already experimented with consumers’ and 
producers’ co-ops, which made their new venture that much easier. 
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Another reason for their success is that the first few co-ops provided 
a “template” that later organizers could use. This, too, is an 
important lesson for contemporary cooperators. 
Another lesson lies in the fate of many of these cooperatives: due 
in large part to their success, they degenerated into semi-capitalist 
corporations. Some of them were actually sold to conventional 
enterprises, but apparently all of them used hired, non-member labor 
much of the time. As stated in chapter two, they did not want to 
increase the number of worker-owners by creating new shares, 
because that would have entailed a loss of income for the current 
members. So the firms that wanted to expand simply hired 
employees who were not allowed to participate in decision-making 
and had vulnerable, often temporary jobs. They were effectively 
second-class citizens in the plants—and they sometimes constituted 
almost 50 percent of the workforce. This clearly interfered with a 
culture of cooperation. In fact, what sometimes happened was that 
when a member retired, his share was not sold to a new worker but 
instead bought back by the firm, so that each member would have a 
somewhat higher annual income. The result was that the 
membership, i.e., the class of owners, gradually shrank as the class 
of hired labor expanded. For example, during the first five years of 
Olympia’s operation (1923 to 1928), 100 non-members were hired, 
as the number of worker-owners dropped from 118 to 92.195 
This capitalist mentality was evidenced also in the fact that these 
co-ops did not participate in cooperative social movements and were 
formed purely for the sake of providing employment to members. 
They had no strong ideological commitment to cooperation; they 
rarely even linked up with one another for political, economic or 
ideological reasons. Each enterprise was simply “one big family” 
(with the exception of the hired labor) united against a hostile outside 
world.196 As mentioned earlier, therefore, it is important that co-ops 
maintain a connection with social movements if their cooperative 
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identity is not to erode. No great social change will happen if 
cooperatives simply speckle the economic landscape atomistically, 
even if there are quite a few of them; they have to actively spread 
their ideology, spawn new co-ops, maintain ties with the labor 
movement, fundraise continually, help agitate politically for grants 
and favorable legislation, look to progressive social experiments 
being undertaken in other parts of the world and learn from them or 
contribute to them. Besides, it is likely that the more connections 
they have with each other, the smaller is the possibility that they will 
fail economically. 
The next great wave of cooperatives after the 1930s adhered to 
some of these principles, and was in any case the very antithesis of 
what the plywood mills represented. I’m referring to the movements 
of the 1960s and ’70s. The perennial question arises: what caused 
these movements? At first glance they seem to have appeared out of 
nowhere. That is not true, of course; rumblings in the 1950s and 
earlier anticipated them. In the South, black activists in the 1940s 
and ’50s were establishing connections with each other, testing the 
limits of repression, registering voters (voter registration increased 
fourfold, eightfold, tenfold even by the early 1950s);197 the NAACP 
became increasingly active prior to and after Brown v. Board of 
Education, and its membership expanded. Conflicts escalated 
between whites and blacks as the latter grew in collective 
confidence. At the same time, urban centers in the North were 
incubating the counterculture, notably Greenwich Village and San 
Francisco, where artists, students, intellectuals, and dissidents of all 
sorts came together in loose communities. In the late 1950s and early 
1960s, these movements reached a critical mass and exploded into 
the national spotlight. 
Ultimately, the explanation for what was happening lies mainly 
in the advance of the productive forces and their bursting the 
shackles of certain conservative production relations. In the South, 
for example, tractors appeared during the First World War; later, 
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flame cultivators cleared land more cheaply than laborers did; a 
cotton harvester came into use during the 1940s, which did the work 
of forty cotton-pickers. In short, cotton production was being 
mechanized. At the same time, “competition from synthetics and 
cheap foreign cotton made cotton a less valuable crop.” Plantations 
needed fewer and fewer laborers, and so there was less economic 
need to control blacks, “either through the near-peonage of 
sharecropping or through violence.” Millions of them migrated to 
Northern cities, while the rest tended to become more socially 
assertive—not least because the rise of radio and television, as well 
as the mass mobilization for the Second World War, lessened their 
isolation from the rest of the world, encouraging activism to enact 
freedom and equality. Northern cities became more populous and 
diverse, which fostered creativity and dissent, as Southern cities 
became more overtly conflict-ridden.198  
The movements that sprouted from this soil, including the civil 
rights, anti-war, women’s, students’, environmental, and anti-nuclear 
movements, translated their concern with freedom and democracy 
into organizational arrangements that revolved around the 
“collective.” In a broad sense, a collective is just a small group that 
embodies participatory democracy; it is a form that can be adapted to 
many uses, from education and childcare to art or law. It was nearly 
ubiquitous in the 1960s: Freedom Schools, informal leadership 
committees, law collectives, communes, underground newspapers, 
cooperative housing, “food conspiracies,” free medical clinics in 
Chicago and Oakland administered by the Black Panthers, the 
latter’s Liberation Schools, free breakfast and clothing programs, 
free stores in San Francisco, music and art groups, “free universities” 
offering unorthodox courses, etc. And there were hundreds of worker 
collectives, and even more consumer co-ops.  
John Curl summarizes the evolution of the sixties’ worker 
collectives:  
                                                 
198 Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom, 17, 19. See also Frances Fox 
Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public 
Welfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), chapter seven. 
HISTORY AND POSSIBILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
105 
The earliest collective businesses were mostly connected 
with radical communication media: presses, bookstores and 
film. This reflected the explicitly political movement from 
which they emerged. They were followed by food-related 
cooperatives in the late 1960s, and artisan/industrial 
collectives and cooperatives beginning around 1970 both in 
urban and rural areas. These differed from earlier American 
industrial cooperatives and co-op stores mainly in that they 
chose worker control through the collective consensus 
decision-making system, rather than the majority-rule 
managerial system predominant since the early 19th 
century.199 
 
I cannot discuss the sixties and seventies in great detail here. 
Much of the history is common knowledge or is easily accessible. 
The rise and partial fall of food co-ops is illustrative and perhaps 
most worth looking at: “Of all the countercultural organizations, they 
became the most interconnected, the most developed ideologically 
and…had the most far-reaching effects.”200  Between five and ten 
thousand of them were organized in the late sixties and seventies, at 
the end of which decade they had an annual volume of about $500 
million.201 Some were controlled only by their workers, others by 
their workers and customer-members. Many began on college 
campuses but spread to working-class and middle-class 
neighborhoods as food prices skyrocketed in the 1970s, rising almost 
50 percent between 1972 and 1976. The cooperatives’ goal was, first, 
to provide healthier, less expensive food to their communities, and 
second, to create a radical alternative to the dominant system. The 
movement developed dozens of cooperative warehouses around the 
country to help supply the stores, since most co-ops could not buy in 
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sufficient bulk for established wholesalers to do business with them. 
Trucking collectives helped connect the system of alternative 
wholesalers, co-ops, and regional federations on both coasts and in 
the Midwest.  
When one considers the forces against them, it is remarkable 
how much the cooperatives accomplished. As always, the main 
obstacle was lack of money. Sometimes organizers had to knock on 
doors in their communities to fundraise before creating a store, or 
hold benefits such as dances. When the co-op got started it was often 
able to sell some food (not all) more cheaply than supermarkets 
because its members were not concerned with making a profit, and 
their business had little overhead. Some customers would be 
recruited for volunteer labor, but most importantly, workers paid 
themselves very low wages. Without this extreme “self-
exploitation,” most co-ops could not have lasted long or offered food 
at such low prices. 
The food co-op movement, insofar as it can be called a 
movement, declined in the late 1970s. Cooperatives could not 
compete with corporate supermarkets at selling processed foods or 
meat, or having a high volume of products. They became specialty 
stores that customers would patronize to buy natural and wholesome 
foods before skipping over to the local supermarket to buy 
everything else. Cooperators found that in order to remain in 
business they had to expand—which meant compromising their 
principles and led to bitter ideological fights. Even if they were able 
to expand, which they usually were not, they were often still too 
small to remain financially viable for long, and with the low wages, 
workers “burned out” after a few years. There was also a chronic 
shortage of business experience. Financial problems were sometimes 
not taken seriously until it was too late. Some of these failures could 
have been mitigated had more cooperative networks been established 
across the country, but participants in the movement had too many 
different ideologies and goals to work together in a sustained way. 
Some had political agendas, others were committed only to running a 
store. “The co-ops in Minneapolis,” said one participant, “are very 
isolationist.” This was true almost everywhere. 
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Surveying the terrain of New Left movements in the sixties and 
seventies, one is led to several conclusions. Most of these 
movements seem to have gone wrong in similar ways, due to similar 
causes. State violence and repression were instrumental in some 
cases, especially regarding those few movements, such as Black 
Power, that explicitly challenged the class structure. More 
widespread in its counterproductiveness was ideological 
sectarianism. The bitter factional infighting that erupted in the late 
sixties and early seventies drained energy from networking and 
coordinating dissent. Often participants could not agree on their 
overall aims, or even their immediate aims. Even more importantly, 
the movements that attempted to create such alternative institutions 
as cooperatives and communes suffered from an inevitable lack of 
capital; in the end, the organizations that survived, whether in the 
media—like the Village Voice and Rolling Stone—or in the food 
industry, had to follow the rules of the dominant system. Idealism 
and inexperience lost out to pragmatism and business acumen.  
On a deeper level, the fatal flaw in the New Left was that it did 
not set out to change the dominant mode of production in any 
comprehensive or competent way. One cannot have a true “social 
revolution” without radically transforming the class structure, which 
is the foundation of society’s institutional structures in general. The 
sixties’ movements, by and large, focused on culture and politics 
while neglecting the economy, thus vitiating their long-term goals. 
They were more interested in “sexy” things like culture, ideology, 
and politics than the hard work, the decades-long work, of building 
up a new economy. Of course, this could not have been done 
anyway; structurally it was impossible at that time, and even now it 
will be decades before the transition from capitalism to a more 
cooperative mode of production, if it takes place at all, will reach a 
very visible level. Nevertheless, the absence in the 1960s of an 
alliance between the labor movement and the New Left—indeed, the 
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outright mutual hostility202—suggests the latter’s “superstructural” 
nature, as it suggests the former’s bureaucratic ossification and 
conservatism under George Meany and the old guard.  
The fate of the New Left shows that the way to a new society 
does not lie with sectarian ideologizing. It lies with protracted 
economic evolution, coordination of sustained economic and 
political struggles, the slow accumulation of financial and human 
resources—nothing so culturally fixated and impatient as the 
movements of the 1960s. They were a product not of the impending 
demise or decrepit nature of capitalism, as many hoped, but of 
transformations in production relations and technologies (most 
obviously in the South), population movements, the complex of 
federal, state, and local housing and tax policies that fostered “white 
flight” to the suburbs and left inner cities to rot,203 the spread of 
media that connected distant regions to an unprecedented degree, the 
partly resultant elevation of the problem of poverty into the national 
consciousness, the U.S.’s waging of an unpopular war in Vietnam, 
and many other circumstances.  
All this time, mainstream cooperatives were making quiet 
progress. Credit unions, for example, which had been given legal 
foundations in the early decades of the century, spread after World 
War II. By 1969 there were nearly 24,000 credit unions, and a 
decade later they had 43 million members. Housing co-ops, which 
date to the beginning of the century, expanded in cities during the 
1960s, many of them partly financed by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development. Agricultural cooperatives (in marketing, 
buying and selling, etc.) continued to thrive and merge into ever-
larger units, even as the number of farmers shrank. In 1955 there 
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were 8100 farmer cooperatives with 7.6 million members; in 1979 
there were 7500 cooperatives with fewer than six million members. 
Most rural inhabitants were no longer independent farmers but wage-
earners for agribusiness, belonging to the rural proletariat. As for 
worker co-ops, John Curl estimates that their U.S. membership 
reached its peak in 1979 with about 17,000 people. There were 750 
to 1000 small co-ops and a number of larger ones, including 18 
plywood co-ops and a reforestation cooperative called Hoedads with 
300 members.204  
The Reagan years were not kind to cooperatives, as they were 
unkind to the whole labor movement and in fact to oppressed people 
everywhere in the world. It was a terrible decade, the first full decade 
of neoliberal attacks on the global population. Still under the 
influence of conservative Meanyite traditions, the U.S. labor 
movement remained ambivalent to worker-ownership as manifested 
in employee buyouts, ESOPs, and cooperatives, opposing the 
blurring of the line between employees and management. Ever since 
the AFL had endorsed collective bargaining and rejected worker 
cooperatives in the late nineteenth century, this had been the standard 
line. It began to change in the late 1970s as union officials and local 
communities experimented with employee buyouts as ways of 
preventing plant shutdowns and saving jobs.205 But in most cases the 
traditional adversarial relations between workers and bosses 
remained despite majority employee-ownership, and often buyouts 
could not prevent the failure of a plant anyway. Stock ownership 
plans have become increasingly popular since the 1980s, but usually 
they have little in common with worker cooperatives, since 
employees typically do not control the firm even if they own most of 
its stock. Arguably they are of more use to management than to 
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ordinary workers, being ways of raising capital and of giving 
employees a direct stake in the company’s success (which is 
supposed to motivate them to be productive).206 Gar Alperovitz may 
be right, however, that in the long run ESOPs have great 
transformative potential, as employees demand more control over the 
companies they own.207  
Recessions and a hostile political environment led to the relative 
decline of consumer and worker co-ops in the 1980s and, to a lesser 
extent, the 1990s, but in some areas in the latter decade co-ops began 
to come together in federations or sponsored the creation of 
supporting institutions. San Francisco’s Network of Bay Area 
Worker Cooperatives, founded in 1994 to connect dozens of co-ops, 
is an exemplar of that trend, and it continues to spawn new 
businesses and affiliate with others. The National Cooperative Bank, 
chartered by Congress in 1978, provided assistance to cooperatives 
throughout these years; its total assets as of December 31, 2012 were 
$1.7 billion. 208  Unfortunately it does not often provide loans to 
worker cooperatives, focusing instead on consumer co-ops, housing, 
ESOPs, community development corporations, and sometimes even 
fast-food chains like Dunkin’ Donuts (which qualifies as a business 
cooperative under NCB’s definition). 
Recently the prospects for cooperatives in all spheres, all over 
the world, have become brighter than ever. The United Nations and 
affiliated institutions have repeatedly proclaimed that cooperatives 
are a crucial component of the plan to meet the Millennium 
Development Goals by 2015. From dairy cooperatives in 
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Bangladesh, water cooperatives in Bolivia (to give people access to 
safe drinking water), and a revitalized consumer cooperative sector 
in Russia, to tenant takeovers of abandoned housing in New York 
City209 and cooperative care of the elderly and disabled in Wisconsin 
and New York, the movement is making life livable for millions and 
spreading an anti-capitalist ethos. Indeed, as stated in this book’s 
Introduction, we seem to be in the early stages of a renaissance 
unlike any in the history of cooperativism.  
As will be clear from the following chapter, this renaissance is 
not some accidental or inexplicable thing. Forty years of savage 
neoliberal assaults on workers’ rights have decimated civil society 
and discredited conventional approaches to fighting capitalist power. 
The old paradigm of bureaucratic business unionism, a narrow focus 
on wages and collective bargaining, and reluctance to fight for 
broader issues of social justice has failed catastrophically. New 
strategies are desperately needed and have begun to be pursued, even 
by such former strongholds of conservatism as the AFL-CIO. Unions 
that used to follow the motto “We’ll get it done ourselves” are now 
allying with women’s groups, immigrant organizations, 
environmental groups, and community groups of all kinds to fight for 
mutually beneficial goals like environmental protection, immigrant 
rights, a higher minimum wage, and improved public education.210 
The innovative strategy of “minority unionism” is spreading: rather 
than organizing a majority of workers at one business and then 
holding a vote for union recognition, a minority of workers at 
multiple businesses are organized to engage in militant, public 
actions that dramatize grievances, galvanize political action, and 
hopefully force employers to make concessions while attracting 
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more workers to unionism.211 Recent strikes at Walmart, in the fast-
food industry, and for a $15 federal minimum wage have followed 
this model. Progressive unions are reaching across national borders 
to create transnational alliances—a long-delayed necessity in this age 
of globalization. New models are emerging of “regional power-
building,” the construction of durable coalitions between unions, 
local labor councils, progressive business groups, and other civil 
society organizations. 212  In this context of free-wheeling 
experimentation to address labor’s woes, the spread of cooperativism 
and worker ownership is one of the most exciting developments. The 
sophistication of current projects is striking: in particular, institutions 
have learned the lesson that nothing is more important than to make 
connections with each other to birth new co-ops.213 
For instance, the United Steelworkers union and Mondragon 
announced in October 2009 that they were collaborating to establish 
manufacturing cooperatives in the U.S. and Canada, an agreement 
that USW president Leo Gerard called “a historic first step towards 
making union co-ops a viable business model.”214 In March 2012, the 
USW, Mondragon, and the Ohio Employee Ownership Center jointly 
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announced the publication of their detailed template for union co-
ops, which sets out an organizational structure that can be replicated 
by other unions interested in starting co-ops as a way to save jobs 
and communities. The template is based on Mondragon’s structure 
but with the key innovation that a Union Council (in place of 
Mondragon’s Social Council) is empowered to collectively bargain 
with the management team on such matters as compensation and 
working conditions. That is, worker-owners elect a Board of 
Directors that appoints a management team to oversee the business’s 
day-to-day operations and to engage with the Union Council on 
matters pertaining to employee rights and welfare. All the members 
of these bodies are required to be worker-owners themselves. The 
template, which also includes guidelines on ownership structures, 
financing, education, training, etc., is flexible enough to be 
appropriate for businesses of from ten workers to thousands of 
workers.215  
The USW, along with SEIU and other unions, is already 
involved in a number of cooperative initiatives. For instance, it is 
helping to launch the Pittsburgh Clean and Green Laundry 
Cooperative, a new industrial laundry that will employ a hundred 
people. “Under the union-cooperative model,” Amy Dean writes, 
“the laundry’s employees would be able to join the union of their 
choice, and the jobs offered at the plant would provide a living wage, 
benefits, and a collective bargaining agreement. As worker-owners, 
the employees would also gain equity in the business.” 216 
Pennsylvania’s Steel Valley Authority, which has been integral to 
the project, describes its ambitions as follows: 
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It would be our intent to create worker ownership 
initiatives across the Pittsburgh region and examine the 
potential for expanding this initiative state and region-wide, 
and over time, explore opportunities for national replication. 
In order to accomplish this, the SVA is exploring the 
development of a dedicated center that provides technical 
assistance, a revolving loan fund that provides early stage 
capital for new co-op businesses, and a training program that 
provides specialized training for company leadership…217  
 
All these ideas are taken, in part, from Mondragon, which is 
collaborating with the SVA. 
Another example of the USW’s activism is its support of the 
Cincinnati Union Cooperative Initiative, which is developing a 
railway manufacturing co-op, a co-op for retrofitting buildings for 
energy efficiency, and a “food hub” called Our Harvest that allows 
institutions “to buy produce that is grown, harvested, and packaged 
by worker-owners.” Our Harvest, which is in partnership with the 
United Food and Commercial Workers union, is already in 
operation: food is grown on a 30-acre farm in an urban 
neighborhood, though plans are underway to get a thousand acres’ 
worth of production going.218  
As Rob Witherell of the USW notes, union-affiliated projects 
like these are springing up all over the country, from Seattle to New 
York. “One of the nice problems we have,” he says, “is trying to 
keep track of it all.”219 This “problem” is a happy indication that the 
U.S. labor movement, in the footsteps of Latin America’s, Canada’s, 
and Europe’s, is finally starting to take seriously the enormous 
potential that cooperatives have as both job-saving devices and 
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means of pushing society in a progressive direction. Not since the 
1880s, in fact, have mainstream American unions been so actively 
involved in either worker cooperativism or what has come to be 
called “social justice unionism” (or “social movement unionism”).220 
One of the success stories that has inspired this recent flurry of 
activism is the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative in Cleveland, Ohio. 
So successful has it been that in 2010 it was featured on NBC 
Nightly News, which glowingly reviewed its efforts to revitalize an 
impoverished community on the east side of the city; it has also been 
the subject of articles in the Economist, Business Week, the Nation, 
Time, and dozens of less prominent media venues. The reason for all 
this hype is that it has provided a new and ambitious model for 
reversing economic decline in a blighted area of the Rust Belt. The 
project came to fruition in 2008 when several local institutions 
(including the Cleveland Foundation, University Hospitals, Case 
Western Reserve University, and the municipal government) teamed 
up with the Ohio Employee Ownership Center and the Democracy 
Collaborative at the University of Maryland to establish a network of 
worker-owned businesses modeled on Mondragon’s federated 
structure. The goal was, and is, to create ten co-ops and 500 living-
wage jobs for local residents. With the help of millions of dollars in 
grants, three businesses had been created as of 2013: Evergreen 
Cooperative Laundry, Evergreen Energy Solutions, and Green City 
Growers Cooperative (supposedly the largest urban food-producing 
greenhouse in the country). Technologically these are cutting-edge 
enterprises, committed to being the greenest firms in their sectors. 
They are also very profitable, in part because they’ve attracted the 
business of hospitals and other local “anchor institutions” that are 
trying to reduce their carbon footprint (and keep their money within 
the community). To help start new co-ops, each of the businesses is 
required to pay ten percent of its pre-tax profits into a Cooperative 
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Development Fund—a practice that is modeled, again, on 
Mondragon.221 
Perhaps as noteworthy as these glimmers of a new movement is 
the fact that worker cooperatives are faring comparatively well in our 
stagnant economy, on average better than capitalist businesses. An 
ILO report in 2009 concluded that “Financial cooperatives remain 
financially sound; consumer cooperatives are reporting increased 
turnover; worker cooperatives are seeing growth as people choose 
the cooperative form of enterprise to respond to new economic 
realities.” 222  Cooperative banks, not being driven purely by the 
profit-motive, had little incentive to give risky loans; 2008 was in 
fact a record year in many respects for credit unions, some of which 
are among the largest banks in the world. Regarding other types of 
cooperatives, there has lately been an increase in their formation 
rates, and, as noted earlier, they have tended to last longer than 
conventional businesses.223  
A 2012 study by the European Confederation of Worker 
Cooperatives, Social Cooperatives and Social and Participative 
Enterprises reaches similar conclusions. The record has not been 
uniformly positive across Europe, but in general cooperatives have 
been more resilient than conventional enterprises. Their members 
mostly attribute this fact to the “participation of members in the 
management of the cooperative, the build-up of reserve funds, the 
connection with territorial needs and the participation of the 
community, the capacity to organise and follow-up business transfers 
to employees, mutual aid and horizontal groups and consortia among 
cooperatives. In particular, the establishment of horizontal groups 
and consortia is considered by members as being an important 
                                                 
221 The Evergreen website, at http://evergreencooperatives.com/, has links 
to many articles describing how the model works. See also Gar Alperovitz, 
Thad Williamson, and Ted Howard, “The Cleveland Model,” The Nation, 
March 1, 2010. 
222 Birchall and Kettilson, “Resilience of the Cooperative Business Model in 
Times of Crisis,” 2. 
223 Ibid., 29. 
HISTORY AND POSSIBILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
117 
instrument to support innovation and competitiveness for small and 
medium sized worker and social cooperatives.”224 The number of 
worker cooperatives in the UK actually increased during the crisis, 
from 373 in 2007 to 541 in 2011. In March 2013 the Financial Times 
had an article titled “Economic crisis spawns co-op revival,” which 
observed that the total number of cooperatives had risen by 23 
percent since 2008, about the same rate as their growth of revenue.225  
One of the lessons of such developments is that as oppressed 
people and their advocates find traditional avenues of reform closed 
to them, they will be forced to invent revolutionary new solutions 
such as worker cooperatives. This is what the Latina immigrants in 
Natural Home Cleaning and Home Green Home Natural Cleaning 
have done, as well as those involved in the emerging New York City 
Co-op Network,226 and the Evergreen cooperators and many others. 
They have all been stymied in their attempts to seek help through 
conventional channels. Economic outcasts like these will continue 
for decades to network with each other outside the mainstream, 
accumulating resources on behalf of cooperativism, building up an 
alternative civil society alongside a decaying capitalist order. The 
system itself will drive them to these extremes; it will produce its 
own gravediggers as it collapses in old age. And the long, tragic 
history of cooperatives will finally be consummated: it will be 
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MARXISM AND THE ALTERNATIVE 
ECONOMY 
 
The death of Marxism has been announced so many times that it 
might seem anachronistic to reconsider Marx’s ideas yet again. In the 
twenty-first century haven’t we moved beyond Marxism? The 
answer, it seems, is no. For one thing, in recent years even the 
mainstream media has suggested that the ghost of Marx is haunting 
the world. Articles are published with headlines like “Why Marx was 
Right”227 and “Marx’s Revenge: How Class Struggle Is Shaping the 
World,” 228  and mainstream economists like Paul Krugman and 
Nouriel Roubini invoke Marxism to explain capitalism’s current 
crisis. Radical thinkers such as David Harvey and Richard Wolff 
have become academic celebrities, and magazines like Monthly 
Review and Jacobin are becoming more popular. In fact, the Pew 
Research Center reported in 2011 that among Americans aged 18 to 
29, 49 percent have a positive view of socialism whereas 46 percent 
have a positive view of capitalism.229 It seems, then, that reports of 
Marx’s death have been greatly exaggerated. 
It is worth asking why Marxism is so resilient. On the most basic 
level, the answer is that class struggle is indeed of central and 
perennial importance to human life. Since the emergence of social 
classes thousands of years ago, individuals’ and groups’ access to 
resources has been determined primarily by their positions in 
particular relations of production (or a “mode of production”)—and 
of course access to resources is of unique importance to life, since it 
essentially determines one’s ability to survive and to influence what 
happens in society. The way that economic production has worked 
since class structures emerged is that certain classes of people have, 
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through various methods of “hard” and “soft” power, forced others to 
work for them, or rather to produce a surplus that can be 
appropriated by the privileged or those with power. Whether people 
have been aware of “forcing” others to work—or of being forced to 
work—is irrelevant; the point is that the system has functioned in 
such a way that some people have had to be slaves, serfs, wage-
laborers, etc., while others have been slaveowners, landed aristocrats, 
capitalists, etc.—i.e., have profited off others’ labor (due to 
asymmetrical power relations). Exploiters and exploited have thus 
confronted each other in a perpetual struggle, sometimes implicit and 
sometimes explicit, to have more power and resources. The profound 
explanatory power of this analytic framework explains why 
academic Marxism has for decades been relatively prominent even in 
a capitalist society. 
Incidentally, a corollary of this emphasis on class struggle and 
class interests is equally valid: at least if explanation is one’s goal, it 
is more fruitful to analyze “social being” than “consciousness.” The 
former is more fundamental than the latter, in part because 
consciousness tends to be a sublimation of social being. That is to 
say, ideologies, “discourses,” subjective identities, thoughts and 
conceptions of all kinds are conditioned by such non-discursive 
things as economic realities, institutional imperatives (the need to 
follow the rules of given social structures), physical environments, 
and the basic necessities of biological survival to a far greater degree 
than the latter are conditioned by the former. This is true of both 
individuals and collectivities. For example, people in a particular 
social category will tend to have beliefs that legitimate their 
economic interests and institutional roles. Slaveowners may well 
believe that slavery is moral or divinely ordained; intellectuals will 
probably think that ideas or “discourses” are of tremendous 
importance;230 capitalists will be prone to thinking that capitalism 
and greed are natural and good. But even if some people manage to 
                                                 
230 For critiques of postmodern idealism, see my Notes of an Underground 
Humanist (Bradenton, Florida: Booklocker, 2013). 
HISTORY AND POSSIBILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
121 
be more mentally independent than the majority, that doesn’t matter 
much, because there are still overwhelming pressures for their 
behavior to conform to social structures and institutional norms. And 
these are situated in a material and economic context that is, on a 
broad scale, structured around the power and interests of a “ruling 
class” (consisting of those who occupy the dominant positions in a 
society’s dominant mode of production). 
Thus, on the societal level too, consciousness and ideas are 
secondary to the configuration of production relations, the resultant 
distribution of resources, and institutional structures in general. 
Ideologies will tend to predominate that either legitimate or are 
compatible with the interests of those people who have the most 
control over the most resources, i.e., the ruling class. As Marx said, 
“the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.”231 
True understanding of social dynamics, therefore, necessarily exists 
on a materialist foundation.232 
Aside from these general considerations, the obvious reason why 
Marxism keeps reappearing in the broader culture is that Marx was 
basically right in his analysis of capitalism: the economy is prone to 
crisis, class polarization has a pronounced tendency to increase 
(unless held in check by other forces), the working class tends to be 
relatively or absolutely immiserated, people in general are 
commodified and dehumanized in capitalist society, commodities are 
                                                 
231 Needless to say, this pat formula is of less use with regard to eras in 
which two or more classes are contending for supremacy, such as during the 
eighteenth century in Western Europe. 
232 For a study that shows the power of such a materialist analysis, see 
Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Right Turn: The Decline of the 
Democrats and the Future of American Politics (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1986). Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the 
United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913) is a still-
compelling classic. The political writings and interview collections of 
Noam Chomsky (Understanding Power is an easy-to-read example) 
likewise demonstrate the persuasiveness, indeed the commonsensicalness, 
of materialism. 
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“fetishized,” and so forth. In fact, all it takes is an unbiased mind to 
see that Marxian perspectives on all facets of capitalism are 
extraordinarily penetrating: the writings of E. P. Thompson, 
Raymond Williams, Paul Sweezy, Ernest Mandel, Harry Braverman, 
David Montgomery, Gabriel Kolko, Robert Brenner, Erik Olin 
Wright, Göran Therborn, Thomas Ferguson, David Harvey, John 
Bellamy Foster, and numerous other academic Marxists of the last 
sixty years are sufficient to prove this. And of course there are the 
writings of Marx and Engels themselves to consider, as well as of the 
second generation of Marxists (roughly Lenin’s generation). In short, 
there is no question that Marxism is here to stay. 
Given the unique power of this intellectual system, it is wholly 
justified to reconsider what is perhaps its weakest aspect, its theory 
of revolution. Marxists have traditionally been hostile to 
cooperatives as a tool of revolution, but as we’ll see, a properly 
understood Marxism is in fact strategically committed to 
cooperatives. Even more importantly, a reconsideration and 
modification of Marx’s theory of revolution will enable us to 
understand how a transition to socialism, or something like it, can 
happen, and what role cooperatives and other “alternative economy” 
institutions will play in that transition. 
These are big topics, and the discussion in this chapter will 
necessarily be both wide-ranging and schematic. There isn’t space to 
go into the detail I’d like. Still, lest the reader lose the thread of the 
argument in the thicket of ideas, I’ll outline it here. The main point 
that ties it all together is that I reject Marx’s statism, and I do so for 
reasons that I think are more faithful to Marxism than his own statist 
conception of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” is. I find it 
astonishing, in fact, that, as far as I know, no one has ever 
appreciated the radically un-Marxian character of that conception, 
the fact that it doesn’t follow logically from the basic premises of 
Marxism. Quite the contrary: as I’ll argue in chapter six—though it 
is also implicit in this chapter—the spirit of anarcho-syndicalism is 
much closer to the essence of Marx’s thought than Leninism and 
statism are. This isn’t just an academic debate, by the way. For one 
thing, Marxists should know what they are logically committed to, 
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and in what respects Marx got his own ideas wrong. It’s also 
important to cleanse and update the theoretical system in order to 
keep it a living force, to salvage its insights and put them to use in 
our own urgent struggles. It seems to me that intellectual integrity is 
a virtue, and ideas can have powerful practical repercussions. 
My rejection of Marx’s statism, i.e., his adherence (despite his 
internationalism) to the framework of the nation-state, leads to my 
argument that only in the twenty-first century are we finally entering 
the revolutionary period Marx and Engels looked forward to. That is, 
they got the timeline wrong: international socialist revolution never 
could have happened in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries, for 
reasons I explain later. Their impatience got the best of them. Only 
now is the nation-state system beginning to deteriorate—and global 
revolution never could have happened before this deterioration 
started. In part to explain why this is the case, and what it is about 
our contemporary world that makes it so much more pregnant with 
international revolutionary potential than the world of, say, eighty or 
a hundred years ago was, I briefly review the “historical logic” of the 
evolution of capitalism and the nation-state into the neoliberal 
present. On the most abstract level, one can view the last 150 years 
or so in the West as consisting of, first, a relatively “pure” and 
“unregulated” capitalism that, through the conflicts it engendered 
between labor and capital (and the resultant economic crises of 
“underconsumption” and “overproduction”), necessitated the birth of 
the regulated Keynesian welfare state, in the heyday of the nation-
state era between the 1930s and 1960s. This period was the 
interregnum, so to speak, between the first era of semi-“pure” 
capitalism and the second, which began in the 1980s and has 
continued to the present. As before, the relative lack of government 
economic regulation and the disempowerment of organized labor are 
leading to extreme social discontent and economic crisis/stagnation. 
This time, however, the old nationalist Keynesian “compromise” is 
not a possible solution, because the nation-state system is 
succumbing to the disintegrating effects of transnational capital.  
So, the current decline of the nation is the world-historic 
development that, together with the emerging period of global 
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economic stagnation, will make possible a (very protracted) social 
revolution—centered not around national states but around 
grassroots movements, municipal democratic experiments, regional 
networking, and transnational coordination of anti-capitalist 
resistance. It was always inevitable that this was how the revolution 
would happen, as opposed to un-Marxist fantasies of “the working 
class” taking over national states and directing economic 
reconstruction from above. Such a proletarian dictatorship has never 
happened and never can happen, as follows from the premises of 
Marxism itself. 
After setting out this theoretical framework, I consider its 
implications in practice. My focus this time isn’t on worker 
cooperatives, since I discuss those in other chapters, but on things 
like municipal enterprise and participatory budgeting. I argue that 
these are the seeds of the new economy, the post-capitalist society 
that will germinate in the next century or two. After reviewing a few 
of these initiatives, I conclude the chapter by considering why states 
and ruling classes will allow—indeed, are allowing—the 
“revolution” to happen despite its anti-capitalist character. At certain 
points in the discussion I try to draw parallels with the earlier 
transition in Western Europe from feudalism to capitalism. I think 
that if we examine that earlier revolution carefully, we’ll find clues 
as to how the future will unfold. 
This chapter is necessarily dense; it could itself be expanded into 
a book or two. Its main purpose, again, is just to sketch a framework 
by which we can interpret the recent and future growth of alternative 
economic arrangements in the interstices of a decaying civilization. 




Marx has, in effect, two theories of revolution, one that applies 
only to the transition from capitalism to socialism and another that is 
more transhistorical, applying, for instance, also to the earlier 
transition between feudalism and capitalism. I will consider, and 
revise, each of these in turn. Both see the working class as the agent 
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of transition to a post-capitalist economy. Whatever Marx meant by 
“working class,” in the following discussion I will interpret the term 
broadly, as denoting the majority of wage-earners—except those 
whose high income, high managerial positions, ownership of stocks, 
and so on effectively align them with the capitalist rather than the 
working class. It has long been known that many people in modern 
society, especially those in the “middle class,” have contradictory 
class locations, sharing some interests with capitalists and others 
with low-wage workers. This is what makes it possible for the 
middle class sometimes to act in radical ways and other times in 
reactionary ways.233 Typically, in fact, the middle class has been the 
conservative bastion of social order; nevertheless, the wage-earning 
status of most of its members always holds out the possibility that 
someday they will act in radical opposition to those who own capital. 
If they lose their middle-class status, whether through economic 
crisis or some other cause, this possibility becomes more likely. 
Among the people who will or can serve as the agents of 
transition to a new society are, for example, industrial workers, 
clerical workers, low-wage service workers, a majority of teachers, 
the unemployed, and in general those people who are relatively 
disempowered by corporate capitalism or have grievances that can be 
remedied by a dismantling of capitalism. This category of people in 
fact also includes others whom Marx would probably not consider 
working-class: most students, peasants, dispossessed indigenous 
peoples, even environmental activists (for such activism is really part 
of the class struggle, the struggle against the predatory capitalist 
class). All these people and more, the totality of whom amounts to 
the large majority of humanity, have interests opposed to the profit-
making, environmentally destructive, humanly exploitative, 
                                                 
233  See, e.g., Robert Johnston, The Radical Middle Class: Populist 
Democracy and the Question of Capitalism in Progressive-era Portland, 
Oregon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Christopher Lasch, 
The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics (New York: Norton, 
1991); and Lewis Corey, The Crisis of the Middle Class (New York: Covici 
Friede, 1935). 
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universally commodifying, undemocratic imperatives of corporate 
capital, and therefore are effectively the “workers of the world” 
whom Marx called to “unite.” This is how we should interpret his 
call in the twenty-first century. 
Let’s consider, then, the basics of his theory of how capitalism 
will gave way to socialism. The pivot of the theory is capital’s 
unquenchable thirst for profit, for surplus-value. It seeks always to 
squeeze more surplus-value out of the worker, which is to say value 
for which the worker does not receive an equivalent in wages.234 This 
entails the reduction of wages to as low a level as possible (given 
societal conditions, workers’ power, the skill-level of the job, etc.) 
and the intensification of work to as high a level as possible. Capital 
invests its earnings in labor-saving, money-saving schemes like 
mechanization, ever-increasing mechanization so as to employ fewer 
workers, especially fewer skilled ones, control them more 
effectively, and generate more profit. At the same time, it expands its 
operations and puts less profitable competitors out of business. These 
failed competitors—who historically have included artisans, 
craftsmen, much of the petty-bourgeoisie, and many capitalists 
themselves—are forced to become wage-earners as the relatively few 
surviving capitalists acquire more money and power. Most of the 
peasantry, too, is eventually forced off the land through myriad 
pressures of “push” and “pull,” swelling the ranks of the working 
class. The “reserve army of the unemployed” also tends to grow, in 
part because periodic economic crises throw people out of work and 
                                                 
234 This controversial theory of surplus-value is really nothing but common 
sense, like most of Marxism. If a worker’s wages were equivalent to all the 
value he produces in the form of a product that goes on the market, the 
capitalist couldn’t make any profit. He obtains a surplus value over and 
above what he pays for workers and equipment. On Marxian economics, 
see, among innumerable others, Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory 
(London: The Merlin Press, 1968); Paul Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist 
Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1942); and David Harvey, The Limits to Capital 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
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shutter unprofitable businesses. Without delving into Marxian 
economics, we can say that these are typically crises of 
overproduction and/or underconsumption, the latter a product of the 
endemic drive to lower wages and employ as few workers as 
possible. That is to say, low effective demand leads to disincentives 
for business to invest and incentives to cut costs, which means laying 
off workers and paying them less, thus aggravating the 
macroeconomic problem.235 The end-result of all these tendencies, at 
least according to Marx’s ideal model, is that the working class and 
the unemployed population become larger and poorer, while the 
capitalist class gets smaller (at least relatively) and wealthier. Society 
becomes increasingly divided into two polarized classes. Workers’ 
self-interest and collective grievances impel them to fight together 
for their power and dignity: they form unions and other associations, 
some of them political, that train them in struggle and radicalize 
them. Because their demands can ultimately not be met in the 
framework of capitalism, at length they seek to take over the state so 
as to remake the economy along democratic, i.e. socialist, lines. 
Marx thinks that eventually they are destined to succeed, if only 
because of their overwhelming numbers and their decades of 
organizing themselves. 
To repeat, this is an ideal model and therefore, like all models, a 
simplification. The question is how closely it resembles reality. The 
answer appears to be: in some respects very much so, in others not. 
In particular, the analysis of how capitalism works seems clearly to 
be an accurate, if idealized, model of definite tendencies in the real 
world. On the other hand, the prediction of radicalization of the 
masses—their increasing class-consciousness—and eventual 
overthrow of the bourgeois state seems not to have been fulfilled. 
                                                 
235 See, e.g., David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) and Richard Du Boff, Accumulation and Power: An 
Economic History of the United States (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 
1989). On the concept of overproduction, see Robert Brenner, The 
Economics of Global Turbulence (New York: Verso, 2006). He departs 
from orthodox Marxian economics, though. 
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Before considering these matters in greater depth, however, I’ll 
describe Marx’s “second” theory of revolution, the transhistorical 
theory.  
Its locus classicus is the last four sentences of the following 
paragraph from Marx’s Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy: 
 
In the social production of their existence, men 
inevitably enter into definite relations, which are 
independent of their will, namely relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their 
material forces of production. The totality of these relations 
of production constitutes the economic structure of society, 
the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of 
social consciousness. The mode of production of material 
life conditions the general process of social, political and 
intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their existence, but their social existence that 
determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of 
development, the material productive forces of society come 
into conflict with the existing relations of production or—
this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms—with 
the property relations within the framework of which they 
have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the 
productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then 
begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the 
economic foundation lead sooner or later to the 
transformation of the whole immense superstructure. 
 
There are several problems with this theory as expressed here. 
First of all, it is clearly the barest of outlines, desperately in need of 
elaboration. Unfortunately, nowhere in Marx’s writings does he 
elaborate it in a rigorous way. Second, it is stated in functionalist 
terms. Revolution happens supposedly because the productive 
forces—i.e., technology, scientific knowledge, labor-power and labor 
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skills, and technical methods of work organization—have advanced 
to such a point that production relations are no longer compatible 
with their socially efficient use and development. But what are the 
causal mechanisms that connect this functionalist concept of 
“fettering of the productive forces” to social revolution? As far as I 
know, nowhere does Marx express his theory in causal, as opposed 
to functionalist, terms. 
Perhaps the biggest problem is that, as it’s stated above, the 
theory borders on meaninglessness. How does one determine when 
production relations have started to impede the use and development 
of productive forces? It would seem that to some extent they are 
always doing so. In capitalism, for example, one could point to the 
following facts: (1) recurring recessions and depressions periodically 
make useless much of society’s productive capacity; (2) enormous 
amounts of resources are wasted on socially useless advertising and 
marketing campaigns; (3) there is a lack of incentives for capital to 
invest in public goods like mass transit, the provision of free 
education, and public parks; (4) the recent financialization of the 
Western economy has entailed investment not in the improvement of 
infrastructure but in glorified gambling that doesn’t benefit society; 
(5) artificial obstacles such as intellectual copyright laws hinder the 
development and diffusion of knowledge and technology; (6) a 
colossal level of expenditures is devoted to war and destructive 
military technology; (7) in general, capitalism distributes resources 
in a profoundly irrational way, such that, for example, hundreds of 
millions of people starve while a few become multi-billionaires. 
Despite all this, however, no revolution has happened. 
Indeed, in other respects capitalism continues to develop 
productive forces in a striking way, as shown by recent momentous 
advances in information technology. It’s true that—contrary to the 
fantasies of “free market” fanatics—this technology was originally 
developed in the state sector; nevertheless, the broader economic and 
social context was and is that of capitalism. It is therefore clear that a 
mode of production can “fetter” and “develop” productive forces at 
the same time, a fact Marx didn’t acknowledge. 
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In order to salvage his hypothesis quoted above, and in fact to 
make it quite useful, a subtle revision is necessary. We have to 
replace his idea of a conflict between productive forces and 
production relations with that of a conflict between two sets of 
production relations, one of which uses productive forces in a more 
rational and “un-fettering” way than the other. This change, slight as 
it might seem, has major consequences for the Marxist theory of 
revolution. It is no exaggeration to say that, in addition to making the 
theory logically and empirically cogent, it changes its entire 
orientation, from advocating a “dictatorship of the proletariat” that 
directs social and economic reconstruction to advocating a more 
grassroots-centered long-term evolution of social movements that 
remake the economy and society from the ground up. I will also 
argue that my revision makes the theory more compatible with the 
basic premises of Marxism itself, and that a statist version of 
Marxism, such as Leninism, is both un-Marxist and unrealistic. 
My revision to the theory, then, is simply that at certain moments 
in history, new forces and relations of production evolve in an older 
economic and social framework, undermining it from within. For 
different reasons in different cases, the new production relations 
spread throughout the society, gradually overturning the traditional 
economic, social, political, and cultural relations, until a more or less 
new society has evolved. This happened, for example, with the 
Neolithic Revolution (or Agricultural Revolution), which started 
around 12,000 years ago. As knowledge and techniques of 
agriculture developed that made possible sedentary populations, the 
hunter-gatherer mode of production withered away, as did the ways 
of life appropriate to it.  
Likewise, starting around the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in 
parts of Europe, an economy and society organized around 
manorialism and feudalism began to succumb to an economy 
centered around the accumulation of capital. Several factors 
contributed to this process, among them (1) the revival of long-
distance trade (after centuries of Europe’s relative isolation from the 
rest of the world), which stimulated the growth of merchant 
capitalism in the urban interstices of the feudal order; (2) mercantile 
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support for the growth of the nation-state with a strong central 
authority that could dismantle feudal restrictions to trade and 
integrated markets; (3) the rise, particularly in England, of a class of 
agrarian capitalists who took advantage of new national and 
international markets (e.g., for wool) by investing in improved 
cultivation methods and enclosing formerly communal lands to use 
them for pasturage; (4) the partly resultant migration of masses of the 
peasantry to cities, where, during the centuries from the sixteenth to 
the nineteenth, they added greatly to the class of laborers who could 
be used in manufacturing; (5) the discovery of the Americas, which 
further stimulated commerce and the accumulation of wealth. In 
short, from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries, capitalist 
classes—agrarian, mercantile, financial, and industrial—emerged in 
Europe, aided by technological innovations such as the printing press 
and then, later on, by all the technologies that were made possible by 
the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. All this is just 
to say that in the womb of the old society, new productive forces and 
production relations evolved that were more dynamic and wealth-
generating than earlier ones. Moreover, on the foundation of these 
new technologies, economic relations, and scientific discourses arose 
new social, political, and cultural relations and ideologies that were 
propagated by the most dynamic groups with the most resources, i.e., 
the bourgeoisie and its intellectual hangers-on.236 
It’s true that numerous political clashes had to occur before the 
rising bourgeoisie could achieve hegemony over Europe. Both the 
                                                 
236 Among many others, see Phyllis Deane, The First Industrial Revolution 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Robert Brenner, “The 
Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism,” 
New Left Review I/104, July-August 1977, 25-92; Rodney Hilton, ed., The 
Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1976); 
T. S. Ashton, The Industrial Revolution, 1760-1830 (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1986); Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: 
Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times (New York: Verso, 1994); 
and Robert Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
WORKER COOPERATIVES AND REVOLUTION 
132 
feudal aristocracy and absolutist monarchies opposed the bourgeois 
doctrines of economic and political liberalism, such that a series of 
revolutions was necessary before the bourgeoisie could accede to 
political power. The point relevant to the following discussion is that 
once capitalist economic relations had reached a relatively mature 
and widespread level, the ultimate political victories of the capitalist 
class were inevitable, if only because of this class’s continuing 
growth and access to more resources than its opponents had. 
Furthermore, it was only when capitalist economic relations had 
already made significant progress that bourgeois political revolutions 
were possible.  
We should apply the lessons of the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism to the future transition from capitalism to some other 
system. This, too, will have to happen in a very gradual way, as new 
production relations sprout in the “interstices” of a decaying order. 
Briefly stated, one can expect that capitalism’s descent into long-
term crisis (or stagnation) will generate—or rather, is generating—
movements of resistance across the world, many of which will be 
devoted to establishing new cooperative modes of production and 
distribution that will assist millions of the unemployed and the cast-
off in their tasks of survival. Explicitly political anti-capitalist 
resistance will spread too, but it cannot possibly attain the summits 
of political power without having command over tremendous 
resources, sufficient resources to compete against the ruling class. 
An important way of acquiring such resources is by accumulating 
capital through business activities, such as cooperatives and other 
“alternative economy” institutions do. Thus, just as the bourgeoisie 
could not achieve power before the capitalist economy had 
conquered much of Europe, so the working class cannot take over 
political power (on a broad scale) before its own economic 
institutions, its “socialist” institutions, have partially remade the 
world economy. Sooner or later, durable alliances will have to be 
made between the alternative economy and political movements if 
the latter are to succeed in their ultimate objectives. On a global level 
this process can be expected to take at least a century or two. 
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Before examining these ideas in more detail, it’s worth 
reviewing the advantages of the revision I’ve made to Marx’s theory 
of revolution. Again, my argument is just that social revolution 
happens when an old set of production relations fetters—or 
irrationally uses—productive forces in relation to a new set of widely 
emerging production relations. The “in relation to…” that I have 
added saves the theory from meaninglessness, for it indicates a 
definite point at which the “old” society really begins to yield to the 
“new” one, namely when an emergent economy has evolved to the 
point that it commands substantial resources and is clearly more 
“rational” in some sense than the old economy. Whether this 
hypothesis applies to all social revolutions is a question I won’t 
consider here; the point is that it does apply to some, and it will 
surely apply to any transition between capitalism and cooperativism. 
(See below.) 
Another advantage of my revision is that it supplies a causal 
mechanism by which a particular mode of production’s “fettering of 
the productive forces” leads to revolution—indeed, to successful 
revolution. The mechanism is that the emergent mode of production, 
in being less dysfunctional and/or more “efficient” than the dominant 
mode, eventually (after reaching a certain visibility in the society) 
attracts vast numbers of adherents who participate in it and 
propagandize for it—especially if the social context is one of general 
economic stagnation and class polarization, due to the dominant 
mode of production’s dysfunctionality. Moreover, this latter fact 
means that, after a long evolution, the emergent economic relations 
and their institutional partisans will have access to so many resources 
that they will be able to triumph economically and politically over 
the reactionary partisans of the old, deteriorating economy. Again, 
this is what ultimately ensured the political success of the 
bourgeoisie in its confrontations with the feudal aristocracy. 
Similarly, if capitalism continues to stagnate and experience 
manifold crises, this will ensure the global victory of a cooperative 
mode of production that will have developed over generations in the 
interstices of capitalist society. 
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So, in short, my revision provides a necessary condition for the 
success of an anti-capitalist revolution, and thus, as we’ll see in a 
moment, helps explain why no anti-capitalist revolution so far has 
been successful in the long term (namely because the condition has 
been absent). Another way of seeing the implications and advantages 
of the revision is by contrasting it with the views of orthodox 
Marxists. A single sentence from Friedrich Engels sums up these 
views: “The proletariat seizes state power, and then transforms the 
means of production into state property.”237 This statement, approved 
by Lenin and apparently also by Marx, encapsulates the mistaken 
statist perspective of the orthodox Marxist conception of proletarian 
revolution. This perspective is briefly described in the Communist 
Manifesto, where Marx writes “The proletariat will use its political 
supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to 
centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., 
of the proletariat organised as the ruling class,” and then lays out a 
ten-point plan of social reconstruction by means of state decrees. By 
the 1870s Marx had abandoned the specifics of his earlier plan, but 
his (qualified) statism remained, and transmitted itself to his 
followers.238 It’s true that orthodox Marxists expect the state, “as a 
state,” to somehow wither away eventually, but they do have a statist 
point of view in relation to the early stages of revolution. 
This statist vision emerges naturally from both of Marx’s 
theories of revolution discussed above: from the first one, because 
Marx simply assumes that the main task of the working class has to 
be to take over the national state (i.e., all national states), and that in 
the long run its efforts will be devoted to this task; from the second, 
                                                 
237 Quoted in Lenin, State and Revolution (New York: International Pub-
lishers, 1969), 15. 
238  See, e.g., ibid., 51, 52. Marx’s pamphlet The Civil War in France, 
written in 1871, expresses an attitude close to anarchism, but it’s not clear 
that this essay is a direct statement of his considered views. To a great 
extent it had to be a eulogy for the Commune and a defense of it against its 
bourgeois critics, not just a neutral discussion of what it did right and 
wrong. Elsewhere, Marx is critical of the Commune. 
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because the idea of a conflict between the rational use and 
development of productive forces and the fettering nature of current 
production relations suggests that at some point a social “explosion” 
will occur whereby the productive forces are finally liberated from 
the chains of the irrational mode of production. Pressure builds up, 
so to speak, over many years, as the mode of production keeps 
fettering the socially rational use of technology and scientific 
knowledge; through the agency of the working class, the productive 
forces struggle against the shackles of economic relations; at length 
they burst free, when the working class takes over the state and 
reorganizes the economy. These are the metaphors naturally conjured 
by the paragraph quoted above from the Preface to A Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy. 
But there are logical and empirical problems with the statist 
view, the view according to which the substance of social revolution 
occurs after the seizure of state power. First of all, it is in tension 
with the Marxian conception of social dynamics. Briefly stated, 
Marx sees the economy—rightly, I think—as the relative foundation 
of the rest of society, including politics, which suggests that a post-
capitalist social revolution cannot be politically willed and imposed. 
This would seem to reverse the order of “dominant causality,” from 
politics to the economy rather than vice versa. Moreover, such 
extreme statism exalts will as determining human affairs, a notion 
that is quite incompatible with the dialectical spirit of Marxism. 
History really happens “behind the backs” of actors: it evolves 
“unconsciously,” so to speak, as Hegel understood. Social and 
institutional conflicts work themselves out, slowly, through the 
actions of large numbers of people who generally have little idea of 
the true historical significance of their acts. As Marx said, we should 
rarely put credence in the self-interpretations of historical actors 
(because they are constrained and influenced by objective 
institutional realities of which they’re little aware or which they 
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interpret incorrectly). 239  And yet apparently he suspends this 
injunction, and his whole dialectical method, when it comes to the 
so-called proletarian revolution. These historical actors are somehow 
supposed to have perfect understanding of themselves and their place 
in history, and their historical designs are supposed to work out 
perfectly and straightforwardly—despite the massive complexity and 
“dialectical contradictions” of society. 
The reality is that if “the working class” or its ostensible 
representatives seize control of the state in a predominantly capitalist 
society—and if, miraculously, they aren’t crushed by the forces of 
reaction—they can expect to face overwhelming obstacles to the 
realization of their revolutionary plans. Some of these obstacles are 
straightforward: for example, divisions among the new ruling elite, 
divisions within the working class itself (which is not a unitary 
entity), popular resistance to plans to remake the economy, the 
necessity for brutal authoritarian methods of rule in order to force 
people to accept the new government’s plans, the inevitable creation 
of a large bureaucracy to carry out so-called reconstruction, etc. 
Fundamental to all these obstacles is the fact that the revolutionaries 
have to contend with the institutional legacies of capitalism: relations 
of coercion and domination condition everything the government 
does, and there is no way to break free of them. They cannot be 
magically transcended through political will. In particular, it is 
impossible through top-down directives to transform production 
relations from authoritarian to democratic; Marxism itself suggests 
that the state is not socially creative in this way. The hope to 
reorganize exploitative relations of production into liberatory, 
democratic relations by means of bureaucracy and the exercise of a 
unitary political will—the “proletarian dictatorship”—is utterly 
utopian and un-Marxist. 
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The record of so-called Communist revolutions in the twentieth 
century is instructive. While one can expect some Marxists to deny 
that lessons should be drawn from these revolutions, since they 
happened in relatively primitive rather than advanced capitalist 
countries, the experiences are at least suggestive. For what they 
created in their respective societies was not socialism (workers’ 
democratic control of production) or communism (a classless, 
stateless, moneyless society of anarchistic democracy) but a kind of 
ultra-statist state capitalism. To quote Richard Wolff, “the internal 
organization of the vast majority of industrial enterprises [in 
Communist countries] remained capitalist. The productive workers 
continued in all cases to produce surpluses: they added more in value 
by their labor than what they received in return for that labor. Their 
surpluses were in all cases appropriated and distributed by others.”240 
Workers continued to be viciously exploited and oppressed, as in 
capitalism; the accumulation of capital continued to be the overriding 
systemic imperative, to which human needs were subordinated. 
While there are specific historical reasons for the way these 
economies developed, the general underlying condition was that it 
was and is impossible to transcend the capitalist framework if the 
political revolution takes place in a capitalist world, ultimately 
because the economy dominates politics more than political will can 
dominate the economy. 
In any case, it was and is breathtakingly utopian to think that an 
attempted seizing of the state in an advanced and still 
overwhelmingly capitalist country, however crisis-ridden its 
economy, could ever succeed, because the ruling class has a virtual 
monopoly over the most sophisticated and destructive means of 
violence available in the world. Even rebellions in relatively 
primitive countries have almost always been crushed, first because 
the ruling classes there had disproportionate access to means of 
violence, and second because the ruling classes in more advanced 
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countries could send their even more sophisticated instruments of 
warfare to these countries in order to put down the revolution. But if 
a massive rebellion happened in one of the core capitalist nations, as 
opposed to a peripheral one, the reaction of ruling classes worldwide 
would be nearly apocalyptic. They would prefer the nuclear 
destruction of civilization to permitting the working class or some 
subsection of it to take over a central capitalist state. 
My revision of Marx’s theory of revolution avoids all these 
problems while still retaining key insights about the inevitable causes 
of revolution. It’s obvious that any transition to a new society, if 
carried out largely through the agency of the oppressed masses 
(which it will have to be), will be a consequence of capitalism’s 
socially irrational distribution of resources and fettering of the 
productive and democratic potential of current “forces of 
production.” If used sensibly, there is no question that modern 
wealth, technology, and scientific know-how could make possible 
adequate shelter, sustenance, and security for billions more people 
than currently enjoy them. An anti-capitalist revolution will be 
motivated by the imperative to redress these (and other) inequalities 
and injustices, and it will necessarily take the form of instituting 
new, more democratic property and production relations. Whether 
such a revolution is “inevitable,” as Marx and Engels seem to have 
believed, is a question I will consider later. I will also consider the 
reasons why the state and the ruling class will allow a revolution of 
the “gradual” sort I have described to happen. The point is that the 
only possible way—and the only Marxist way—for a transition out 
of capitalism to occur is that it be grounded in, and organized on the 
basis of, the new, gradually and widely emerging production 
relations themselves. This is the condition that has been absent in all 
attempts at revolution so far, and it explains why, aside from a few 
isolated pockets of momentary socialism (such as Catalonia in 1936), 
they never managed to transcend a kind of state capitalism. They 
existed in a capitalist world, so they were constrained by the 
institutional limits of that world. 
Ironically, Marx understood that this would be the case unless 
the revolution was international. He understood that “socialism in 
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one country” is impossible. He knew that unless a rebellion in Russia 
triggered or coincided with rebellions elsewhere, which on an 
international scale worked together, so to speak, to build a socialist 
mode of production, it was doomed to failure. What he didn’t 
understand was that the only way a revolution can be international is 
that it happen in a similar way to the centuries-long “bourgeois 
revolution” in Europe and North America, namely by sprouting first 
on the local level, the municipal level, the regional level, and 
expanding on that “grassroots” basis. The hope that the states and 
ruling classes of many nations can fall at approximately the same 
time to a succession of national uprisings of workers—which is the 
only way that Marx’s conception of revolution can come to pass—is 
wildly unrealistic, again because of the nature of capitalist power 
dynamics that Marxism itself clarifies. 
Indeed, only recently has capitalism attained the truly globalized 
condition that Marx assumed was a necessary prerequisite for 
revolution. While there are good reasons to say that the USSR and 
Communist China before the 1980s or 1990s were in some respects 
state capitalist, their “capitalism” was very different from the 
competitive, market-driven system that is impelled by economic 
logic to expand and spread its dominion over the planet. This 
capitalism, which Wolff calls “private [as opposed to state] 
capitalism,” has only in the last thirty-five years spread to huge areas 
of the world that had for a long time managed to hold it at bay. In 
addition to China, the USSR, and Eastern Europe, much of Latin 
America and Africa until the 1990s remained outside the domain of 
classical capitalist relations of production, defined by the presence of 
a mass of people who own nothing but their labor-power and are 
consequently forced to seek employment with those who own the 
means of production. The absence of these production relations was 
the result of many factors, for instance popular and elite reactions 
(such as, in some respects, the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920 
and its aftermath) against the predatory liberal capitalism and 
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imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.241 In 
other cases, such as parts of Central America, it was the result of 
international capitalism’s shoring up domestic semi-serfdom, by 
means of the peculiar incentive structures created by “merchant 
capitalism” and the international division of labor (whereby some 
countries export raw materials, others export finished products).242 
Finally by the 1980s and 1990s, all this semi-capitalism, semi-
feudalism, peasant resistance to proletarianization, state ownership of 
industries, and so on gave way to neoliberal offensives of 
privatization and marketization, such that the capitalist mode of 
production and its corresponding property relations have by now 
virtually conquered the world and are creating a truly global 
“proletariat” (or “precariat”).243 As they do so, resistance spreads and 
intensifies. 
In order to understand what is likely to happen in the next fifty 
or a hundred years, it’s useful to contextualize the historical moment 
we’re living in. And to properly understand its context, it helps to 
resurrect an old, currently unfashionable idea, viz., that there is a 
kind of logic to history. That is, we should return to Marx’s Hegelian 
notion that history, on the broadest scale, unfolds according to a 
certain “necessity,” which is always evident in retrospect. This idea 
is commonly rejected nowadays, even by some Marxists, for two 
main reasons: first, it seems to deny that individuals have the power 
to shape history, that they are active agents in the historical process, 
instead treating them as mere tools of an impersonal historical 
“Reason”; second, it seems to valorize this Reason as being 
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synonymous with “Progress” in some quasi-moral sense, implying 
(supposedly) that, e.g., the rise of Europe in modern times was both 
inevitable and good, and that people—artisans, workers, peasants—
who resisted such things as industrial capitalism were benighted and 
backward, the enemies of progress. The result of these 
misinterpretations is that few writers now are interested in 
excavating the structural tendencies, the dialectical self-undermining, 
the logic of “the emergence of the new within the shell of the old” by 
which historical phases have yielded to their successors. Radical 
authors like Richard Wolff, David Schweickart, and Michael Albert 
have largely abandoned Marx’s quasi-“scientific” conception of 
socialism, according to which socialism not only should but will 
happen (by means of class struggle); their approaches to the subject 
are not so much historical as ethical. We should resurrect Marx’s 
historical approach—which follows Hegel’s in seeing the “truth,” the 
“meaning,” of the past as revealed by the present and future—in the 
process correcting his mistakes.244 
Consider Marx’s predictions that the impoverished working class 
would continue to expand until it constituted the majority of society, 
and that as it did so its class consciousness and radicalism would 
mature—internationally—to the point that world revolution would 
occur. In retrospect, we can see that he was wrong; he misunderstood 
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capitalist society. While there are indeed tendencies toward class 
polarization, impoverishment of workers, international class 
solidarity, and economic crisis, there are also tendencies toward 
assimilation of the working class into the dominant order, toward 
“pure and simple trade-unionism,” toward the state’s stabilizing 
management of the economy, and toward workers’ identification not 
only with the abstract notion of a social class that spans continents 
but also with the more concrete facts of ethnicity, race, trade, 
immediate community, and nation. These identifications make 
possible the working class’s fragmentation, which diminishes the 
likelihood of socialist revolution in the classical sense. Similarly, the 
historical successes of trade unionism obviated the necessity (from 
the proletariat’s perspective) of revolution; reform was sufficient, at 
least in the short run, to improve the life situations of a large 
proportion of workers. Thus was born twentieth-century social 
democracy, the welfare state, and collective bargaining.  
Marx was right that the capitalist class is averse to progressive 
initiatives like these, and that it has inordinate influence over the 
state; what he didn’t appreciate was the historic potential of divisions 
within the class. The research of Thomas Ferguson, for example, has 
shown that the “second New Deal” (in 1935) in the United States, 
which led to the welfare state and federal protection of collective 
bargaining, was made possible by divisions in capitalist ranks 
between labor-intensive, domestically oriented, protectionist 
businesses, such as those in the textile industry, and capital-
intensive, internationally oriented businesses, such as Standard Oil 
and General Electric. The former were viciously opposed to labor-
empowering measures like the 1935 Wagner Act, while the latter, 
who valued social stability more than savage repression of workers, 
in fact helped write the Wagner and Social Security Acts.245 Their 
support for Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal order made 
the U.S. welfare state possible (as did, in another sense, the struggles 
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of millions of workers). The welfare state—and the 
institutionalization of collective bargaining—in turn contributed to 
postwar economic and political stability, which for a while seemed to 
invalidate Marx’s pessimistic analysis of capitalism. Trade unions 
became part of the “establishment”; much of the white working class 
became increasingly conservative, alienated from movements for 
radical social change, and intellectuals decided that Marx had been 
totally wrong all along. 
In reality, though, what he was wrong about was the timeline, as 
I said earlier. It was impossible for capitalism to succumb to 
socialism in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. Suppose, for 
instance, that by some unimaginable miracle Friedrich Engels’ eager 
prophecies (in the 1880s) with regard to the Knights of Labor had 
been borne out. Aware of its experiments in cooperativism, its 
attempts at industrial unionism, and its radical rhetoric, Engels 
predicted that it would serve as midwife of a revolutionary class 
consciousness and class organization that would lead the workers to 
victory over capitalism. This couldn’t have happened, of course, for 
obvious reasons. (The ruling class had a monopoly over the means of 
violence; divisions in the laboring classes, between black and white, 
skilled and unskilled, Catholic and Protestant, precluded the 
necessary continent-wide unity; most leaders of the labor movement 
were basically conservative, as they almost always have been.) But 
suppose capitalism had been overthrown in the United States in the 
late 1880s or 1890s and a semi-cooperative “republic of labor” had 
been founded, with artisans in their small workshops connected 
through cooperative networks, public control of industry, Rochdale-
type consumer cooperatives proliferating around the nation. What 
would have happened then? Capitalists in Europe would have 
continued amassing profit, investing in mechanization, building up 
industry and technology, and the artisans, craftsmen, and self-
governing industrial workers in the U.S. would have been, in the 
long run, unable to compete with them. In the end, the U.S.’s proto-
socialism would have eroded due to competition from Europe, and a 
degeneration to capitalism would have taken place, much as it did 
later in the Soviet Union. What this would have proven is that 
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America’s proto-socialist adventure, like the USSR’s so-called “state 
socialism,” was a historical detour, a dead end, a kind of accident.246 
Economic conditions—and productive forces—simply were not 
“ripe” then, or in the twentieth century, for socialism. It certainly is 
appalling to contemplate the irony of this fact. It’s an absurd, 
senseless tragedy: millions of people in the Americas, in Russia and 
Asia, in Germany, in France, in Spain and Italy spending decades 
fighting and dying for a dream that would never have come to 
fruition anyway because, supposing they had achieved something 
like it in a particular region, such as Catalonia, and it had not been 
crushed by the forces of reaction, it would have slowly degenerated 
under market pressures from the broader capitalist society, pressures 
on wages—downward for the lower workers, upward for the 
higher—pressures to mechanize, and the business cycles that 
inevitably would have seeped in to these havens of cooperation and 
disturbed the order of things, and of course after the revolutionary 
fervor had subsided the usual daily problems of running factories 
would have cropped up, “alienation” would have returned because 
industrial work is inherently unpleasant, battles between 
management and the average worker would have spoiled the 
revolution. Mondragon’s recent evolution confirms these 
counterfactual claims. So, the irony is shockingly cruel: it is when 
capitalist industrialization was starting, precisely when socialism 
was least possible, that workers, artisans, peasants, and intellectuals 
fought with greatest heroism and determination for socialism. 
Industrialization was so brutal and so conducive to the lower classes’ 
radicalization that visions of, and struggles for, a cooperative society 
were inevitable everywhere. But they didn’t have the significance 
their participants thought they did. They were, so to speak, 
symptoms of the birth-pangs of industrial capitalism, not of its death-
throes. Or, to view the matter from a different perspective, they 
were—in the long run—symptoms of the (conflict-ridden) 
maturation and consolidation of the nation-state, not of the imminent 
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overcoming of capitalism. A global system structured around state-
capitalist nation-states was always the inevitable outcome, despite 
the utopian hopes of millions of oppressed people. 
This, indeed, is another way of expressing Marx’s mistake: 
political conditions were not ripe for international socialist 
revolution. Marx didn’t foresee the “mature nation-state” period of 
history, which is to say the twentieth century. He profoundly 
underestimated the power of the “nationality” principle, and of the 
state. In many ways he was right that the class principle is more 
important than the nation principle, but not in the way he wanted: 
business tended to be more loyal to class than to the nation, and it 
used the idea of nationality to divide the working class and maintain 
social control. (For example, big business subsidized and continues 
to subsidize fascist or semi-fascist movements because they distract 
from the class struggle and serve business’s political agendas; and its 
frequent support for “patriotic” wars is a function not only of their 
profit-making potential but also of their usefulness in stifling 
domestic social discontent and progressive political movements.247) 
For other reasons too, though, the nation-state’s central authority was 
bound to get stronger, more bureaucratic, more extensive, more 
“society-regulating,” more effective at manufacturing consent, than it 
was in, say, the 1870s. In retrospect we can see this. From the 
Middle Ages on, capitalism and the nation-state have grown up 
together in a symbiotic relationship (at least until very recently); it 
was inevitable that as capitalism continued to grow in power and 
extent in the early and middle twentieth century, the nation-state 
would do so as well.248  
There isn’t space here to discuss all the reasons for the necessary 
failure of Marx’s prophecies in the historical short term, or for the 
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inevitability of the “high modernist” period of the nation-state.249 I 
could, for instance, draw from the Marxian tradition itself and argue 
that an era of “monopoly capital” necessarily followed the 
nineteenth-century era of competitive capitalism, and that monopoly 
capitalism necessarily engendered certain varieties of state 
capitalism, corporatism, fascism, state welfarism, etc.250 Instead I’ll 
invoke Karl Polanyi’s arguments in The Great Transformation, while 
adding my own perspective, which brings the story up to the 
neoliberalism of the present day. Permit me to quote from my Notes 
of an Underground Humanist:  
 
It’s always dangerous to construct abstract schemas, but 
there appear to have been two, or rather one-and-a-half, 
“cycles” in capitalist history. Abstractly you can think of it 
in this way: first, a lot of ancient [feudal] communal 
practices and public goods [such as the peasant commons] 
were dismantled before, during, and after the Industrial 
Revolution. You can call this the first wave of privatization. 
(It has continued unceasingly all over the world, but let’s just 
call it the first wave.) As it was going on, the victims of 
capitalism sought to maintain their old rights and/or acquire 
new, governmentally protected ones. At length they 
succeeded to some extent, and new public goods were 
consolidated under the 20th-century Keynesian welfare state. 
This was probably a nearly inevitable development, because, 
as Karl Polanyi said in The Great Transformation, 
                                                 
249 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve 
the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1998). 
250 See Rudolph Hilferding, Finance Capital: A Study in the Latest Phase of 
Capitalist Development (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981 (1910)); 
Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American 
Economic and Social Order (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966); and 
Robert A. Brady, Business as a System of Power (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1943). 
HISTORY AND POSSIBILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
147 
marketization and privatization will, if unchecked, 
eventually cause the total destruction of society. So popular 
resistance, aided by sane elements of the upper classes, 
succeeded in regulating further depredations and temporarily 
saving society after the Great Depression. But technology 
kept progressing, capital mobility increased, global 
integration continued, populations kept growing, and the 
“public” and politicized nature of the Keynesian state started 
encroaching too much on capitalist class power. Finally the 
masses got out of hand, got too politicized, too powerful—
all those crazy ideas of democracy in the 1960s!—and there 
was a capitalist backlash, made possible by (and making 
possible) ever-more-globally-integrated markets, elite 
institutional networks, and extreme capital mobility 
worldwide. The inflationary consequences of relative 
popular empowerment in a context of economic stagnation 
(the 1970s) were tamed, namely by destroying popular 
empowerment. That is, the second wave of privatization 
occurred, after the 1970s: public goods were again 
dismantled and “capital accumulation by dispossession” 
began anew (though, in truth, it had never really stopped). 
This time, the old nationalist Keynesian solution to the 
horrors of privatization wasn’t available, since the world had 
become too integrated and nations themselves were 
deteriorating, due to the post-1970s capitalist onslaught. So 
transnational social movements were necessary…251 
 
Or, even more schematically: 
 
With respect to the very long run, Marx was always right 
that capitalism is not sustainable. There are many reasons for 
this, including the contradiction between a system that 
requires infinite growth and a natural environment that is 
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finite, but the reason most relevant to Marxism is that 
ultimately capital can never stop accumulating power at the 
expense of every other force in society. It is insatiable; its 
[competition-driven] lust for ever more profit and power 
condemns it to a life of Faustian discontent. It can never rest. 
Any accommodations, therefore, between the wage-earning 
class and capital—such accommodations as the welfare state 
and the legitimization of collective bargaining—are bound to 
be temporary. Sooner or later capital’s aggressiveness will 
overpower contrary trends and consume everything, like a 
societal black hole (to change the metaphor). Everything is 
sucked into the vortex, including social welfare, the nation-
state, even nature itself. The logic is that nothing will remain 
but The Corporation [in the plural], and government 
protections of the people will be dismantled because such 
protections are not in the interest of capital. This absurd, 
totalitarian logic can never reach its theoretical culmination, 
but it will, it must, proceed far enough, eventually, that an 
apocalyptic struggle between the masses and capital ensues. 
A relatively mild version of this happened once before, in 
the 1930s and ’40s, and a compromise [in the West]—the 
mature welfare state—was the result. But then, as I said, 
capital repudiated the compromise (or is doing so as I write 
these words), and the old trends Marx diagnosed returned 
with a vengeance, and so humanity could look forward, this 
time, to a final reckoning. A final settling of accounts will 
occur in the coming century or two.252 
 
Those two paragraphs sum up my argument as to the context in 
which the “new economy” of cooperatives and other anti-capitalist 
institutions is arising. The rise of neoliberalism (from the mid-1970s 
on) was inevitable, given the distribution of power in the West and 
the heightening of international economic competition after the 
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1960s.253 In other words, a resurgence of global privatization and 
capitalist empowerment—after the consummation of the nation-state 
era between the 1930s and 1960s—was bound to happen, which 
means that social disintegration and atomization was bound to reach 
the pathological extremes of the present. This would inevitably, 
sooner or later, trigger massive resistance and creative efforts to 
reconstruct civil society and the economy on a new basis. These 
efforts are still in their infancy. 
To elaborate in a little more detail: As David Harvey and others 
have argued, the corporate capitalist class in the U.S. and Britain 
faced two major problems in the mid-1970s. First, it had to rein in 
the 1960s’ “excess of democracy” that was threatening its political 
power;254 second, it had to restore its profits that were eroding from 
the combination of intense international competition and 
“excessively generous” social welfare programs. Moreover, these 
programs, and in general all the pressures resulting from the 
population’s relative political empowerment, were causing high 
inflation, which was bound to become intolerable to much of the 
ruling class sooner or later. In the end, the most effective way to curb 
inflation and to protect profits from the demands of organized labor 
was, first, to adopt a restrictive monetary policy (which Paul 
Volcker, chairman of the Federal Reserve, did in 1979) and, second, 
to dismantle the welfare, regulatory, and labor-accommodating 
regime that had been constructed between the 1930s and early 
1970s.255 The Reagan and Thatcher administrations proceeded to do 
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this with gusto in the 1980s, and their successor administrations in 
the 1990s and 2000s continued their work. In the U.S., for example, 
union density in the private sector sank from 35 percent in 1954, and 
20 percent in 1980, to less than 7 percent today. Various “free trade” 
acts, such as NAFTA, have been negotiated that have contributed to 
the decimation of organized labor in the affected countries. Daily 
newspaper headlines remind us of the devastation of the social safety 
net. Numerous studies have described how government regulation of 
the economy has been gutted since the 1970s, making possible the 
financial collapse and recession of 2008 and 2009. All this grows out 
of the dynamics of a corporate capitalism that is throwing off the 
shackles imposed on it by the nation-state-centric “compromise” 
(between labor and capital) of the postwar period.256 
Moreover, by now the political economy of neoliberalism has 
spread from the U.S. and U.K. to the whole world. Libraries could be 
filled with the scholarship and popular writings on this subject. 
Naomi Klein provides a good popular overview in The Shock 
Doctrine (2007), which recounts the sordid tale of neoliberalism’s 
conquest of Latin America, Eastern Europe and Russia, Southeast 
Asia, and the Middle East (leaving out Europe, Africa, China, and 
India). Through IMF structural adjustment programs, trade 
agreements, collaboration with authoritarian governments, and other 
means, the U.S. has imposed its model of a liberalized economy on 
the entire globe. Recently even Europe, long known for its generous 
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social welfare provisions and healthy trade-union presence, has been 
shredding its former social contract. This process was underway long 
before the 2008 recession, but since then ruling elites have adopted 
the motto “Never let a crisis go to waste” and accelerated their 
dismantling of unions and the welfare state. The pretext, as always, 
is the restoration of fiscal health and national economic 
competitiveness. The consequences are that far fewer workers are 
covered by collective bargaining agreements, workplace protections 
are being rolled back, income inequality is rising, healthcare and 
education are being partly privatized, and, in general, the social 
fabric is being re-cut to fit the pattern of the U.S.257 
The most important points about this worldwide hegemony of 
neoliberalism (and its associated productive forces, in particular 
information technology 258 ) are that it is causing a resurgence of 
economic crisis and stagnation, and it is hollowing out the nation-
state as an entity. Let’s consider each of these phenomena in turn, 
starting with the first (which contributes to the second). 
Any thoughtful observer of the neoliberal political economy has 
to be struck by the parallels between it and the era that culminated in 
the Great Depression. There is similar class polarization and vicious 
subjection of labor to capital, similar ‘thinness’ of government 
economic regulation, similar extreme subordination of government 
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to corporate capital, similar proneness to periodic economic crisis, 
similar empowerment of financial capital, and so on.259 It’s true that 
there are differences. For example, since the 1960s or 1970s, 
“deindustrialization” has occurred in the West, most notably in the 
United States. There, employment in the manufacturing sector 
declined as a share of total non-farm employment from 31 percent in 
1950 to 20.7 percent in 1980, 13.1 percent in 2000, and 9.1 percent 
in 2009.260 As Robert Brenner argues, this trend results in large part 
from heightened international competition since the late 1960s and 
consequent declines in the growth-rates of manufacturing 
profitability and investment. 261  That is, intense international (and 
intra-national) competition and the resultant diminished growth of 
profitability have necessitated firms’ feverish cost-cutting, which has 
meant more automation, employee layoffs, wage cuts, and 
outsourcing of production. The former industrial infrastructure of the 
West has been dismantled as firms have downsized and relocated 
their operations to regions with cheaper labor. In the process, 
industrial unionism has been destroyed, the high wages and stable 
jobs of what was once the core of the economy have become low 
wages and unstable (or nonexistent) jobs—in part because 
automation is making human labor superfluous262—and a massive 
restructuring of the West’s economy has happened. 
The existence of deindustrialization only supports the broader 
point I want to make, that (to quote David Harvey) an “underlying 
problem [of] excessive capitalist empowerment vis-à-vis labour and 
consequent wage repression, leading to problems of effective 
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demand,”263 characterizes both the dynamics of neoliberalism and of 
the political economy that eventuated in the Great Depression, which 
is commonly interpreted along Keynesian lines, as a product of 
(among other things) low effective demand. Deindustrialization has 
recently been a major contributor to this dynamic, and thus to the 
stagnation that afflicts the West and with it the world. For the loss of 
jobs and high wages in the manufacturing sector has not been 
compensated by high wages or a sufficient quantity of stable jobs in 
the service sector; hence, in part, the higher income inequality in the 
West now than fifty years ago, and the resultant lowering of effective 
demand.264 
Moreover, with deindustrialization, increased capital mobility 
since the 1960s, the demise of the Bretton Woods international 
regulatory framework in the 1970s, and in general the neoliberal 
“restoration” of capitalist class power has come a financialization of 
the U.S. economy even more striking than that of the 1920s. It isn’t 
necessary to dwell on this point, since it has been thoroughly 
analyzed by scores of commentators. 265  I will only note that the 
financial sector’s share of corporate profits in the early 2000s was 
around 40 percent, though since then it has declined to 30 percent.266 
Likewise, its share of GDP was 8.4 percent in 2011, compared to 2.8 
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percent in 1950. 267  As investment has shifted from the “real” 
economy to the more profitable financial sector since the 1970s—a 
sector that employs far fewer people than manufacturing once did—
wealth and income inequality have skyrocketed, growth has 
stagnated, economic instability driven by speculative bubbles has 
increased, physical and social infrastructure has deteriorated, and 
unemployment has grown. Neoliberalism has meant, in short, a 
partial “de-development” of the United States (which in this respect 
is not alone among advanced industrial countries). 
Processes that were in some ways similarly disempowering to 
the majority of wage-earners helped lead to the Great Depression, 
from which, as we know, ultimately emerged the Keynesian 
compromise between capital and labor. The national state stepped in 
to boost effective demand and empower labor, so keeping the system 
running. At the same time, nationalism, or rather the “imagined 
community” of the nation, continued its earlier function as a kind of 
ideological glue to cohere societies and ensure order: “we,” both 
capitalists and workers, were “Americans” (or “British,” or 
“French,” or whatever) sharing a common language, a culture, a 
history, etc.268 “We” were supposed to maintain allegiance to the 
nation and the state, i.e., to overarching power-structures, no matter 
how much we might disagree with one another or want a bigger slice 
of the economic pie than we had. To be “disloyal” was the supreme 
crime, and invoking that concept proved effective as a way to tar and 
feather “radicals.” To call them Communists, for example, was to 
call them foreigners and subversives, which marginalized them and 
helped keep the capitalist order relatively stable. Thus the nation-
statist compromise, which functioned ideologically as a kind of 
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distraction (from immediate issues of economic, social, and political 
empowerment), reached its classical, high modernist phase. 
Since the 1970s, however, the nation-state, after many centuries 
of growing in power, importance, and global extent, has finally 
begun its long, tortured descent into crisis and collapse. The elegant 
irony of history is again on display: while the evolution of capitalism 
hitherto had contributed to the consolidation of the nation-state, at 
this point capital outgrew and started to shake off its old friend and 
enabler, who clung to it in ever more servile fashion. The state now 
does almost whatever it has to to stay in the good graces of the most 
mobile and wealthy sector of capital, finance; but other sectors, too, 
have found that they have a freer hand than they once did. 
Again, the essential condition of this shift in the balance of 
power has been the spectacular increase in capital mobility since the 
1960s, made possible by the rise of new productive forces, in 
particular electronic technology. Actually, even apart from its 
enabling the ascendancy of transnational corporations and global 
finance, this technology is playing an important role in the downfall 
of the nation. Just as “print-capitalism” after the fifteenth century 
contributed to the rise of the nation-state (as Benedict Anderson 
argues), what one might call “electronic capitalism” is contributing 
to its fall. To be sure, the imagined community of the nation is 
declining faster than the national state itself. The community is 
fragmented by electronic media, which, at least in the context of 
capitalism, tend to substitute isolation and self-involvement for direct 
interaction with others, as well as to degrade communication into 
instantaneous visual and auditory stimuli whose effect is to 
undermine identities (be they personal, national, or whatever). To 
quote myself again: 
 
These trends [of national disintegration] are evident 
when one considers the impact of television, video games, 
cell-phones, computers, the internet, and such “social media” 
outlets as Twitter and Facebook. A society in which most 
people spend an inordinate amount of their time sitting in 
front of TVs, playing video games, shopping online, 
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searching for soulmates through internet dating, imbibing 
bits of information in short bursts from an endless variety of 
global news and entertainment sources, and electronically 
“chatting” with acquaintances or strangers located anywhere 
from the next room to the other side of the world—such a 
society does not have much of a tangible national culture, 
and its “imagined community” is indeed imaginary, a mere 
abstraction with little basis in concrete reality. In short, the 
individualistic, passive, and consumerist nature of a 
capitalist society saturated by electronic media 269  is 
interpersonally alienating and destructive of civil society, 
hence destructive of a shared national consciousness.270 
 
Moreover, the fact that electronic technology makes possible 
nearly instantaneous communication across the world means that the 
kind of community it fosters is global rather than national. One may 
start to feel more affinity for people ten thousand miles away than 
for one’s compatriots. Global social movements become easier to 
coordinate; things like the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street can 
emerge to break down national barriers and birth a global 
consciousness.  
The worldwide hegemony of finance and the transnational 
corporation is similarly destructive of traditional civil society, and 
thus of the nation. For it has contributed to deindustrialization in 
advanced countries, the virtual destruction of organized labor, the 
rise of a “precariat” of insecure workers living on society’s margins, 
the erosion of the welfare state, the privatization of such public 
resources as education and the natural environment, the decline of 
Keynesian stimulation of demand (largely because investors fear its 
inflationary consequences), the hollowing out of state regulation of 
the economy, the onset of economic crisis and stagnation, 
degradation of the natural environment, etc. All these circumstances 
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tend to bring about a relative equality of conditions between 
countries, as a creeping Third-Worldization of the West occurs. The 
very idea of “America” or “Britain” or “France”—a substantive 
national community that differs from others—becomes threadbare, a 
transparent fig leaf for the naked pursuit of power by moneyed elites. 
The state, too, is in decline, though perhaps less obviously than 
the idea of the national community. The reason is simply that the 
global community of capitalists will not let the Western state reverse 
its post-1970s policies of retrenchment, which is the only way for it 
to adequately address all the crises that are currently ripping society 
apart. If any state—unimaginably—made truly substantive moves to 
restore and expand programs of social welfare, or to vastly expand 
and improve public education, or to initiate programs like 
Roosevelt’s Works Progress Administration or Tennessee Valley 
Authority (but on a necessarily broader scale than in the 1930s), or to 
restore organized labor to its power in the 1960s and thereby raise 
effective demand, or to promulgate any other such anti-capitalist 
measure, investors would flee it and its sources of funds would dry 
up. It couldn’t carry out such policies anyway, given the massive 
resistance they would provoke among all sectors and levels of the 
business community. Fiscal austerity is, on the whole, good for 
profits (in the short term), since it squeezes the population and 
diverts money to the ruling class. In large part because of capital’s 
high mobility and consequent wealth and power over both states and 
populations, the West’s contemporary political paradigm of austerity 
and government retrenchment is effectively irreversible for the 
foreseeable future.  
This raises an obvious question: how is the state to deal with 
social discontent? In the 1930s and 1940s, states adapted to 
discontent mainly by becoming more inclusive and increasing their 
control over capital.271 But since that is no longer an option, what’s 
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the solution? Evidently the most immediate and urgent response is 
repression. This is the natural instinct of every power-structure when 
confronted by resistance: destroy it, stamp it out, for instance by 
imprisoning people, demonizing dissidents as “extremists” or 
“terrorists,” and deploying police forces to smash popular 
movements. So far this has been, and will probably continue to be, 
the predominant political response to the contemporary crisis. A 
quasi-police state is taking the place of the welfare state, as can be 
seen from governments’ investment in “national security,” greater 
powers of surveillance, the expansion and privatization of the prison 
system, the militarizing of police forces,272 the ever-more-frequent 
suspension of civil liberties, etc. These measures do not signify the 
health of the state; they are its desperate response to a terminal 
illness. National governments are being hamstrung and privatized by 
capital even as their subject populations are rising up in revolt. The 
only recourse, it seems, is to militarize society—i.e., to expand one 
of the few government powers capital doesn’t object to, the power to 
suppress democratic resistance. 
In short, durable “compromises” between labor and capital are 
no longer possible. Only the nation-state could be a framework for 
such a compromise, because only national governments (not local or 
regional) potentially have the power to stand up to corporate capital 
and regulate it. But they have lost this power on the scale necessary 
since the 1970s. So what will ensue in the coming decades is a global 
conflict between the capitalist hyper-elite—together with its political 
minions—and the majority of the species, a conflict that this time 
will not be resolved by the principle of nationality, because it is 
dying. Almost two hundred years after the Communist Manifesto, 
Marx’s time has arrived. The time for true internationalism, which is 
to say transnationalism, in anti-capitalist (and anti-statist) 
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movements has arrived, at long last.273 A hundred years ago there 
was no such internationalism in labor movements, as the two 
nationalist world wars—largely supported by organized labor—
showed. Nor was there in the context of the Cold War, as the 
reactionary and imperialistic stances of the U.S.’s AFL-CIO showed. 
Only since NAFTA, and especially since the Seattle demonstrations 
against the WTO in 1999, have labor unions and social movements 
in general really begun to realize their internationalist potential.274  
A leader of Brazil’s Landless Workers’ Movement says it well: 
“It is very striking that it is only now that farmers are starting to 
achieve a degree of worldwide coordination, after five hundred years 
of capitalist development… The new phase of capitalism has itself 
created the conditions for farmers to unite against the neoliberal 
model.”275 And the neoliberal model, to repeat, is not some drastic 
new departure but only the logical conclusion of tendencies that have 
operated in capitalism for many centuries, namely privatization, 
marketization, the commodification of everything, suppression of 
workers’ power, class polarization, integration of the world under the 
aegis of capitalist relations of production, and ever-increasing capital 
mobility. These tendencies have finally reached the point that they 
are consuming nation-states and making both possible and necessary 
globally coordinated resistance in the form of transnational social 
movements. This global confrontation with capital, in fact, is really 
what Marxism was all about to begin with. The slogan “Workers of 
the World, Unite!”, far from being outdated, has become more timely 
and necessary than ever before.  
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There is much more to be said about the decline of the nation-
state, but I’ll skip to the main point: what the retrenchment of 
government’s public functions is making possible, for the first time 
ever, is the paradigm of revolution that I described above when 
critiquing Marx’s theory. Given the state’s growing incapacity to 
assuage discontent, movements of a decentralized, semi-interstitial, 
regional, democratic character are emerging to fill the vacuum. In the 
long run they, or the institutions they spawn, will probably take over 
many of the functions of the national state, such as the provision of 
social welfare. Even more importantly, they will enable the 
construction of new production relations in the shell of a corporate 
capitalist economy that cannot provide billions of people with a 
livelihood. These relations will spread all over the world, in an 
agonizingly slow process that will surely take well over a hundred 
years—because social transitions on the scale of capitalism-to-
“cooperativism” do not happen quickly. 
But how will such a transition happen? I’ll address this question 
empirically in the following section, but here I can at least outline the 
historical logic. Marxists and other radicals often object that the sorts 
of developments I’ll describe shortly are merely interstitial and 
unpolitical, can be co-opted by the ruling class, can function as 
stabilizing forces for society, are compelled to compromise with 
capitalism, and therefore do not represent viable paths to a post-
capitalist future. There may, indeed, be some truth to these 
objections when the social context is one of basic systemic stability, 
i.e., when society isn’t in a “revolutionary situation” anyway. But 
when it is—when the social fabric is disintegrating, economic crisis 
is throwing millions out of work, class polarization is growing—
these “interstitial” developments can potentially have revolutionary 
significance. The logic is that as political protest spreads and the 
ruling class grows ever more fearful, some of its more progressive 
members and institutions split off from the rest and throw their 
support to un-capitalist or semi-capitalist initiatives as a desperate 
way to keep the masses obedient and society under control. Again, 
this is how the New Deal state was born in the U.S. But since such a 
state is not an option anymore, the ruling class’s hopes for stabilizing 
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society will, by and large, lie in more localized and decentralized 
democratic experiments (in addition, as I said, to political 
repression). The combination of mass agitation and ruling-class 
support will ensure that these experiments spread, especially because 
in all likelihood there will be no foreseeable end to the economic 
crisis. In the long run, the result will be capitalism’s self-
undermining by means of its forced support for a proliferation of 
people-empowering measures. Their popularity and success, 
moreover, will generate a dynamic by which they spread of their 
own momentum, so to speak. The success of the new “bottom-up” 
economy will make the old top-down one increasingly obsolete, 
though of course innumerable political clashes will have to occur 
before it can be unseated from the summits of power. 
In short, the state and ruling class will, whether consciously or 
not, adopt two overarching strategies to maintain their power: try to 
repress dissidents, and assist progressive initiatives that seem 
comparatively unthreatening. In “liberal” societies confronted by 
massive and sustained protest, such a dual approach is necessary, 
because repression alone is unsustainable, does not address the 
underlying causes of protest, and (as the government’s sole strategy) 
is unacceptable to large portions of the public and the elite. On local, 
regional, and national scales, the ruling class will try to smash radical 
movements even as it (or a section of it) tentatively supports such 
things as public banking, municipal enterprise, cooperatives, 
enlightened use of eminent domain, 276  and communal self-help 
institutions of various kinds. But political dissidence will, if 
anything, only spread, not go away. One can expect that, in a world 
of multiform crisis, alliances will naturally emerge between different 
movements on the left some of which are less explicitly challenging 
to the capitalist state than others. The progress of so-called 
“unpolitical” initiatives, therefore, will aid the progress of the more 
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political movements, and vice versa, such that corporate capitalism 
will be slowly hollowed out even as it loses ideological hegemony. 
Its opponents will command more and more resources, which itself 
will make possible their command over even more resources, in a 
self-reinforcing cycle somewhat comparable to the early-modern 
bourgeoisie’s gradual erosion of feudalism’s (and later absolutism’s) 
economic, political, and ideological hegemony. The more economic 
success one has, the more resources one has, which means the more 
propaganda one can churn out and so attract people to one’s agenda.  
As for the question whether alternative economic institutions can 
indeed be more “successful” than capitalist ones, that is to say more 
productive and socially equitable: one of the purposes of this book is 
to show that they can. Cooperatives, as we’ve seen, can be more 
effective than conventional businesses even by the narrow standards 
of capitalism. We shouldn’t necessarily condemn co-ops for having 
to work within the confines of capitalism, for if they become 
common and network with each other and other progressive 
organizations they might prove to be of great use to left-wing 
political movements, by providing them with resources and 
spreading an anti-capitalist ethos. Furthermore, as greater numbers of 
co-ops support one another, each will be less shackled to the logic of 
capitalism. The economic success of these and other alternative-
economy institutions—in part a result of their mutual support—will 
then serve as its own public-relations campaign, so to speak, 
attracting people to new models and thus contributing to the spread 
of alternative modes of production beside the old dysfunctional 
capitalist mode. 
Another way to conceptualize the coming social transformations 
is to return to the idea that the main problem the economy is facing is 
low effective demand. The question, then, is how to 
comprehensively raise demand. We know that the old Keynesian 
solution was high government spending and high wages for workers, 
but both those options are off the table in an era of austerity, 
government privatization, and neoliberal globalization. 
Keynesianism on the colossal and international scale necessary is 
simply out of the question. The only other solution, and the only 
HISTORY AND POSSIBILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
163 
appropriate one in an age of decaying nation-states, is to construct 
new, non-statist social relations that economically empower people, 
i.e., raise demand. To repeat, what many of these will ultimately 
amount to are new production relations, on the basis of which will, 
necessarily, arise new social and political structures. Thus, virtually 
by analytical necessity it is evident that profound social revolution 
offers the only way out of the contemporary economic crisis. The 
slowness of the revolution is what will allow members of the ruling 
class to support it, for it will appear that all they are doing is defusing 
mass unrest by means of piecemeal reforms. But these reforms will 
be of a very different character from those of the earlier welfare 
state. Rather than being essentially corporatist, i.e., giving greater 
power to a national state that is integrated into corporate capitalism, 
they will consist of a democratic transformation of social relations 
“from the ground up.” 
Of course the national state isn’t going away anytime soon. In 
fact, it will likely have to become more inclusive in the coming 
decades in order to adapt to social crisis. However, the ways in 
which it becomes inclusive will be relatively new: given the different 
political economy we live in than sixty years ago, they will be less 
centralized and less corporatist, involving a devolution of 
governmental powers and greater international coordination on 




In the tradition of Marxism, we’ll follow our theoretical 
discussion with a focus on practice, which is, if anything, more 
important than theory. The point is to change the world, not just to 
interpret it. This whole book pertains mainly to practice, but in this 
section I’ll focus not on worker co-ops in the U.S. but other 
initiatives springing up around the world. Needless to say, there are 
many to choose from. People and governments everywhere are 
experimenting with alternative economic, social, and political 
arrangements. Some of these will not last long or will prove to be of 
limited importance; others may end up serving as models for a future 
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society. In the following I’ll describe some initiatives that strike me 
as particularly promising and interesting. 
A reasonable starting point is Quebec’s social economy, which is 
a sophisticated set of interlocking institutions that has matured since 
the 1980s. The term “social economy” just refers to the third sector 
in economies, between the private and the public sector. It is 
composed of such things as housing associations, civic societies, 
nonprofits, charities, cooperatives, and credit unions—institutions 
that are at least in part run by community members and exist not to 
pay profits to shareholders but to benefit communities, the 
environment, and marginalized groups. The social economy has 
ethical aims, but, as we have seen with cooperatives, the seemingly 
opposed imperatives of ethics and “efficiency” are by no means 
mutually exclusive. Very often one finds that the more ethical an 
institution is, the more profitable, productive, and efficient it is. 
Likewise, bureaucracy, gigantic size, and slavishness to the interests 
of big capital not only are immoral (inhumane and undemocratic) but 
have costs even by the narrow standards of efficiency and 
effectiveness. Being run by people whose goals are ethical, the social 
economy contributes to job creation, the provision of services, the 
production of goods, community revitalization, and in general 
sustainable development.277 
Quebec’s social economy is famous, and has been intensively 
studied, because of its sophistication and effectiveness. I won’t 
describe it in great detail here, but it comprises over 7000 
organizations that provide an array of services to the population. A 
watershed moment for it occurred in 1996, when the state invited 
representatives of all these actors—among which are “citizen’s 
committees, food banks, community centers, family economy 
cooperative associations, community health clinics, legal clinics, not-
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for-profit childcare centers,” 278  housing co-ops, women’s centers, 
workers’ co-ops, community economic development corporations, 
labor unions, and environmental associations—to participate in a 
conference on the future of Quebec in light of its problems with 
unemployment and economic development. The result was the 
subsequent institutionalized collaboration between the state at all 
levels and these diverse organizations, a collaboration that 
“involve[s], among other things, making it much easier for non-profit 
associations engaged in social economy activities to acquire the 
necessary financial resources, through government grants, indirect 
subsidies, or access to credit; the creation of a social economy office 
within the provincial government; and the consolidation of an 
umbrella organization in civil society, the Chantier de l’économie 
sociale, to coordinate strategies for enlarging and deepening the role 
of the social economy.”279 Few social economies in the world have 
achieved this degree of institutional coherence and coordination, 
which explains why activists and policymakers have been so 
intrigued by the Quebec model. 
In general, the global social economy can be expected to grow in 
the next fifty years, as national governments prove less capable of 
fulfilling their welfare and regulatory functions. Quebec’s social 
economy, for example, continues to grow in extent and access to 
capital. A recent innovation was the creation in 2007 of the Fiducie 
du Chantier de l’économie sociale, “a $53.8 million patient capital or 
quasi-equity fund to enable collective enterprises to embark on long-
term planning, invest in real estate, and move out of a vicious cycle 
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of debt.”280 A couple years later, a financial network called CAP 
Finance was established to connect microcredit organizations, local 
development funds, large “labor solidarity” funds, and so on. The 
mainstream economy’s recent travails have not hindered any of this 
activity; on the contrary, “amidst the debris of speculative financial 
markets” it has become easier to interest investors in the Fiducie’s 
stable rates of return.281 
Europe’s social economy is just as vital as Quebec’s. As reported 
in 2012 by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), 
the social economy accounts for over 14.5 million jobs and about 6.5 
percent of total paid employment in Europe.282 Since the last quarter 
of the twentieth century the social economy has grown considerably, 
so that it is increasingly taking the place of the state in creating 
employment and correcting economic and social imbalances. It is 
also achieving greater recognition as an important actor in European 
affairs, as reports on it are published by the EESC, the UN declares 
the social economy to be crucial for global development, Europe-
wide statutes for cooperatives are adopted, conferences on 
cooperatives and the social economy are organized, new legal forms 
are created to accommodate social enterprises, university courses on 
the social economy appear, and, in 2012, a social economy minister 
is appointed in France’s government. As in Quebec, this sector of the 
economy is faring relatively well in conditions of economic 
stagnation; for instance, it has been able to deploy “its own 
alternative forms of solidarity funding, such as ethical banking, 
social currencies or the credit unions, which are not only providing 
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credit but are also generating trust in its financial services.” 283 
Similarly, employment levels are proving more stable than those of 
the private sector. It’s true that recent cutbacks in public spending 
have had a damaging effect, but they have been far from devastating.  
A few random figures indicate the sector’s vitality. In France, the 
social economy (which accounts for 10 percent of salaried 
employment) created 18 percent of all new jobs between 2006 and 
2008. Its employment level increased by 2.9 percent (70,000 new 
jobs) between 2008 and 2009, while in the private sector it sank by 
1.6 percent and in the public sector by 4.2 percent. Similarly, in Italy, 
employment in cooperatives increased by 8 percent between 2007 
and 2011, while in the conventional private sector it decreased by 2.3 
percent. In Spain, too, employment in worker cooperatives grew by 
4.7 percent in 2011, as it dropped in the rest of the private sector for 
the fourth consecutive year.284 
Related to the social economy, and often considered a part of it, 
is the solidarity economy, which tends to be a little more political 
and anti-capitalist than the social economy as a whole. The values 
that inspire its participants are the opposite of capitalist: community, 
egalitarianism, and democracy. Like its more well-known cousin, the 
solidarity economy started growing exponentially in the last quarter 
of the twentieth century, as neoliberalism ravaged Latin America and 
other parts of the world. The solidarity economy’s chief impetus 
came from social movements in Latin America, which has a long 
history of peasant- and indigenous-based resistance to Western 
imperialism. In the past, this resistance helped bring about things like 
the Mexican and Cuban revolutions, the “developmentalist” period 
of South American history between the 1930s and 1960s, Chile’s 
dalliance with a kind of democratic proto-socialism in the early 
1970s (until it was crushed by the U.S. and Pinochet), and attempts 
at revolution in Central America in the 1980s. Since the 1990s, it has 
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birthed Latin America’s turn to the left (for example with the 
elections of Hugo Chavez, Lula da Silva, Evo Morales, Rafael 
Correa, and Daniel Ortega) and helped birth such global movements 
as fair trade, solidarity lending, the expansion of cooperativism and 
credit unions, the World Social Forum and its offshoots, and La Via 
Campesina. Among the practices that are often mentioned in the 
context of the solidarity economy are community-supported 
agriculture, urban gardening, alternative currencies, collective 
kitchens, and community land trusts, not to mention all the more 
familiar forms of cooperativism (producer, consumer, housing, 
agricultural, etc.). 
Before going into more detail about some of these phenomena, it 
will be worthwhile to consider just how significant the solidarity 
economy and its conceptual relatives are becoming. In a sense, after 
all, the term is nothing but a name for the ideal that all “radicals” are 
fighting for: it is socialism, anti-capitalism, cooperativism, economic 
democracy, whatever your preferred name is. The post-capitalist 
economy will have to incorporate the “solidarity” structures that are 
emerging, and in fact it will be grounded in them. Especially if you 
broaden the concept of solidarity economy so that it encompasses 
public banking, municipal enterprise, benefit corporations, and 
participatory budgeting (all to be discussed below), its contemporary 
significance is undeniable. It is, in short, the terrain of the 
“movement of movements” against privatization and profit-
mongering, aimed at the resurrection of public space, whether 
embodied in the World Social Forum, Occupy Wall Street, or any of 
the countless dissident movements rocking the globe. 
A clear indication of the growing importance of the solidarity 
economy is its ever-greater institutionalization. A rather primitive 
gauge of this is the proliferation of relevant websites, such as 
yesmagazine.org, geo.coop, shareable.net, aloe.socioeco.org, 
ripess.org, community-wealth.org, en.solecopedia.org, uwcc. 
wisc.edu, and american.coop. More substantively, dozens of 
international networks have been formed recently to facilitate 
organizing and education, including Alliance for a Responsible, 
Plural and Solidarity Economy (ALOE), the Intercontinental 
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Network for the Promotion of the Social Solidarity Economy 
(RIPESS), the U.S. Solidarity Economy Network (SEN), the Asian 
Alliance for Solidarity Economy, the European Institute for 
Solidarity Economy (INESS), and many organizations in Latin 
America. One must include all the social forums that exist even in 
the conservative U.S.: the U.S. Social Forum, the Midwest Social 
Forum, the Social Forum of the Americas, the European Social 
Forum, etc. Like their progenitor the World Social Forum, which 
began in 2001 and has met annually, these are essentially periodic 
conferences where activists and organizations involved in the alter-
globalization movement can come together to share ideas, strategies, 
and experiences, attend workshops and lectures, network and seed 
new institutions. The WSF regularly draws more than 60,000 
participants from around the world.285  
Perhaps even more striking than the proliferation of all these 
networks, organizations, and conferences is the recognition that the 
solidarity economy is receiving from governments. I already 
mentioned the creation of the new post of Minister for the Social 
Solidarity Economy in the French government. Compared to Latin 
America, though, France is behind the times. For example, in 2003 
Brazil’s president Lula established a National Secretariat of the 
Solidarity Economy, and cooperatives receive financial support from 
the ministries of Agricultural and Social Development. The Brazilian 
government also funds university programs that provide local groups 
with training and support to set up cooperatives or social enterprises, 
“similar to business incubators in the U.S.”286 (Cooperative business 
programs are starting to appear in North American universities too.) 
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Ecuador went a step further in 2008: it adopted a constitution that 
draws from the social and solidarity economy (SSE) model for 
development, in that it formalizes commitments to food sovereignty, 
the use of land for social and environmental functions (forbidding 
large estate farming, land concentration, and the privatization of 
water), a “decentralized national system of participatory planning” 
for development, and numerous other progressive principles that are 
fleshed out in very concrete ways. Bolivia’s 2009 constitution is 
similarly progressive. Public policy initiatives on the SSE have been 
flowering in Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and 
elsewhere, under the pressure of growing social movements. 
Governments in Africa and Asia are likewise facilitating the 
growth of the SSE, though I can’t review all the relevant policies 
here. The South African government, for example, has passed 
legislation to boost cooperatives, and, as of 2012, further legislation 
to establish a cooperative council, academy, and development 
agency has been proposed.287 Africa’s tenth ministerial conference 
on the theme of cooperatives was held in Rwanda in 2012; 27 
countries committed to passing laws to support the SSE, expanding 
education regarding the creation and sustainability of co-ops, 
increasing regional cooperation and trade among co-ops, and 
possibly creating integrated financial cooperatives at country and 
regional levels.288 Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey launched in 
2012 a national cooperative strategy and plan of action to 
fundamentally restructure the cooperative sector so as to make it 
more effective, competitive, and sustainable.289 India and Indonesia 
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have recently reformed their laws regarding co-ops. Since the early 
2000s, the Russian government—at all levels—has actively 
supported the cooperative movement. 290  Indeed, on the whole it 
seems there are few governments in the world that do not provide 
notable support, and are not increasing their support year by year, for 
the social and solidarity economy. 
The UN and its specialized agency the ILO have been taking 
action too; in fact, they have facilitated many of the policy initiatives 
just mentioned. I noted in the Introduction that the UN declared 2012 
the Year of the Cooperative. What this designation concretely meant 
was a year of intense advocacy and organizational support for co-
ops, so as to publicize their worldwide impact on poverty reduction, 
social integration, and socioeconomic development. (The website 
social.un.org/coopsyear showcases the UN’s work in this area.) As 
the UN sponsors international summits, forums, ministerial 
conferences, film festivals, and other events to spread the ideology of 
cooperativism, the ILO publishes in-depth reports, sponsors 
cooperative projects, aids in the formation of policy, and helps 
organize conferences like the SSE Academy, which began in 2010. 
The SSE Academy is “an inter-regional training event bringing 
together more than 100 [in fact as many as 300] practitioners and 
policy-makers from around the world, to share their experiences and 
meet leading SSE specialists.”291  Among other achievements, the 
2013 conference helped further the ILO’s initiative to establish an 
Interagency Task Force in the United Nations that would bring 
“relevant UN agencies together for regular exchanges on their 
programming and policy making in the field of SSE.”292 
As for the actual practices of the solidarity economy “on the 
ground,” I can at best hope merely to gesture at a few examples in 
the limited space here. The classic example is Brazil’s Landless 
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Workers’ Movement (MST), which began in 1984 and now has a 
membership of almost two million people. Its main political goal is 
to bring about national agrarian reform that eliminates the extreme 
inequality in ownership of land; much of its activity consists of 
occupying unused land and establishing encampments on it, which 
become permanent settlements if the occupiers gain legal ownership. 
The encampments and settlements can be organized on the basis 
either of family ownership or of collective ownership, depending on 
the decisions of local assemblies. Each settlement is structured as a 
mini-society (with extensive ties to other settlements and to state, 
regional, and national leaders), which collectively decides how the 
settlers’ income is to be spent—how much will go to production, 
health care, schooling, and so forth. The MST as a whole has 
established hundreds of agricultural cooperatives that take in more 
than 50 million dollars a year, some of which goes to the 20 million 
dollar budget for social services and infrastructure, the rest of which 
goes directly to member families. The movement also has founded 
teacher-training programs in national universities, hundreds of 
daycare centers, an agricultural college, almost two thousand 
primary and secondary schools, several credit cooperatives, 96 food 
processing plants, a clothing factory, etc.—all of which is ancillary 
to its main achievements of organizing over 250,000 occupations and 
winning land for over 350,000 families in two thousand settlements 
(as of 2009), in addition to the 200,000 families that are currently 
occupying land but do not yet legally own it. As a result of all this 
success, the MST has won international recognition, receiving grants 
from UNESCO and UNICEF and awards from the UN.293 
The MST clearly parallels the solidarity economy in general: it is 
both a model of a future democratic, socialist society and a means of 
bringing it about. More specifically, as activist Ethan Miller says, the 
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means to the end is that “building relationships between solidarity-
based enterprises and larger social movements builds increased 
support for the solidarity economy while allowing the movements to 
meet some of the basic needs of their participants, demonstrate 
viable alternatives, and thus increase the power and scope of their 
transformative work.”294 That’s my argument in a nutshell. It’s worth 
noting, incidentally, that the MST belongs to the Brazilian Solidarity 
Economy Forum, which “works on an even broader scale [than the 
MST], incorporating [as of 2006] twelve national networks and 
membership organizations with twenty-one regional Solidarity 
Forums and thousands of cooperative enterprises to build mutual 
support systems, facilitate exchanges, create cooperative incubator 
programs, and shape public policy.” 295  This is the revolution in 
action. 
A broad category, and a particularly well-known one, of the 
solidarity economy is the movement known as Fair Trade, which has 
expanded significantly in recent years. As defined by the World Fair 
Trade Organization (in association with Fairtrade International, the 
Network of European Worldshops, and the European Fair Trade 
Association), Fair Trade is a “trading partnership, based on dialogue, 
transparency and respect, that seeks greater equity in international 
trade. It contributes to sustainable development by offering better 
trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized 
producers and workers—especially in the South.” 296  More 
specifically, it “promotes standards for production practices and 
delivery procedures, working conditions and labour remuneration, 
environmental care and social policies in supply chains of certified 
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goods.” 297  The Fair Trade Labeling Organization (FLO) was 
established in 1997 to set standards worldwide and certify that 
particular products embody these standards. Among the growing 
range of goods that the certification system can cover are coffee, 
bananas, sugar, oranges, tea, chocolate, wine, rice, honey, flowers, 
cosmetics, and clothing. As the Fair Trade movement has gone 
mainstream, with large retailers selling certified products, the 
worldwide volume of sales has increased; in 2011, for example, sales 
were up to 6.6 billion dollars, 12 percent higher than the previous 
year.298 
The way Fair Trade works is quite complex, but the main point 
is that for a product to be Fairtrade-certified it has to have been 
produced and traded under conditions characterized by, for instance, 
the absence of child labor and forced labor, workers’ freedom to 
unionize, compliance with ILO conventions on working conditions, 
respect for the environment, commitment to gender equity and 
poverty reduction, and the importer’s payment to the producing 
organization (e.g., an agricultural cooperative) of both a specified 
minimum price and a premium. The minimum price helps shield 
farmers from the volatility of world markets, while the premium goes 
into a fund that farmers and workers can use for community 
purposes, as they see fit. Producers and traders who want to sell 
Fairtrade-labeled products have to pay a fee to FLO, which inspects 
them to certify that they adhere to the requisite standards.  
Studies have shown that, so far, Fair Trade (FT) has had mixed 
results in terms of improving local conditions and empowering 
farmers and workers. On the one hand, “guaranteed Fair Trade 
market outlets and stable prices provide incentives to producers to 
realise on-farm investments, intensify input applications and enhance 
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labour use.”299 FT associations and cooperatives can provide farmers 
with technical assistance and administer social and environmental 
projects made possible by the FT premium. Land and labor 
productivity are thereby raised above those of non-FT producers, 
which translates into higher household income and willingness to 
invest in long-term projects. According to some studies, FT 
producers report a greater sense of well-being and a more positive 
outlook for their future than non-FT producers do. Nutritional 
standards are higher and infant mortality rates lower than in 
households without access to Fair Trade organizations. Participation 
in Fair Trade has been found to reduce farmers’ economic 
vulnerability, assist in poverty reduction, enhance family stability, 
improve children’s education, strengthen the role of women in their 
community, and benefit the natural environment.300 
On the other hand, these positive effects are not universally 
observed, in part because the certification process is not foolproof 
and FT standards are not consistently enforced. There are relatively 
few impact studies of Fair Trade, and the ones that exist do not 
always have sound methodologies. One thing known for sure is that 
few FT producers are able to sell most of their product to FT outlets, 
because of insufficient demand. Fair Trade is still a very small 
fraction of global trade even in such commodities as coffee and 
bananas; about 1.5 million farmers and workers around the world 
participate in it.301 In 2011, FT producer revenues in the export of 
coffee, bananas, cocoa beans, and cane sugar were less than 1 
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percent of the global value of exports (although FT markets are 
growing at a brisk pace). 302  Some critics worry, too, that as FT 
becomes more mainstream, it is losing its commitment to the values 
that originally sustained it. Other common criticisms are that FT 
doesn’t necessarily benefit migrant laborers, that its impact on non-
FT producers is ambiguous at best, that the premiums consumers pay 
do not always directly benefit farmers, and that FT’s consumer-
driven model means it “cannot address the core problem of 
excessively concentrated markets in which a handful of over-
powerful transnational corporations dictate terms of trade and suck 
profits up into their own coffers.”303 
Insofar as there is justice to these criticisms, the best answer to 
them is probably the one that applies to all initiatives in the solidarity 
economy: they cannot realize their transformative potential unless 
backed up by social movements. But if they are, and if the capitalist 
state feels existentially threatened so that it has to tolerate and 
support them, then they can indeed be components of systemic 
change. Fair Trade has already raised consciousness in the global 
North, making people more aware of conditions in the South and 
proving that consumers are willing to pay extra for products if doing 
so benefits farmers and workers. The task now is the admittedly 
difficult one of making the movement more mainstream while 
simultaneously shoring up its commitment to strict standards of 
producer empowerment. As producers improve their living 
standards, get access to more resources, and develop a greater sense 
of collective self-worth, they will have more success in pressing for 
political changes in their own countries. Fair Trade can also 
potentially assist in building solidarity movements in the North, and 
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it can provide issues on which to pressure governments—and 
resources by which to do so. It’s true, though, that ultimately the 
main component of systemic change is the transformation of the 
class structure, and here Fair Trade, in its current form, must play a 
subordinate role. The main strategic emphasis has to be on 
movements that directly attack the power of transnational 
corporations and aim to bypass them by organizing economic 
activity through different paths. What those paths will be is still not 
clear. 
There are obvious possibilities, however—and even obvious 
necessities. As John Restakis argues, any future moral—and 
sustainable—regime of global trade will have to give a central place 
to agricultural cooperatives of the sorts that already exist across the 
South (and North). Only cooperatives, whether of separately 
producing farmers or of workers who collectively manage a single 
farm, can provide producers with the democratic agency and 
protections they need. One relevant model of a regional economy is 
the Emilian Model mentioned in chapter two. This system that 
permits small farmers organized in cooperatives to produce many of 
Italy’s food products could be replicated in other parts of the world, 
with assistance from the global cooperative and Fair Trade 
movements. It’s worth quoting some of Restakis’s speculations on 
this score: 
 
The global co-operative movement contains within itself 
the material resources to do what the fair trade movement 
alone cannot do. Credit is one example. The credit unions of 
both rich and poor nations have the capital to establish a Fair 
Trade and Development Bank to do what the World bank 
and the IMF will never do—give direct support to farmer 
organizations, NGOs, business groups and local 
communities to build regional economies based on 
democratic control and ownership. An international co-
operative development bank with members and progressive 
stakeholders from among consumers in the North and small 
producers in the South could provide the credit necessary to 
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fuel the kind of value-added development that is now 
beginning to emerge in these areas. Among its top priorities 
would be to build up local credit unions that can play a 
regional role in this development process. This has already 
begun. The World Council of Credit Unions (WCCU) and 
the national co-operative federations of many countries have 
been working to build the development infrastructure of 
Southern regions for many years…304 
 
What the future holds for global trade is anyone’s guess, but it 
isn’t impossible to imagine a new regime that gives a much more 
prominent place to Fair Trade organizations, regulatory structures 
that protect small farmers, and regional coordination of development 
among cooperatives and local governments. 
Turning to the North, in particular the U.S., recent research has 
illuminated potentially revolutionary developments of a different 
character than those we have been discussing. Gar Alperovitz is the 
scholar who has done the most work on this subject, and his books 
America Beyond Capitalism (2006) and What Then Must We Do? 
Straight Talk about the Next American Revolution (2013) are 
essential reading. Alperovitz is not alone, however: a veritable 
industry of reportage and scholarship is growing to document the 
systemic alternatives that are emerging throughout the North. As 
these alternatives become more widely known, one can expect them 
to continue spreading on an almost exponential scale, as people 
clamor for change. 
One example that Alperovitz discusses is “municipal enterprise,” 
effectively a kind of small-scale socialism whereby local government 
owns and operates properties and businesses. As the website 
Community-Wealth.org reports, “Increasingly, local governments 
have turned to municipal enterprise to both raise revenue and 
promote local jobs and economic stability by developing a more 
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diversified base of locally controlled wealth.”305 For instance, there 
are over two thousand publicly owned electric utilities in the U.S., 
which, together with a number of co-ops, collectively supply 25 
percent of U.S. electricity—more efficiently and at lower cost to the 
consumer than private utilities do. Hundreds of cities have built 
public internet networks too, and hundreds more are building them 
now. 306  Many other cities are involved in hotel construction and 
ownership, hospital ownership, transit development projects, 
ownership of land that is leased to companies for a profit, and 
environmentally friendly businesses like methane-recovery. 
Important initiatives are in the works on the state level as well, 
most notably, perhaps, proposals to establish public state banks. 
North Dakota is the only state that has such a bank; it has been in 
operation since 1919. Its public bank is one reason why North 
Dakota is the only state to have been in continuous budget surplus 
since 2008. As Ellen Brown notes, “The bank has contributed over 
$300 million in revenues over the last decade to state coffers, a 
substantial sum for a state with a population less than one-tenth the 
size of Los Angeles County.”307 Public banks allow governments to 
invest in local communities, in ways that actually benefit the 
community rather than some distant corporate elite. Accordingly, a 
public banking movement is growing; as of 2013, at least twenty 
states were considering establishing a state-owned bank.308 Counties 
and municipalities are likewise beginning to consider proposals for 
public banks. 
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Another type of institution with great potential is the benefit 
corporation (B Corp), which is a new legal form created in 2010. 
This kind of corporation differs from others in that “the goal is both 
to make profits and to use some part of them for social purposes.”309 
Shareholders can’t sue these businesses for failing to prioritize 
profits above all else, as they can in the case of a conventional 
corporation. The depth of public support for B Corps, and in general 
for a new, more socially conscious way of conducting economic 
activity, is shown by the fact that as of 2013, sixteen states had 
passed laws for benefit corporations. The number in early 2010, 
again, was zero. 
More common than B Corps—because older—are community 
development corporations (CDCs), community development 
financial institutions (CDFIs), and community land trusts. CDCs are  
 
nonprofit organizations dedicated to bringing about the 
revitalization of a clearly defined geographic area—often an 
urban neighborhood scarred by decades of disinvestment and 
concentrated poverty or an isolated and underdeveloped rural 
area. Governed by boards of directors composed primarily of 
local residents and other citizens with a strong stake in the 
community, most CDCs engage in some form of economic 
development within their service areas.310 
They have been most successful at housing development, but in 
recent years have tried to return to the vision of their original 
founders (in the 1960s) and engage in “comprehensive economic, 
social, and political development activities,” including community-
owned and -controlled business development and economic 
revitalization. By 2005, 4600 CDCs had created over 1,252,000 units 
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of affordable housing and generated 774,000 jobs.311 They rely for 
funding on nonprofits, foundations, corporations, and all levels of 
government. CDFIs, similarly, are institutions that give credit to 
communities shunned by traditional lenders; they include community 
development banks, community development credit unions, 
microcredit programs, etc. Community land trusts, on the other hand, 
of which there are several hundred in the U.S., are nonprofit 
corporations that hold and lease land to keep it affordable for the 
community by removing it from the sphere of the market. The 
National Community Land Trust Network states that the purposes of 
these nonprofits are “to provide access to land and housing to people 
who are otherwise denied access; to increase long-term community 
control of neighborhood resources; to empower residents through 
involvement and participation in the organization; and to preserve 
the affordability of housing permanently.”312 What their long-term 
potential may be is still not clear, but if sufficient public pressure is 
broad to bear on government, they could easily become of more than 
marginal significance. 
The same is true of the more experimental and radical movement 
to establish “Transition Towns” around the world, where initiatives 
exist to “rebuild local agriculture and food production, localiz[e] 
energy production, rethink healthcare, rediscover local building 
materials in the context of zero energy building, [and] rethink how 
we manage waste.” 313  As Richard Heinberg characterizes it, “the 
‘transition’ that’s being referred to is away from our current growth-
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based, fossil-fueled economy and toward a future economy that is 
not only sustainable but also fulfilling and interesting for all 
concerned.”314 The movement began in 2005 in Totnes, England, and 
has spread to well over a thousand towns in at least 43 countries, all 
of which have initiatives inspired by the belief that “communities 
must become more resilient in the face of three catastrophic threats: 
peak oil, global warming and economic instability.” 315  These 
initiatives include such projects as community gardens, community-
owned energy production, community-owned bakeries and 
breweries, local currencies, and programs to incubate sustainable 
businesses. One celebrated initiative is called Transition Streets, 
which, in Totnes, “brought residents together, block by block, to 
support each other in decreasing their home energy use through 
improvements like insulation and solar panels. On average, each of 
the 550 participating households cut its annual carbon use by 1.3 
tons and its annual energy bill by £570 (about $883).” 316  Such 
projects admittedly seem too tiny to make much of a difference, but 
this may change as they become more common and publicized. The 
vision of “localization” that is behind them is likely to be ever more 
appealing, indeed necessary for survival, as the capitalist status quo 
disintegrates in the next century. 
Turning to politics, a radical reform called participatory 
budgeting is gaining momentum around the world. First developed in 
Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1988, when the Workers’ Party was elected, 
it has spread to over 1500 cities on all inhabited continents.317 Erik 
Olin Wright describes its functioning in Porto Alegre as follows: 
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Without going into details, the basic idea [of municipal 
participatory budgeting] is that citizens meet in popular 
assemblies throughout the city to deliberate about how the 
city budget should be spent. Most of these assemblies are 
organized around geographical regions of the city; a few are 
organized around themes with a city-wide scope—like 
public transportation or culture. At the beginning of the 
budget cycle each year these assemblies meet in plenary 
sessions. City executives, administrators, representatives of 
community entities such as neighborhood associations, youth 
and sports clubs, and any interested inhabitant of the city 
attends these assemblies, but only residents of the region can 
vote in the regional assembly. Any city resident participating 
in a thematic assembly can vote in those. These assemblies 
are jointly coordinated by members of municipal 
government and by community delegates.318 
 
In Porto Alegre, participatory budgeting has consistently had 
high levels of participation and generated positive results. One 
resident observed in 2002 that before participatory budgeting, “there 
was no sewer, school, health clinic, or transportation. Now, a 
reservoir has been built with 6 million liters of water, the streets have 
been paved, and a school opened.”319  In fact, as reported by the 
World Bank, “Sewer and water connections in the city…went up 
from 75 percent of total households in 1988 to 98 percent in 1997. 
The number of schools has quadrupled since 1986. Porto Alegre’s 
health and education budget increased from 13 percent in 1985 to 
almost 40 percent in 1996.”320 There has been a “massive shift in 
spending toward the poorest regions of the city,” corruption has been 
dramatically reduced due to transparency, and a “thickening” of civil 
society has occurred, with civic groups of all kinds being stimulated 
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by issues of democratic budgeting. 321  In the 2000s, participatory 
budgeting began to spread at an accelerated pace, finally reaching the 
United States in 2010 (in Chicago). The remarkable successes it has 
had here and elsewhere are showcased on the Participatory 
Budgeting Project’s website, participatorybudgeting.org.  
The point, again, is that democracy, cooperation, and 
transparency are not only ethically imperative but more socially 
efficacious than the top-down, corporatized, bureaucratic, secretive 
methods of the contemporary ancien régime. When ordinary people 
have a democratic say in budget allocation, the money goes where 
it’s needed most, not where it will benefit only some politically 
connected corporate interests. Schools are built, streets repaired, 
libraries expanded, facilities improved. Poor neighborhoods see more 
money, and can expect greater accountability, than they would 
otherwise. At the same time, involvement in the political process 
creates a better informed and more active citizenry, empowering 
people to form associations and networks through which they 
demand ever greater expansions of democracy from political 
officials. Participatory democracy reinforces and expands itself, so to 
speak. It counteracts social atomization, builds community, militates 
against apathy, and captures resources for people who will use them 
to further improve democracy.  
Measures of even greater democratic significance have been 
enacted in Kerala, India. When Kerala’s Left Democratic Front 
coalition came to power in 1996 it began a program of 
administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization to 1214 local 
governments. This ambitious campaign took advantage of the 1993 
Constitutional mandates to increase local government power as a 
response to India’s developmental failures and crisis of 
democracy.322 A brief summary gives some sense of the project’s 
scale: 
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The nested design of the Campaign’s core institutions—
Grama Sabhas (ward-level assemblies), development 
seminars, task forces, and local governments—represents a 
deliberate attempt to broaden avenues for citizen 
participation. In every year since 1997, local governments in 
Kerala have formulated and implemented their own 
development plans. These plans take shape through a multi-
stage process of iterated deliberation between elected 
representatives, local and higher-level government officials, 
civil society experts and activists, and ordinary citizens. The 
process begins in open local assemblies, called grama 
sabhas, in which participants discuss and identify 
development priorities. Development seminars formed by 
the grama sabhas are then tasked with developing more 
elaborate assessments of local problems and needs. The 
development seminars give way to multi-stakeholder task 
forces that design specific projects for various development 
sectors. These projects are in turn submitted to local elected 
bodies (municipal councils called panchayats) that formulate 
and set budgets for local plans. Final plans are presented 
back to grama sabhas for discussion. These local plans are 
then integrated into higher-level plans (blocks and districts) 
during which all projects are vetted for technical and fiscal 
viability.323 
 
The logistics are very complex, but the campaign seems to have 
been successful both at invigorating democracy—it is extremely 
popular—and at implementing development more effectively than 
before. This is partly because “popular involvement increases 
problem-solving efficiency through better and more rapid feedback 
and increases accountability by multiplying the points of scrutiny.”324 
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Much greater priority has been given to basic needs like sanitation, 
housing and drinking water than in the past, and there are now 
significant interregional differences as opposed to the “one-size-fits-
all logic of the past.” Just between 1997 and 1999, 98,494 houses 
were built, 240,307 sanitary latrines constructed, 50,162 wells dug, 
8000 kilometers of roads built, and 2,800,179 people received 
support for seedlings and fertilizers—all of which far exceeds 
achievements from earlier comparable periods.325 At the same time, 
corruption has declined significantly, as happened, too, when the 
cooperative KDB was formed.326  
The innovations in Kerala demonstrate the possibility of a 
politics different from the anti-democratic paradigm of the present. 
As an alternative economy develops, a Kerala-style politics may 
follow in its wake. 
 
All these quasi-experimental “radical reforms,” involving 
millions of people and thousands of institutions across the world, 
cannot be a mere historical curiosity. They have epochal potential. 
One participant contrasts them with the dreams of the old anarchists 
and socialists who looked forward to a cooperative commonwealth: 
“The old cooperativism,” he says, “was a utopia in search of its 
practice, and the new cooperativism is a practice in search of its 
utopia.”327 The contrast is apt. The tragedy of the old cooperativism, 
from a Marxist perspective, is that consciousness outran material 
conditions, material possibilities, and so it was doomed to failure; the 
new cooperativism has placed consciousness at the service of 
people’s immediate economic interests, so that new modes of 
production and of governance are evolving step by step. Utopian 
dreams are being subordinated to economic realities—thus, perhaps, 
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making possible the realization of “utopian dreams” in the distant 
future. 
The obvious question, though, is the one that has been posed to 
radicals from time immemorial: how will the old world succumb to 
the new? How is that possible? What will the process look like? At 
this moment in history, characterized by a convergence of crises, it is 
easier to imagine catastrophe than a new and more stable civilization. 
We’re traveling headlong into a perfect storm of crises. For example, 
the UN projects that the world population will be almost ten billion 
by 2050, which of course will put severe strain on human and natural 
resources.328 At the same time, global warming is expected to have 
an incalculably destructive impact on civilization and the global 
ecosystem: ocean levels could rise three feet or more by the end of 
the century; temperatures will rise at least 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit, 
probably much more; extreme heat waves will contribute to 
difficulty growing food and to massive changes in plant and animal 
life.329 In addition, the sword of Damocles hangs over humankind in 
the form of possible nuclear war, whether provoked by state or by 
non-state actors. And then there’s the economic crisis I’ve already 
discussed. These circumstances in themselves are enough to show 
that there will be no smooth or peaceful transition to a more 
equitable and just society. 
Some commentators, such as Chris Hedges and Richard 
Heinberg, insist that we are headed for a near-apocalyptic scenario. 
“The steady depletion of natural resources,” Hedges writes, 
“especially fossil fuels, along with the accelerated pace of climate 
change, will combine with crippling levels of personal and national 
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debt to thrust us into a global depression that will dwarf any in the 
history of capitalism.” Heinberg speculates that soon our economic 
system will “implode”: 
 
And when it does the financial system will seize up far 
more dramatically than in 2008. You will go to the bank or 
the ATM and there will be no money. Food will be scarce 
and expensive. Unemployment will be rampant. And 
government services will break down. Living standards will 
plummet. “Austerity” programs will become more 
draconian. Economic inequality will widen to create massive 
gaps between a tiny, oligarchic global elite and the masses. 
The collapse will also inevitably trigger the kind of 
instability and unrest, including riots, that we have seen in 
countries such as Greece…330 
 
These dire prophecies may be accurate, or they may be wildly 
exaggerated. What should be uncontroversial is that multifaceted 
crisis is here to stay for a very long time. It’s predictable what 
popular reactions to it will be: demonstrations, periodic rioting, 
looting (in the case of natural disasters, as after Hurricane Katrina), 
perhaps a rise in crime, and grassroots organizing on both the 
political left and the right. What will determine how it all plays out is 
the reaction of the ruling class, which possesses most of society’s 
resources and so has disproportionate power over the directions in 
which history proceeds. 
Above I made some rather vague predictions regarding the 
behavior of governments and the ruling class, which I will qualify 
and elaborate on now. Of course it’s impossible to predict the long-
term future with any certainty. For all we know, nuclear war will 
destroy much of the species in the next century, or the collapse of 
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our current world system will lead to two hundred years of wars over 
natural resources. Nevertheless, I think it can be useful and 
interesting to speculate on possible paths that the future will take—
and not only because I consider apocalyptic scenarios to be 
implausible. Assuming that human society doesn’t revert to some 
kind of Hobbesian state of nature, one can sketch plausible paths of 
historical development and use those sketches to help guide strategy. 
As I said above, the point to keep in mind is that governments 
and ruling classes are not monolithic entities. This fact is what makes 
possible a paradigm of revolution different from the orthodox 
Marxist one: rather than the working class suddenly rising up as one 
in a titanic social explosion, bursting through the straitjacket of a 
unified ruling class that has refused to reform capitalism, what can 
and should happen—and has happened in the past—is that popular 
struggles exploit divisions in the ranks of the elite so as to achieve 
gradual progress. Many wealthy people and institutions are 
reactionary, but many are progressive. In order to accomplish lasting, 
democratic change, it is necessary for popular movements to get 
some of the progressive elite at least partly and provisionally on their 
side. Universities, nonprofits, philanthropic foundations, liberal 
millionaires and billionaires, progressive businesses, and politicians 
are just some of the entities whose wealth and influence can be 
critical to the success of a movement or a new idea. By any means 
necessary, one must get their support—because if it isn’t 
forthcoming, the combined might of the reactionary and the liberal 
elite will squash the left.  
Fortunately, the last 150 years of Western history have taught us 
that when crisis afflicts society, much of the liberal elite is willing to 
favor measures that benefit the populace and are not dictated solely 
by the short-term interest of the capitalist class (or some narrow 
section of it). There exist wealthy benefactors of environmentalism, 
public education, civil liberties, the labor movement, infrastructure 
development, and the social and solidarity economy. As the reign of 
neoliberalism deepens the crises that beset the world, more and more 
entities in the ruling class will divert more and more resources to 
assuaging popular discontent, in many cases by funding radical new 
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initiatives such as have been surveyed in this chapter. The rot that 
runs through traditional government and civil society makes this 
“experimentalism” utterly predictable—because “desperate times 
call for desperate measures,” etc. It’s highly doubtful that social 
crisis will abate, so radical reforms, insofar as they are demanded by 
the masses and seem to work, will spread from region to region and 
country to country, as they are already doing. 
It’s instructive to contrast, again, the present situation with that 
eighty or a hundred years ago. Aside from the comparatively serious 
and multifaceted nature of contemporary crises, there are crucial 
differences between the periods that should hearten present-day 
radicals. Certainly the national and international left does not appear 
to be in good shape at the moment. On the other hand, a closer look 
reveals glimmers of hope. First of all, popular movements potentially 
have far more resources available to them now than in the 1930s or 
before. Technology is infinitely more advanced than it was, making 
possible global resistance movements and more effective 
coordination between them. Electronic media make it easier to 
publicize, on a wider scale, projects in an alternative economy and 
politics. Society is awash in wealth and knowledge, which, although 
it’s concentrated at the top now, could be harnessed and used for the 
benefit of “the 99 percent” and their dissent. Many of the people who 
will be in dire economic straits in the coming decades are highly 
educated, college graduates, articulate and aware, who were raised 
with high expectations and are likely to be radicalized relatively 
easily. Moreover, their education and former position in the middle 
class will probably ensure that their protest is less ineffectual than 
those of some more marginal group might be. 
From one perspective, the fragmentation of the contemporary 
left isn’t even a bad thing. For it arises, in part, from the 
fragmentation of society itself, the dissolution of an integral 
capitalist civil society and the nation-state. A decaying social 
fabric—and a decaying national state—signifies, in the long run, a 
decaying corporate capitalism, a doomed civilization. It was different 
in the Great Depression, though: then, it was clear very quickly to 
far-seeing liberals that what was necessary to save capitalism was a 
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stronger state, more state intervention in the economy, and stronger 
labor unions to bargain for high wages and so keep demand high and 
the economy running. With the strengthening of the state and unions 
would come a repairing of the social fabric and, in fact, the heyday 
of the nation-state system. Now, eighty years later, no one has a clear 
idea of how to save society (neoliberal globalization having made 
Keynesian nationalism impracticable)—which, in a sense, is a good 
thing for radicals, because it suggests that we really are nearing the 
end of the capitalist epoch. Systems and institutions are floundering; 
the left, for now, is floundering, as is the center, as is (in some cases) 
the right. But all this floundering opens up space for “decentralized” 
innovation, grassroots experimentation, localism and regionalism, 
under-the-radar moves toward cooperativism. This slow, semi-
interstitial process is the natural way in which social (economic) 
systems yield to their successors. 
Another respect in which the present has promise is that its 
transnational framework militates against fascism. Whatever 
revolutionary potential the 1930s had was vitiated by the (inevitable) 
consolidation of state capitalism, which in this early phase was easily 
susceptible to fascism, or “palingenetic ultra-nationalism.”331 Fascist 
movements marched all over Europe in the 1930s, and in some cases 
they achieved total or partial control of the state. After all, they were 
useful to certain sections of the ruling class in their struggle to beat 
back the labor movement, Socialists, and Communists. At present, 
the same goal exists among similar reactionary entities of beating 
back the labor movement and progressivism of whatever form, and 
some of these entities are even willing to bankroll semi-fascist 
movements for this purpose. The Koch brothers’ funding of the Tea 
Party is a well-known example. It’s also true that as the middle class 
declines, one can expect many of the aggrieved to have sympathy 
with right-wing groups like Golden Dawn in Greece and the Tea 
Party in the U.S. This fact presents clear dangers for the left. 
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Nevertheless, the dangers are surely not what they were in the 
1930s. The point, again, is that the world is simply too 
interconnected now, and transnational corporations have too much 
power, for a return to the era of sovereign and autonomous nations to 
occur. In the thirties it was much easier to assemble the political 
apparatus of reactionary ultra-nationalism than it is in an age of 
advanced globalization, unparalleled access to information from 
global sources, widespread higher education, and greater political 
sophistication among the elite than when they allowed fascist leaders 
to come to power in the early twentieth century. Nor should we 
discount the lessons that people and institutions have learned from 
the experiences with Italian Fascism and German Nazism. Historical 
memory is not always acute, but in this case its power is not 
insignificant. The main threat that semi-fascist movements might 
pose is just that they will slow down progress—or in some instances 
reverse it temporarily—and exacerbate social problems. The 
possibility is minimal that they will decisively take over national 
governments and start World War III. Worldwide, there is every 
reason to expect that far more people will join progressive 
movements than fascist ones. 
As for the much-discussed decline of the middle class, there are 
silver linings in this (insofar as it is happening). One would be a fool 
to deny that it’s causing untold human suffering and is a fundamental 
manifestation, even a cause, of the horrors that are wrecking 
society.332 A Marxian, “dialectical” standpoint, however, which sees 
the good in the bad and vice versa, can complicate the narrative of 
unmitigated catastrophe. For the “middle class”—by no means a 
monolithic entity—has tended to be the bastion of centrist 
conservatism, the ballast that has steadied the course of capitalism 
(or, frequently, turned it to the right). No transition to post-capitalism 
could have occurred as long as the middle class was stable and intact, 
because few people whose material circumstances are satisfactory 
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would ever give that up to fight for the mere hope, and the very risky 
prospect, of a completely different social system.333 That is to say, as 
long as traditional labor unionism was strong, thus keeping the 
middle class strong, revolutionary hopes were doomed. Unions and 
collective bargaining had to decline—as did the welfare state—in 
order for radical possibilities to open up. This is an unpleasant and 
ironic truth that many leftists prefer to deny, but it is true. As I 
argued above, a post-capitalist order never could have happened 
within the corporatist framework of the nation-state; and industrial 
unionism and the welfare state were essential components of the 
mature Western nation-state. So they had to go. (And they were 
bound to go sooner or later, given capital’s aggressiveness and its 
increasing mobility on a global scale.) In any case, capitalism cannot 
end except in the context of economic crisis, as Marx sensibly 
argued. And crisis on the scale necessary is incompatible with the 
existence of a large and protected middle class. So the decline of this 
“class,” while presenting dangers in the form of semi-fascism, is a 
necessary prerequisite to a transition out of capitalism.334 
The old question remains: is such a transition “inevitable,” as 
many Marxists have thought? Is corporate capitalism necessarily 
going to succumb to its own contradictions and to the crises, and 
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resistance, it engenders? On this question, too, I’m an optimist, as I 
indicated above. For one thing, no social system is permanent; 
everything in history is transitory and in flux. More substantively, I 
agree with István Mészáros: “The fraudulence and domination of 
capital and the exploitation of the working class cannot go on 
forever. The producers cannot be kept constantly and forever under 
control.” 335  Indeed, the inevitability of the current social order’s 
demise seems so obvious to me that I can scarcely argue for it. The 
facts speak for themselves. No civilization can possibly weather the 
crises that are in their infancy now—the chaos of climate change, 
overpopulation, economic stagnation, class polarization, government 
retrenchment, privatization and exhaustion of resources, 
commodification of everything, and possible nuclear war. Radical 
reforms are inevitable.  
One way the future may play out is that such reforms, eventually 
supported by much of the elite, continue to spread for many decades 
as social instability increases. They build up a constituency that 
acquires a vested interest in their maintenance and expansion. Since 
national governments and bureaucracies are simultaneously 
becoming ever more dysfunctional and inadequate to the task of 
ensuring social order, the “reforms” typically amount to a partial 
ceding of powers to the regional, local, and international scales. 
Military and police repression of far-left movements continues in 
many places, and such movements or parties are rarely permitted to 
capture national governments (because they’re too important), but on 
less visible scales, such as the local and regional, “the people” do 
have more and more say in governance—because the elite finds it 
necessary to make some concessions, and it’s less dangerous to do so 
on lower levels of governance than on higher levels. Nevertheless, 
even on the national level one can predict that the left makes slow 
progress—simply because the right can’t control things forever, 
otherwise society would completely collapse. The left’s increasing 
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success is partly a result, too, of the fact that the ranks of the hyper-
elite are thinning due to the repeated bursting of economic bubbles, 
the protraction of economic crisis, and the consequent colossal 
destruction of wealth.  
As the centers of global capitalism become more preoccupied 
with internal problems while having fewer resources to devote to 
policing world politics on behalf of corporate interests, left-wing 
movements in the global South have greater success against their 
governments. Quite possibly, democratic initiatives such as have 
been pursued in Kerala, India become more common, as do 
participatory budgeting, public banking, and comparable 
experiments. This gives more resources to the left, which therefore 
grows. Social and physical infrastructure continues to decay in 
places where the right still has control and improves where the left 
does—but, because the left is growing, the long-term trends are 
largely positive. Environmental deterioration and economic 
stagnation counteract these trends, but in many regions governments 
are able to alleviate the effects of these negative forces by, for 
instance, sponsoring programs to establish worker cooperatives and 
coordinating the distribution of resources to where they’re needed 
most. Regarding the environment, the severity of the crisis and the 
clamoring of the people finally force governments around the world 
to take substantive measures against global warming and other forms 
of pollution—although for centuries to come, environmental 
disasters are frequent. Indeed, probably billions of people in the next 
century are severely affected by climate change and other such 
calamities, so that innumerable inter- and intra-governmental 
organizations are established to address these problems (by 
reforestation, promotion of renewable energy, distribution of water 
and food to devastated populations, and so forth). On local levels, 
governments tolerate and even encourage the proliferation of 
nonprofits, communal “crisis centers,” large communal housing 
cooperatives and other “self-help” institutions, and grassroots 
endeavors we can’t presently foresee to mitigate the impact of 
extreme weather patterns. The reason for this political support, again, 
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is that such organizations promote social stability and are demanded 
by both the public and a large part of the elite. 
In general, the only adequate way to respond to crisis is by 
pursuing measures that are the opposite of privatization and 
marketization. This fact alone should make a leftist optimistic with 
respect to the long run. As the world’s corporate sector faces 
declining profit-rates from global overproduction and 
underconsumption, 336  and even the financial industry is suffering 
from replays of the 2008 collapse (and other sources of instability), 
its resistance to progressive movements becomes less effective than 
it once was. More and more corporations succumb to bankruptcy. 
One can’t rule out the possibility that some industries critical to 
societal well-being are nationalized. In any case, the point is that 
over generations, the character of the economy, society, and politics 
changes such that the “public sphere” expands, albeit typically in less 
centralized and nationalistic ways than in the mid-twentieth century. 
After a long evolution, new modes of producing and distributing 
resources have spread around the world, modes that we can’t clearly 
foresee at present. What national governments will look like at this 
point is impossible to predict, except that they will probably be 
attenuated relative to the growth of other political forms. Certainly 
the principle of nationality itself will be hollowed out, since it will 
hardly serve any economic purposes any longer.337 The corporate 
capitalist class will have so thinned by this point that in many 
countries it will be possible for the “working class” (now in a 
                                                 
336 See Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence. 
337  This statement doesn’t imply the crude economic reductionism one 
might think. Raymond Williams was right that in cultural and political 
analysis one has to take into account the “residues” of previous systems; for 
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different form, much of it consisting of members of cooperatives and 
other democratic organizations) to effectively take over national 
governments and continue to transform them into mere extensions 
and enablers of lower-level and higher-level administrative 
apparatuses. Throughout this long history there will have occurred 
innumerable bloody clashes between armed enforcers of the status 
quo and proponents of democracy, but repression cannot work 
forever. Maybe 150 years from now, things will have started to settle 
down and the contours of the post-capitalist global order will be 
clear. 
—That’s one possible scenario, a relatively optimistic one. It 
doesn’t seem wildly implausible, though. The premise underlying it 
is the commonsense truth that corporate capitalism and privatization 
are unsustainable, i.e., a democratic reaction against them is 
inevitable. Given this fact, the above scenario is one plausible 
account of the future. It does leave out such eventualities as nuclear 
war or the destruction of most of the human species by climate 
change, neither of which is out of the question. Another 
unpredictable variable is the politics of white rage, i.e., semi-fascism, 
which may be manipulated and co-opted by interests with a stake in 
imperialist rivalries, for example between the U.S. and China.338 
Nonetheless, whatever scenario one concocts, it is surely inevitable 
that modes of economic, social, and political cooperation will evolve 
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to partially or totally replace the privatized competition that has led 
humanity to the brink of catastrophe. If most of the species is 
destroyed, for instance, democratic cooperation will probably be 
essential to the survival of the remaining humans. Certainly 
corporate capitalism will no longer exist. 
It is largely futile to speculate on the future of the market or 
whether new forms of sophisticated barter or economic planning will 
emerge. What is certain is that, for all the reasons I gave above, no 
other model of revolution than the “gradualist” one I’ve sketched is 
relevant to a transition from capitalism to a more just society. 
Worker cooperatives may well be an important element in the 
accumulation of resources by leftists and “the people” that is 
necessary for the latter ultimately to achieve political power. The 
recognition among unions that a social movement unionism has 
become necessary will cause more to promote and form 
cooperatives, even as more workers follow the example of 
Argentinians after 2001 by taking over businesses in the wake of 
economic collapse and turning them into co-ops.  
Incidentally, these happenings provide an opportunity for us to 
observe history’s fascinating, albeit inhuman, symmetry and logic: 
while the wave of worker cooperatives in the late nineteenth century 
succumbed to an ascendant corporate capitalism, the wave that is just 
beginning now—a product of comparable conditions of inequality, 
economic “chaos,” and insufficient government intervention in the 
economy—will continue to build as its nemesis corporate capitalism 
dies. Thus, cooperative movements sprang up in the fractured dawn, 
or pre-dawn, of an era in the 1870s and 1880s, and they spring up at 
its fractured dusk—only to enjoy a success they could not earlier 
when their nemesis was in its childhood rather than its old age (and 
when they themselves didn’t have the resources they do now). 
Neoliberalism has thereby been an unwitting tool of the “cunning” of 
historical reason, by precipitating the demise of the very order whose 
consummation it was and making possible the rise of a new one. 
New Era Windows, which I’ll discuss in the following chapter, is 
one of the cooperatives in the vanguard of the coming revolution. It 
is still a rather lonely outpost overlooking a vista of economic 
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desolation, but its loneliness will surely be a temporary condition. 
After decades of concessionary bargaining and passive rearguard 
action, the labor movement is finally, by virtue of the enormity of its 
predicament, being forced to embrace revolutionary strategies such 
as worker ownership. Herein lies the hope for the future. If current 
trends continue, in our lifetimes we may even see a recrudescence, in 
a more sophisticated global form, of the old heroic battles on behalf 
of cooperation against the robber barons, as the beauty of Catalonian 
socialism in 1936—thousands of people joyously birthing a new 













It may seem awkward to descend from the lofty heights of the 
previous chapter to the low terrain of a case-study, but it is precisely 
on the level of local institutions and their mutual self-help (with 
political assistance) that a new economy will have to develop. Its 
cooperative dimension will emerge in a variety of ways: people 
starting a co-op from scratch, buying out an employer, benefiting 
from liberal initiatives as in Cleveland, using their union to start a 
cooperative, etc. In the following I’ll consider the second case, that 
of buying out an owner. In the U.S., since the late 1970s there have 
been countless attempts by workers to buy out employers that 
planned to shutter factories; few of these have been successful, 
typically because of capitalist resistance. For example, in 2010 a 
hundred employees at an aerospace plant in Taunton, Massachusetts 
that was about to be closed by their employer, Esterline 
Technologies, wanted to buy its equipment so as to run the plant 
themselves. After being rebuffed by the company, they and their 
union, the United Electrical Workers (UE), convinced the city of 
Taunton to pursue the use of eminent domain to seize Esterline’s 
machinery and buy the factory on behalf of the workers. This was 
unprecedented in recent labor history, and the tactic holds promise 
for the future. Unfortunately, it didn’t work in this case, for complex 
reasons we need not dwell on here.339 
Despite past failures, one can expect that such attempts will 
continue, indeed will probably become more numerous as unions and 
the progressive elite embrace the idea of employee buyouts and/or 
using eminent domain to save jobs. The more success stories are 
publicized, the more attractive these options will be (and the easier it 
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will be for workers to find financial assistance). One such success 
story is that of New Era Windows, which bought its equipment from 
the former owner in 2012. This case is particularly interesting and 
instructive given the workforce’s history of militancy, including 
factory occupations, and success in confrontations with employers. 
For people who want to start a co-op from scratch, there are 
dozens of books and manuals, some of them available at 
www.american.coop and www.usworker.coop. University courses 
are now being offered as well, at UMass Amherst, Rutgers, the 
University of Connecticut, Southern New Hampshire University, 
MIT, and other places.340 It is probably more feasible, however, that 
large cooperatives are started by buyouts and takeovers than from 
scratch by entrepreneurs, so those scenarios are what I focus on in 
this chapter. 
 
The New Era Windows cooperative is run by a workforce that, 
since 2008, has grown used to the glare of the media spotlight. In 
2008 these workers symbolized the nation’s disgust with the greedy 
and corrupt bankers who had run the economy into the ground and 
then gotten bailed out, and their defiance of the leviathan that is 
Bank of America was inspiring. Even Barack Obama, no leftist, felt 
compelled to express support for them: “I think they’re absolutely 
right and understand that what’s happening to them is reflective of 
what’s happening across this economy.” 341  Six years later, they 
symbolize not only defiant action for workers’ rights but defiant 
construction of an alternative to corporate capitalism. Coverage of 
their actions by the New York Times, the Washington Post, the 
Chicago Tribune, The Nation, Yes! Magazine, the major television 
networks, Democracy Now!, Al Jazeera, and innumerable other 
media outlets around the world testifies to how deeply their story 
resonates with the public. The obvious questions, then, are: what is 
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their story?; how have they accomplished all that they have?; and 
how can their victories be replicated?  
Journalist Kari Lydersen published an excellent account in 2009 
of the workers’ struggle against Bank of America and Republic 
Windows and Doors, entitled Revolt on Goose Island: The Chicago 
Factory Takeover, and What It Says about the Economic Crisis. In 
the first part of what follows I’ll draw disproportionately on her 
book, summarizing some of its main points in order to provide 
context for the discussion of the cooperative later.  
Republic Windows and Doors was formed in 1965, and 
continued to grow until the end of the century. By the 1990s it was 
selling vinyl replacement windows and patio doors not only to small 
home-improvement contractors, as earlier, but to businesses, 
factories, and apartment complexes. It owned a large factory on 
Goose Island in Chicago where it employed hundreds of workers, 
primarily Latinos who had left Mexico and their families behind. 
This predominance of Latino workers is, of course, not an unusual 
thing in the “postindustrial” U.S. More than 50 million Latinos live 
in the United States, 23 million of whom are in the labor force 
(employed or unemployed).342 Millions of these people are recent 
immigrants who regularly send money back to their relatives at home 
or try to earn enough for their families to join them someday in the 
U.S.; for instance, three-quarters of the workers at Republic had 
emigrated from Mexico.343 In part because of the rising proportion of 
Hispanic immigrants, low-wage workers in the U.S. are increasingly 
likely to be Hispanic.344 
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Given these trends, it is not much of an exaggeration to say that 
“the future of America’s labor movement will be written in 
Spanish.” 345  This fact should, perhaps, be encouraging to labor 
organizers, because, as the Republic occupation and other militant 
actions in recent decades suggest, there are clear tendencies for 
Latino and indigenous American workers to be more easily 
radicalized than white or even African-American workers. 346  The 
latter groups have typically been socialized into the neoliberal 
American way of behaving and thinking, an unfortunate amalgam of 
atomism, loneliness, cynicism, interpersonal alienation, semi-passive 
resignation, disdain for unions, and so forth. Latino immigrants, by 
contrast, having come from a very different society with its own 
history and culture—in most cases a vibrantly left-wing or “populist” 
one at the grassroots—have not typically internalized American 
atomism in the way that the mainstream has. This is evident simply 
from impressionistic observation. Moreover, the very fact of 
constituting a minority in another country, speaking another 
language, being more cruelly oppressed than most mainstream 
groups, and to some extent possessing a common culture different 
from the dominant one, pushes people towards solidarity, mutualism, 
and militancy in social and political struggles. These are good omens 
for the future labor movement in the United States, especially 
considering that Hispanics are the largest and fastest-growing 
minority group. 
Richard Gillman, who became the owner of Republic in 2005, 
thus had the bad luck of inheriting an intractable workforce. This 
was particularly the case because the workers had voted in 2004 to 
end their association with a union called the Central States Joint 
Board (CSJB) and affiliate with the UE, one of the most militant and 
progressive unions in the country. Disenchantment with the 
conservative, undemocratic, and corrupt CSJB had become acute in 
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2001, when the union negotiated a dismal contract with Republic. As 
Lydersen recounts, workers were so disgusted that they organized a 
wildcat strike a couple months later, in January 2002. For more than 
two weeks, in the freezing cold, they held out against the opposition 
of the company, the union, and the police, who all encouraged 
workers to cross the picket line (as some did each day). “On a 
particularly frigid morning,” for example, “some workers were lured 
across the picket line by the quintessentially Chicago bait of Krispy 
Kreme doughnuts and coffee.” 347  Despite the support of Latino 
elected officials, including U.S. Congressman Luis Gutierrez, the 
strike failed and workers were forced to return to their jobs—while 
continuing to nourish the hope that someday they could get rid of 
their union.  
Through informal contacts with labor-rights and immigrant-
rights groups in Chicago, the workers eventually met with UE 
organizers Leah Fried and Mark Meinster, who convinced them that 
theirs was a much more effective union than the CSJB. In late 2003, 
about a year before the CJSB’s contract was going to expire, “the UE 
launched its typical organizing drive, holding meetings to inform 
workers of their rights, providing stickers and flyers, and pointing 
out all the things the CSJB was not doing for them.”348 As is usually 
the case, a “militant minority” among the workers was crucial to the 
success of the organizing drive (and would prove crucial to the 2008 
factory occupation). Armando Robles, for example, a maintenance 
worker in his late thirties who had started working at Republic in 
2000, discussed with his coworkers week after week the merits of the 
UE, passing out flyers, holding meetings in community centers, and 
in general trying to counter the company’s anti-union propaganda. 
When it came time for the election, the UE trounced the CSJB, 340 
votes to 9. (About 100 workers voted for no union at all, having been 
disillusioned by their earlier one.) 
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Since the UE played a critical role in later years, it’s worth 
saying a little about this unique union. It was formed in 1936, when 
independent local unions attended a conference in Buffalo, New 
York to create a national union that would organize the radio and 
electrical manufacturing industries. A few months later, it became 
the first union granted a charter by the newly formed CIO, which 
was a progressive alternative to the old, craft-union-based AFL. In 
the legendary years of the late 1930s when the United Autoworkers 
was organizing the automobile industry, the Steel Workers 
Organizing Committee was organizing the steel industry, and the 
Packinghouse Workers of America was organizing the meatpacking 
industry, the UE was making swift and fantastic gains at General 
Electric and other major corporations. Its victories continued through 
World War II, so that by 1945 it was the third largest CIO union, 
with over 500,000 members.  
The organizational structure that made possible these early 
successes—as well as the union’s later tenacious survival in difficult 
times—was unusual in the U.S. labor movement. The UE was and 
remains a much less centralized and bureaucratic union than others, 
with radical democracy enshrined in its constitution and by-laws. 
Union members not only elect, from among their ranks, local 
officers, stewards, negotiators, and delegates to national conventions; 
they also decide, themselves, when to strike and to end a strike, when 
to accept a contract and what terms to demand, and how to use local 
dues. The salaries of union staff and executives do not exceed the 
highest wage in the industry, a provision unique among American 
trade unions. On rights for women and African-Americans, the UE 
was far ahead of its time and most other unions, for example 
supporting “equal pay for equal work” during World War II and 
fighting to end workplace discrimination against blacks. It has also 
not been afraid to take controversial political stances such as 
opposing the Vietnam War (when the AFL-CIO resolutely supported 
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it) and being actively involved in the civil rights movement. On the 
whole, it is hard to imagine a more progressive and militant union.349 
In the context of the Cold War, however, progressivism was not 
unequivocally an asset. It led several unions, including the UE, to be 
branded as Communist and hounded out of the CIO. The 1950s were 
a dark time for the UE: under a barrage of attacks from business, the 
federal government, and mainstream unions, its membership 
plummeted to 60,000. It’s a miracle that it survived at all; virtually 
no other left-wing union did. In the 1960s it began to rebuild its 
numbers, but the deindustrialization of the 1980s and 1990s wiped 
out many gains. At present the UE has about 35,000 members, and 
even this relatively low number has only been made possible by the 
union’s trademark radicalism and flexibility. It has branched out 
from its traditional industrial jurisdictions to include teachers, nurses, 
and clerical workers, and it was one of the first unions to embrace 
undocumented immigrants. It has also been at the forefront of efforts 
to build transnational alliances, having formed a close alliance with 
the Mexican union Frente Autentico del Trabajo in the 1990s when 
they were both fighting NAFTA.350 
In the light of this honorable history, it should come as no 
surprise that the contract the UE negotiated with Republic in 2005 
was excellent from the workers’ point of view: “They obtained a 
nearly unheard-of average $3-an-hour raise over the course of three 
years, with $1.75 in the first year. They overhauled a subpar bonus 
system. And they won the right to have 19 union stewards on the 
shop floor, compared to five before. This meant more power for the 
union and more ability to file and win grievances.”351 A couple years 
later, Armando Robles was elected president of the local—Local 
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1110—and Ricky Maclin vice president, forming a partnership that 
would prove effective and long-lasting. 
Being a democratic union, the UE gives leadership training to its 
members, particularly the stewards. This “consciousness-raising” 
and confidence-boosting is essential to giving members a sense of 
empowerment, efficacy, and self-respect vis-à-vis management. Leah 
Fried gives the example of training in grievance procedures. 
Stewards will learn about the different kinds of grievances, the steps 
involved in filing a grievance, and how to follow through in 
meetings with management. After reading through the contract and 
learning all the procedures, they then simulate a grievance meeting: 
one person plays the boss, another is the steward, a third the worker 
filing the grievance. Later, after a real grievance meeting, they meet 
to go over what went well and what to do differently next time, and 
so the learning process continues over months and years. Gradually 
the workers become more effective at standing up for their rights. 
For instance, one time a Republic worker was fired for taking out 
the garbage. Literally: as Fried recalls, “he took out the garbage and 
the supervisor fired him, saying ‘You weren’t supposed to take out 
the garbage!’ So we got everybody to wear a picture of [the worker 
who had been fired], and they marched into the boss’s office during 
their break…” 352  Combined with the filing of a grievance, this 
collective action got the worker rehired. 
Horizons, in short, weren’t very sunny for Republic on the labor 
side of things; but the business side wasn’t doing much better. The 
situation became especially dire in 2007, when the real estate boom 
collapsed. The loss of customers meant that Republic quickly used 
up its $5 million line of credit from Bank of America, which refused 
to grant more loans. By the summer of 2008 the company had lost 
$10 million in less than two years, and its factory was in the process 
of being downsized from 500 workers to 250. November 2008 is 
when the real drama started. 
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Robles and other workers noticed that factory equipment was 
being spirited away in the night, to an unknown destination. 
Managers assured them and UE officials that nothing was amiss, an 
obvious lie given the business’s economic troubles (of which 
workers were well aware). It was revealed later that the equipment 
was intended for a factory in Iowa that Richard Gillman planned to 
be the base of operations for a new, un-unionized, company; at the 
moment, all that the workers knew was that they couldn’t sit idly by 
while their factory was dismantled, an action sure to presage the 
elimination of their jobs. As Lydersen relates, the workers organized 
surveillance teams to keep an eye on the factory during nights and 
weekends. One Saturday, Robles and Sergio Revuelta, a union 
steward, were fulfilling their watchman duties in the parking lot 
when they saw boxes being loaded onto two trailer trucks at the 
factory’s front entrance. They decided to follow them, curious where 
they were headed. Fifteen miles later they ended up at a truckyard, 
where the trailers were parked. Robles called Mark Meinster, who 
drove out to them to discuss what they should do. Angry at 
Republic’s brazen contempt for its workforce, Robles suggested 
stealing the trailers to force the company to negotiate with them. Or 
at least deflating their tires. Meinster hit upon another idea to save 
their jobs: stage a sit-in at the factory. Robles liked the suggestion, 
and in the following days he and Meinster found others enthusiastic 
as well. 
So that’s how the idea was born. Factory occupations are more 
common in Mexico and other parts of Latin America than in the 
United States, so it isn’t surprising that a mostly Latino workforce 
would be attracted to the idea. The local’s executive board certainly 
was; its members saw no other option in the case of the plant’s 
closure. Many other workers were similarly enthusiastic, and it was 
easy to find volunteers to occupy the plant. No action was taken for 
the moment, except to organize 24-hour surveillance over the long 
Thanksgiving weekend, each shift lasting two hours. 
The workers’ strange “limbo” situation lasted until December 2, 
when the plant operations manager called them to a meeting in the 
cafeteria and announced, predictably, that the plant would be closing 
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on Friday, December 5. They wouldn’t get severance pay or accrued 
vacation pay, and their health insurance would end on December 15 
(in fact earlier, as it turned out). This sudden closing of the plant was 
in apparent violation of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification (WARN) Act, which requires that employees be given 
either sixty days’ notice or sixty days of severance pay, a fact that 
would be exploited by workers and their allies in the following days, 
when they declared to the media that it was illegal to close the plant 
under these conditions. After bringing his grim tidings the manager 
hastily retreated, leaving everyone to contemplate the destruction of 
the lives they had known. 
It’s at this point that connections became especially important. 
Most things in the modern world depend on connections; luckily the 
Republic workers had them, through the UE. Union representatives 
got in touch with their contacts in the Chicago political world and 
such groups as Interfaith Worker Justice and Jobs with Justice; it was 
decided that the next day, December 3, there would be a protest rally 
in front of Bank of America’s headquarters downtown. This was the 
strategy they had decided on: it made more sense to publicly shame 
Bank of America than Republic, in part because the latter had 
insisted that everything was the bank’s fault for having cut off credit, 
and in part because the bank had just received a $25 billion bailout 
from the government and was by no means popular with the public. 
This was, after all, the moment when Americans were enraged by the 
financial sector’s sabotage of the economy and disgusted by the 
TARP bailouts of the chief culprits. Attacking Bank of America for 
destroying jobs even after accepting public funds was a brilliant 
strategy—which the media, for its part, was happy to facilitate, given 
the public’s mood.  
As Leah Fried explained later, the union and workers crafted 
their image in a very conscious and knowing way. The issue couldn’t 
be worker rights, because, as she said, “the media doesn’t cover 
worker rights. It’s very rare that they will. In fact, some of them right 
up front said we can’t cover a union story.” So instead, the union 
framed it as a story of the bailout. “This is what the taxpayer bailout 
is really doing. It goes to these financial institutions who then turn 
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around and shut down factories. People are losing their jobs, and on 
top of that, they’re not even being paid the money that they 
earned.”353 This so effectively tapped into the public’s rage that, in 
the end, the workers had much more success than they expected. 
The rally on Wednesday gained visibility for the coming 
struggle, but of course it was the occupation that captured 
international headlines. On Friday morning Robles, Fried, Meinster, 
and other union leaders met with the full workforce to ask once more 
if they wanted to go ahead with their plan: everyone did. “Si se 
puede!” they cheered. “We can do it!” About thirty people said they 
would occupy the plant, while the others would support them outside 
on the picket line. (The action was illegal, after all, and some 
workers were worried about the repercussions for their families if 
they were arrested.) Later in the day, though, when a final vote was 
taken just before the action was to commence, everyone wanted to 
occupy, no doubt caught up in the thrill of what they were doing. 
They formed committees to organize it, deciding, for example, that 
three shifts would be set up so that people could periodically go 
home to get some sleep; in general, only workers, union staff, and 
family members would be allowed inside; and the place would be 
kept tidy for the sake of public image. Soon after the occupation had 
begun at 5 p.m., managers called the police to implore that the 
workers be forcibly removed; the police, however, refused, having 
been told earlier by the city councilman representing Goose Island 
that this was a labor-management dispute in which they shouldn’t 
intervene. 
This points to the importance, again, of having connections with 
progressive members of the elite. From the very beginning, 
Congressman Luis Gutierrez was an articulate defender of the 
workers, an intermediary (along with union reps and others) between 
them and Bank of America, and an effective coordinator of resources 
such as food. Other political figures who showed support in the 
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following days included the Illinois Attorney General, concerned 
whether Republic had broken laws in its treatment of workers; 
Governor Blagojevich, who visited the factory on Monday (three 
days after the occupation had begun) to declare his support for the 
workers; Obama, who on Sunday had done the same thing in a press 
conference; Jesse Jackson, who showed up at the factory to hand out 
turkeys and offer encouragement; U.S. Senator Dick Durbin, 
Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky, various city councilmen, and 
county commissioner Mike Quigley. All wanted to bask in the 
popularity of these workers who were seen as defying the monster 
that is Bank of America. 
The press, including correspondents from national and foreign 
media, were already at the factory on Friday before workers emerged 
to announce that they were occupying it until their demands were 
met. The UE’s contacts with the media and activist groups around 
the city thus paid off from the start. Republic officials hadn’t shown 
up to a meeting on Friday with Bank of America and union leaders, 
so the sit-in continued into the weekend. A support rally on Saturday 
drew several hundred people, and donations of food, sleeping bags, 
pillows, and other items flooded the plant. Jobs with Justice 
continued to organize solidarity rallies nationwide in the following 
days. Inside the factory the atmosphere was in fact somewhat festive, 
despite people’s fear of arrest. Initially, indeed, they expected to be 
arrested, and yet were determined not to leave. When several 
policemen ventured inside the plant on Friday night some of the 
occupiers prepared to chain themselves to the equipment, but were 
relieved to see that the police were only checking for vandalism.354 
The lengths to which workers were prepared to go to defend their 
jobs is a poignant illustration of their outrage and desperation, shared 
by millions of others that winter. 
Another meeting with Bank of America and Republic was called 
for Monday, but this one didn’t go very well either, at least at first. 
Gutierrez and a couple city councilmen joined Robles, Maclin, and 
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union reps, all of whom faced a room of representatives from the 
bank, the Chamber of Commerce, the city treasurer’s office, and 
other state agencies and interest groups. Maclin got angry when a 
Chamber of Commerce official asked the workers to tone down their 
statements to the media and stop making the bank look so bad; he 
slammed his fist down on the table, cursed loudly, and retorted that 
he’d tell the media whatever he wanted. Things went a little more 
smoothly later, but still no resolution was reached.  
On Tuesday, after another day of the media “eating out of the 
workers’ hands” 355 —even Fox TV, no friend of labor, praised 
them—talks resumed, this time more fruitfully. Richard Gillman 
angered the labor side when he asked, incredibly, that any new loan 
from Bank of America (to pay workers’ wages) include severance 
pay for himself and funds to pay the leases on his two luxury cars—
“even his own attorney looked at him like he was crazy,” said Maclin 
later—but after a huddle with the negotiators he withdrew his request 
and agreed to pitch in $117,000 of his own money to meet his ex-
employees’ final payroll. The bank then agreed to extend a “loan”—
really a donation, since there was little chance it would be paid 
back—to cover the rest of the money owed the workers. The deal 
couldn’t be finalized immediately, though, since UE officials, 
consistent with the union’s democratic traditions, insisted that all the 
workers would have to vote on it later. 
On Wednesday a final meeting occurred with Bank of America 
and JP Morgan Chase, which had 40 percent equity in Republic. 
Their proposal amounted to $1.35 million from the former and 
$400,000 from the latter to cover workers’ severance and vacation 
pay, and two more months of health insurance. At the factory that 
evening the workers, thrilled at their victory, voted to accept the 
offer—and yet were disappointed that it appeared the plant wasn’t 
going to be kept open. How would their families survive the next 
year? What kind of jobs could they get in this dismal economy? 
They decided right away to start a new trust fund, the “Window of 
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Opportunity Fund,” to raise money to buy the plant themselves or 
find another buyer. In the meantime, they accepted their partial 
victory and celebrated with their supporters, both in the immediate 
community and, in spirit, all over the world. 
What had made their victory possible, then, was an unusual 
confluence of factors. First, they were lucky enough to be 
represented by a union as militant and democratic as the UE. Leah 
Fried says it well:  
 
Here’s what made it possible for UE to do this [sit-in]. 
Number one, we had spent the time building the leadership 
in that local. The leadership had gained a lot of skill and 
knowledge. People had been through fights before… We had 
built relationships with other unions, with community 
groups, with the immigrant-rights movement, with important 
coalitions in the city like Jobs with Justice and Interfaith 
Worker Justice… We had built relationships over time, and 
we called on those relationships when the moment was right. 
And folks rallied, because they saw this as their fight, not 
just a UE fight. So, I think anybody could do it; you just 
gotta practice fighting, and you gotta build relationships with 
the rest of the movement. And start acting like a movement 
when the moment comes.356 
 
If the labor movement as a whole acted more like the UE—or 
like the Chicago Teachers Union when it organized its 
internationally celebrated strike in September 2012—things might 
improve for workers. Unfortunately, the momentum and direction of 
entrenched bureaucracies, such as exist in mainstream trade unions, 
are not easily set on a new course. Timid, conservative, and 
establishment traditions cannot be reversed unless circumstances 
force them to be—that is, unless a context of prolonged crisis for the 
bureaucracies themselves finally necessitates their radical change. 
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The labor movement seems to be undergoing this change now, at 
long last. It does have a ways to go before it catches up to the UE, 
though. 
The very fact of having a union at all, or at least having a nearby 
worker center that can lend its support and resources, is virtually a 
prerequisite for the sort of action that Republic’s employees 
undertook. Certainly if the action is to have some success, 
organizational resources—and the confidence that comes with 
them—are a necessity. This may help explain why the Republic 
occupation didn’t cause many similar acts around the country. The 
unionization rate in the U.S.’s private sector is less than seven 
percent, which doesn’t translate into a lot of organizational resources 
for workers.  
Similar incidents did happen, though. The most notable was after 
the Colibri Group in Rhode Island, a jewelry maker, laid off its 280 
employees (mostly immigrants) without giving advance notice; some 
actually arrived at work the day the plant closed only to see a sign 
informing them of the fact. And that was it, even for those who had 
worked there twenty or thirty years. “I gave them so much, my 
whole life,” one worker said later, “and then they just closed the 
doors on us like we were animals. I felt like my heart was on the 
floor.” 357  Since no notice had been given, the employees were 
entitled (under the WARN Act) to sixty days of severance pay and 
health insurance. They had no union, but some of them got in touch 
with a local immigrant- and labor-rights group called Fuerza 
Laboral—which had just two staff members—and organized a 
protest rally a couple weeks later, on February 3, 2009. Three days 
later, coincidentally, Armando Robles and a few other Republic 
workers and UE representatives came to Providence on a tour they 
were taking around the country—called the Resistance and Recovery 
Tour—to spread word of their story and raise money for their trust 
fund mentioned above. The fifty Colibri workers they met with were 
inspired by what they heard, all the details of how a couple hundred 
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Latino workers had shamed Bank of America before the world. So 
they decided to enact a similar campaign to shame the majority 
owner of Colibri (Founders Equity) and two banks that were 
creditors. In the following months they and Fuerza Laboral took 
many actions, including marching on the state capitol, protesting in 
front of Founders’ Manhattan headquarters, initiating a national 
letter-writing drive, and filing a lawsuit to get the money they were 
owed. But the act most reminiscent of the Republic sit-in happened 
at an auction of Colibri’s assets on March 19: fourteen people, 
including ten workers, were arrested for sitting on the street to block 
traffic to the auction.358 
While the campaign got attention from the media and sympathy 
from politicians, it didn’t have the success of the Republic sit-in. The 
workers were never paid, because creditors got everything left over 
from the business. Why this failure? One obvious reason is that the 
factory had already been closed, so it couldn’t be occupied. As 
Occupy Wall Street showed in 2011, occupying an area can be a 
uniquely effective tactic if it draws media attention and/or prevents 
members of the elite from using facilities valuable to them. It forces 
the authorities either to give in to protesters’ demands or deploy the 
police to violently disperse them, which never makes the elite look 
good. Thus, none of the actions of the Colibri workers quite “packed 
the punch” of a factory sit-in. Nor did the workers have the resources 
of a battle-hardened union, powerful coalition partners, or ties to 
political leaders. 
The Republic workers also benefited, of course, from perfect 
timing (although Colibri workers’ timing wasn’t much worse). It was 
soon after the TARP bailouts had been announced, jobs were 
hemorrhaging—awful employment numbers came out on the very 
day the sit-in began—and people worldwide were enraged at the 
corporate sector. Hopes for comparable or greater victories in the 
future should be raised by the knowledge that for a very long time to 
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come, economic stagnation and crisis will be the norm. Crises are 
bound to continue recurring, and as they do so the public will grow 
more angry at big business and more sympathetic toward factory 
occupations. While it won’t always be possible for workers to invoke 
unpopular “bailouts,” they will still be able to attack corporations for 
destroying jobs and not paying employees what they’re owed—two 
compelling soundbites, as Bank of America learned to its cost. If 
unions and their allies have the will, the “way” will present itself. 
I’ve spent so much time discussing the 2008 sit-in because I 
think this tactic is the most radical and effective of all, and I suspect 
it will grow more common in the next decade or two. As seen in 
hundreds of cases in Argentina after its 2001 crash, it can even lead 
straight into the formation of a worker cooperative. In the case of the 
Republic workers, the route was a little more circuitous. Let’s 
consider that route briefly now, after which I’ll discuss the co-op 
itself. 
A company called Serious Materials (later Serious Energy), 
which manufactures energy-efficient building materials, bought 
Republic’s factory in February 2009. With the help of Obama’s 2009 
stimulus package, it hoped to hire back all of Republic’s former 
employees by the summer. Things didn’t work out as planned, 
though: by September 2009, only twenty employees had been 
rehired, for reasons having to do with bureaucratic delays and 
insufficient stimulus funds.359 Over the next couple years, in fact, 
only about 75 workers were hired back. Then, on February 23, 2012, 
the UE was notified in a meeting with local executives that the plant 
would be closed that very day, because of “ongoing economic 
challenges in construction and building products, collapse in demand 
for window products, difficulty in obtaining favorable lease terms, 
high leasing and utility costs and taxes, and a range of other 
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factors.” 360  This time, at least, management said it would pay 
workers what they were owed under the WARN Act; union officers 
and staff, however, wanted to find a buyer for the factory, so they 
could save the jobs. Management refused. 
Because of a recent layoff, only 38 workers were employed at 
the moment. After the meeting with Serious, therefore, Robles and 
Fried called laid-off employees, asking them to come to the plant. 
Fifty workers met at 2 p.m., the end of the shift, to discuss the 
situation. Journalist Jane Slaughter describes what happened next: 
 
Robles presented [their options] soberly: Do nothing, or 
fight—stay and occupy the plant again. Without much 
hullabaloo, matter-of-factly, the members voted un-
animously to occupy. 
They had no food, no sleeping bags. Workers and 
leaders immediately started to phone fellow workers, allies, 
and the media. They called the local alderman and asked 
others to alert the mayor’s office. Occupy Chicago came 
with tacos. Stand Up Chicago arrived. 
Workers from other UE locals, including recently 
organized railroad van drivers, were there. Republic workers 
who’d never been called back to Serious but who still came 
to union meetings were there. The crowd inside grew to 65 
and outside to 100.361 
 
UE regional president Carl Rosen got in touch with Serious CEO 
Kevin Surace to tell him the workers were prepared to be dragged 
out and arrested. The police showed up after being summoned by 
management and warned the workers that in five minutes they would 
be arrested if they didn’t leave the plant. And maybe they would 
have been, if not for the many supporters outside with cellphones 
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and cameras, including local TV news cameras. So the police 
thought better of their threat and let the workers stay. By 5 p.m., 
Occupy Chicago was raising tents as workers inside played 
dominoes and ate donated food. 
Soon, corporate headquarters in California took over 
negotiations, having decided they didn’t want a big confrontation 
with the union. By 1 a.m. they had, incredibly, agreed to all their 
employees’ demands: in addition to severance pay for all the 
workers—even the ex-employees of Republic whom Serious had 
promised to hire but never had—the plant would stay open for ninety 
days, giving time for the workers and their union either to find a new 
buyer or arrange to run the factory themselves. The latter is the 
course they chose, thanks largely to Robles’ advocacy. 
The co-op idea had been in the air for a while. In 2006 Robles 
had attended the World Social Forum in Venezuela and heard a 
group of electricians discuss the cooperative they had formed, but at 
the time he wasn’t able to pursue the idea. During their “victory 
tour” around the U.S. in early 2009, however, he and his coworkers 
got a step closer to starting a co-op. In an interview on Democracy 
Now! in New York they met Naomi Klein and Avi Lewis, who had 
made the documentary The Take about factory occupations in 
Argentina and, since then, have been deeply committed to the cause 
of worker cooperativism. They introduced Robles to Brendan 
Martin, founder (in 2004) of a nonprofit called The Working World, 
which would provide crucial assistance to the New Era Windows 
cooperative formed later. As stated on TWW’s website, it helps 
design, fund, and carry out cooperative projects—hundreds of them 
in the last ten years, in Argentina, Nicaragua, and the U.S. While its 
business model might seem risky, in that it gives low-interest loans 
to relatively poor people who don’t have to pay them back until their 
businesses make a profit, its loans have a 98 percent repayment 
rate.362  
                                                 
362  Elie Winninghoff, “The Giving Generation,” Barron’s, December 3, 
2012. 
WORKER COOPERATIVES AND REVOLUTION 
220 
Martin pitched the idea of a co-op to Robles, but at the moment 
it was too late: Serious Materials had already stepped in. Robles was 
hopeful, though. As he recalls, “my answer [to Martin] was: you 
know what? Things happen. Owners are owners, they close. Sooner 
or later we could be in that spot, and then we’ll give you a call.” 
Almost exactly three years later, his prediction was borne out. 
As he says,  
 
when [Serious] announced the close of the factory [in 2012], 
I keep mention [sic] all during the whole occupation—
twelve hours—every single minute talk to the people, we 
should buy the factory, we could make a co-op. ’Cause I 
already have the idea. I see the movie The Take and it 
inspired me a lot. I have the opportunity from Brendan 
Martin who offered to us the financial support, and he has 
the dream to start the movement in the United States. So I 
see it as a big opportunity.363 
 
At Robles’ request, Leah Fried called Brendan Martin, who was 
in Argentina but flew to Chicago a couple days later. He met with 
Robles, Ricky Maclin, and a steward to start planning the co-op, for 
instance by choosing which workers they wanted to invite into the 
business. Initially it would have to be a small group of people who 
could be expected to get along well; later, the co-op could expand. 
They got in touch, therefore, with a few dozen former employees of 
Republic, not all of whom were interested. After all, the equipment 
hadn’t even been purchased yet, and the whole idea of starting a co-
op struck some people as crazy. Many saw themselves exclusively as 
workers, not bosses, and they couldn’t break out of that mindset. 
Nevertheless, progress was being made that spring of 2012. At 
an event showcasing the achievements of the Evergreen cooperatives 
in Ohio, the small group of planners fortuitously met Dennis 
Kelleher, executive director of the Center for Workplace Democracy. 
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This institution assists cooperatives and community-based 
organizations in Chicago through advocacy, technical support, and 
financing. After hearing about the project that would soon come to 
fruition as New Era Windows, Kelleher organized classes in 
cooperative business administration for the workers who had agreed 
to join the co-op. In the spring and summer of 2012, therefore, when 
the status of the future business was still very uncertain, workers 
attended weekly classes run by Kelleher at the UE hall. The content 
of these classes was useful, but perhaps most important was the fact 
that—in these doubt-full early months—they brought people together 
every week and so fostered a group cohesion that, in retrospect, was 
“absolutely necessary,” as Fried says.  
One reason cohesion was so necessary is that there were still 
unforeseen battles ahead. Serious had agreed on February 24 to sell 
the factory—or rather, its equipment364—instead of liquidating it, 
thus giving workers the opportunity to buy it. Negotiations between 
the company and its ex-employees began soon after: the workers 
painstakingly selected which equipment they wanted to buy and 
negotiated the prices with Serious, Brendan Martin serving as an 
intermediary. Things were looking so positive that the 17 future 
worker-owners took steps to incorporate New Era Windows on May 
30, 2012, though they didn’t yet have equipment or a place of 
business. Negotiations continued for weeks until suddenly, at the 
beginning of July, Serious informed them it wasn’t going to sell its 
equipment after all—thus reneging on the contract it had signed at 
the end of February.  
Immediately the workers launched a petition on Change.org to 
pressure Serious to comply with its own prior agreement; within 24 
hours, the petition had received 3000 signatures. (Seventy-five 
thousand more would follow in the next two weeks.) Meanwhile, the 
UE filed for arbitration over Serious’s violation of the February 24th 
agreement. The next day, July 5, the union organized a rally in which 
workers and supporters, armed with stacks of their signed petition, 
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marched on one of the chief financial backers and board members of 
Serious Energy, Mesirow Financial.365 In less than thirty minutes, the 
march grew from twenty people to about eighty. Evidently this 
frightened Serious and its investors, for, in a conciliatory mood now, 
they promptly got in touch with the workers. “Stop,” Robles 
paraphrases them, “don’t go to the media, we’re going to work with 
you guys.” 
This incident shows, once again, that Glenn Greenwald’s 
characterization of bureaucrats in the National Security Agency 
applies to functionaries of power everywhere: they’re like 
cockroaches, happy to operate in the dark but extraordinarily skittish 
once light is shined on them. In most cases they’d rather concede 
defeat in some battle than have their dark machinations be exposed. 
Doing so, or threatening to do so, is one of the most powerful 
weapons in the arsenal of democracy. 
So negotiations resumed, continuing through the summer. 
Meanwhile the search for a new factory continued, since the old one 
on Goose Island was too expensive and much too large. Even 
Serious hadn’t needed all the space or used all the equipment it had 
bought. The cooperative, in contrast, would start out small and 
without a large surplus of cash, a fact that encouraged its members to 
be much more efficient and sparing in their purchase and use of 
machinery and facilities than large corporations tend to be. They 
looked at over ten possible buildings, eventually deciding on one in 
southwest Chicago that was significantly cheaper than the property 
on Goose Island. 
To pay for the equipment they were buying, each member 
contributed the $1000 that was his or her buy-in to the co-op, and 
The Working World provided the rest—in fact, more than the rest. It 
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raised over $600,000, though in the end the equipment cost only 
about $400,000. The rest of the money it raised has served as a line 
of credit for New Era. 
However, the whole cooperative venture almost fell apart again 
in September, when Serious dropped another bombshell. After 
months of negotiations over individual pieces of equipment, its 
executives changed their mind and declared that New Era had to buy 
everything or nothing. Since it didn’t have the money to buy 
everything, the business could have ended just then, before it even 
began. Luckily Brendan Martin came to the rescue: he found a 
company that liquidates factories and arranged for it to buy 60 
percent of the equipment while New Era bought 40 percent (which 
included much it didn’t need, such as extra computers, tables, pallets, 
and lots of odds and ends the workers sold later). The deal was 
signed, and New Era had its equipment, finally. 
The task now was to transport everything from the factory on 
Goose Island to the new one in south Chicago. Aside from four 
heavy machines that they hired someone else to transport, the 
workers moved all the equipment themselves—almost seventy 
trailers’ worth. They hired a driver, but the loading and unloading 
they did themselves. Robles recalls with pride how effectively they 
organized this operation. They had bought four trailers from Serious; 
after filling them up they called the driver, who drove them one by 
one to the new factory, where another team of workers unloaded 
them. The efficiency with which they carried this out defied 
everyone’s expectations, as Robles says: 
 
Against all the predictions from the Wrigley people, 
who’s been the owner of the Goose Island building, and 
against the predictions of the liquidators—they assumed like 
how the workers gonna move, we don’t have experience to 
do nothing like that. Well, with experienced people [who 
transported the equipment the liquidators had bought] they 
moved like four trailers, at most they moved four trailers a 
day. We reached, in three consecutive days, moving ten 
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trailers a day. So we moved around seventy trailers to this 
facility. 
 
That was in October 2012. In the following months they fixed up 
the plant, which was not in good shape. Old mattresses were piled 
high, the ceiling was an ugly brownish color, there were no lights 
and no heaters. With help from the building owners they cleaned it 
all out, painted the ceiling white, installed heaters and lights, ran 
pipes to each machine, and eventually built a break room and a large 
office on the factory floor. They didn’t have fancy architectural 
drawings to guide them regarding the layout of the plant; instead, 
they just put the machines where they thought they should be, based 
on memory. “I was working here, I need this amount of space, this is 
the next machine, I could put this other one here… We make straight 
lines better than Republic or Serious,” Robles says, “because we 
tried to do step by step.”  
Finally, late in the spring of 2013, they were almost ready to 
open—except for the required fire inspection, which they were 
worried about. Any little irregularity, whether with the sprinkler 
system, the fire extinguishers, the proximity of electrical panels to 
machines, or “all the chemical stuff,” could pose a serious problem. 
It turned out they had no cause for concern, though: they passed the 
inspection without a hitch, and so were able to open their business on 
May 9. 
Businesses rarely start making a profit very quickly; New Era 
has not differed much in this regard (though it has been successful 
more quickly than most businesses). The first summer was spent 
building up a base of customers, and not much production was done 
until the fall, which is in any case a more active season for the 
windows business than summer. In fact, the workers didn’t give 
themselves their first paycheck until the fall. Their pay, which they 
calculate themselves, is based on a combination of sales and how 
many hours each person has worked, with everyone receiving the 
same rate. Nine months after opening, their individual earnings have 
fluctuated as the number of windows manufactured each week 
changes. 
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As the cooperative has expanded its business, the UE has been 
an invaluable resource. New Era’s worker-owners are still unionized, 
but the role of the union has of course changed: it now serves to 
represent the co-op, giving it support with advertising, legal work, 
promotion among other unions and social justice groups, conflict 
mediation if that’s necessary, and other issues that might arise. For 
example, if there’s a protest or some kind of mass event, the union 
will get in touch with New Era to send people who can pass out 
flyers (while wearing their New Era t-shirts) and talk to the media. 
Also, the UE has connections that help it find customers who 
otherwise wouldn’t even have heard of New Era. Suppose, for 
instance, that the city or state government wants to weatherize some 
buildings. If a small co-op offers to supply the windows, the 
government will just laugh at it. If, on the other hand, a union backed 
by 35,000 people pressures the government with petitions coming 
from all over the country and other such tactics, officials will listen. 
And there’s also the influence that the UE can bring to bear on 
contractors as opposed to end users. All this can add up to the 
difference between a failed business and a successful one. 
The union can perform other services too. At this writing, Leah 
Fried is arranging to get health insurance for the members of New 
Era. She’s also facilitating the adoption of a “collective bargaining” 
agreement—not in the traditional sense, as between a boss and 
employees, but merely in the sense of a set of rules that the members 
commit themselves to obey. It isn’t a particularly urgent issue at the 
moment, when the business is small and personal conflicts are 
infrequent, but if and when the cooperative brings in new members it 
could prove useful to have such a statement of principles and rules. 
Brendan Martin has remained just as involved with the co-op as 
Fried. Amidst his continent-hopping he regularly comes to Chicago 
to work on behalf of New Era, primarily in sales, meeting with 
government representatives, construction companies, and other 
potential customers. Meanwhile, another member of The Working 
World, Steve Wong, works at New Era in sales, purchasing, 
technical support, and other areas. In addition, the worker-owners 
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energetically advertise themselves, seeking out clients in person 
around the city. 
As a result, business is steadily growing. Robles recalls that his 
first paycheck in the fall of 2013 was only $20—and yet even that 
was satisfying, because it was symbolic. “It was money from our 
own work, from our own factory, from our own product. That was a 
big thing, to make me successful, to make me feel comfortable and 
happy, ’cause in the end it was the fruit of all our work we put in 
this.” In less than ten weeks after their first check, everyone’s 
biweekly pay had shot up to $580. Winter is an off season in the 
industry, but they expect sales to increase dramatically in the spring. 
When talking to the members, it’s striking how positive and 
optimistic they are about the cooperative. Joel Cruz, a middle-aged 
man with six children, thinks his future is much more secure now, 
just as the present is much more satisfying. “My life is different. 
Maybe next year, with more customers, I forgot everything, my 
problems [in 2008 and 2012]… You know, when you’re in the 
company, you have a supervisor; the supervisor say, ‘Why you come 
in late? Hey, what happen? You talk too much, you go to line! Back 
to line, back to work!’ Now, nothing like that.” As one would expect, 
he’s motivated to work harder now that he partly owns his business; 
at the same time, he’s able to relax occasionally without worrying 
he’ll be punished. For some of the members, indeed, the co-op also 
serves as a kind of social club, and they enjoy coming to work to see 
their friends. The only complaint Cruz has—which is shared by the 
others—is that, for now, the pay is too little. To provide for his 
family he has to work a second job on the weekends, as a 
saxophonist with a Mexican band. Other members, such as Robles, 
have had to be supported by their spouses. 
William Swanson is, if anything, even more enthusiastic than 
Cruz, about everything except the pay (so far). He worked at 
Republic for 26 years, then at Serious for two years, and now it 
seems that for the first time he actually enjoys his job. He views it as 
a kind of adventure, an adventure in freedom-from-a-boss. For him, 
that’s by far the best part. But he also enjoys the learning process, 
learning how to do purchasing (which is his main responsibility now) 
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and the other duties they all share. “It’s fun! It’s knowledge, we’re 
learning. That’s the good part about it. We’re learning something, 
and we can always have this, you know? We’ll always have this 
under our belt. And we ain’t got no bosses standing over us telling 
‘C’mere, ya gotta do this!,’ ’cause we know what we gotta do. If we 
don’t do it, we don’t make money.” Ricky Maclin has the same 
attitude as Swanson—something like exhilaration—and is absolutely 
confident about the future. 
The co-op has five female members, whose attitudes toward their 
business do not differ much from their male coworkers’. Arizona 
Stingley worked at Republic for twenty years, then Serious, and now 
is loving her new role as a worker-owner. The small size of the 
business and its cooperative nature make it feel like a “family,” very 
different from the impersonal environment of her two previous 
employers. Neither she nor Victoria Amaya, another long-term 
employee of Republic, has noticed any sexism at New Era; in fact, 
Victoria is one of the more dominant voices in the business and at 
their weekly meetings. These meetings, at which important business 
decisions are made (such as what materials to buy or how to address 
some problem that’s arisen), are structured fairly informally, 
typically with a 75 percent supermajority being required on any 
given decision.  
In short, things are going smoothly at New Era. The members 
hope to start a second shift and bring in new people in 2014, though 
they haven’t yet decided on the specifics of that process. New 
members will probably have to pay a larger buy-in than the current 
members did, since the latter did all the hard, unpaid work of getting 
the business started. For now, though, they’re just looking forward to 
enjoying the economic fruits of their intensive two-years-long labor. 
 
Several lessons can be drawn from the history outlined in this 
chapter. First, militancy works. Or rather, it can work, if it has 
institutional support such as the UE and The Working World 
provided in this case. At each step of the way, it was by acting 
“impolitely,” even illegally, that the workers were heard and got 
justice. The whole of labor history, of course, confirms this 
WORKER COOPERATIVES AND REVOLUTION 
228 
conclusion. For example, it was the sit-down strikes of 1936 and 
1937 that led to the unionization of the automobile and other 
industries, whereas the concessionary bargaining of the 1980s and 
later did nothing to stop the decline of the union movement. It’s time 
that mainstream American unions took the UE as their model. 
The other obvious lesson is that media savvy is an invaluable 
tool for activists and workers. The slogan Leah Fried came up with 
in 2008, “Banks got bailed out, we got sold out,” perfectly captured 
the public’s mood and justified the workers’ struggle. It was a catchy 
soundbite that simultaneously directed ire at banks and highlighted 
the injustice of what had happened to millions of people in the 
country. It’s necessary to spin stories in such a way that the media 
will cover them, and then to conduct visible protest actions. 
Especially if one has already built relationships among the liberal 
elite, it’s quite possible that militant tactics will force authorities to 
come to the bargaining table, or even to concede all demands so that 
the issue goes away. 
Regarding the cooperative itself, the history of New Era is vivid 
confirmation that starting a sizable co-op is extremely difficult and 
labor-intensive, and requires institutional guidance and support. 
Without Brendan Martin and The Working World, or the UE and its 
skilled organizers, New Era Windows never would have happened. If 
the U.S. had anything like a sensible industrial policy, government at 
all levels would provide much of the support needed to start co-ops 
and so give employment to some of the millions who desperately 
need it. For now, though, it seems that activists and visionaries will 
have to fill in the gap left by the government’s inaction, while 
simultaneously pressing for policy changes. 
A more encouraging lesson comes out of New Era’s capital-
intensiveness: it reminds us that worker co-ops need not be limited to 
labor-intensive industries. The record of Mondragon already 
demonstrates this, as does the cooperative sector in Emilia-Romagna 
and the success of other high-tech co-ops such as the long-running 
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Isthmus Engineering & Manufacturing.366 Still, to have a successful 
high-tech cooperative run by a working-class membership of 
Hispanics and African-Americans is yet another nail in the coffin of 
conservative conventional wisdom. Indeed, the diversity of the 
workforce demonstrates that, despite the scholarly stereotypes 
summarized in chapter two, homogeneity of cultural background is 
by no means a prerequisite of successful worker co-ops (however 
much it may conduce to success). What matter, rather, are 
commitment to the business and some degree of flexibility and 
amiability in relations with coworkers. 
The broadest implication of the New Era Windows story is that 
one doesn’t need a sophisticated formal education or a middle-class 
background or millions of dollars to stand up to corporate titans and 
win, or to start an ambitious manufacturing cooperative that is poised 
for indefinite expansion a few months after its inception. Such 
qualities as creativity, intelligence, ambition, and initiative are not 
limited to any one class of people but spread evenly throughout the 
population. It so happens that current social structures are designed 
to stultify these qualities in people who don’t belong to the elite, but 
with determination, capitalist resistance can be overcome. If working 
people, with assistance from activists, tap into their enormous 
collective reserves of energy and defiance, there are no limits to what 
they can accomplish. 
 
  
                                                 
366 See Michael Billeaux et al., “Worker Cooperative Case Study: Isthmus 
Engineering & Manufacturing,” University of Wisconsin Center for 




CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON REVOLUTION 
 
While worker cooperatives are the main subject of this book, I 
am more interested in revolution than cooperatives for their own 
sake. The future of civilization is what concerns me, the future of 
cooperatives only derivatively. Given the unsustainable nature of 
corporate capitalism, society will necessarily undergo a transition to 
a different system sooner or later. In chapter four I tried to answer 
the question of how that transition might happen, admittedly in very 
sketchy ways. No certain or precise answer is possible. I used 
Marxism because no other relevant set of intellectual tools 
approaches it in explanatory power, theoretical fruitfulness, or 
historical resonance. The revision I made to Marxism, though, is 
important enough to warrant further consideration, not only for 
intellectual or academic reasons but because it bears on debates that 
activists have been having since the split between Marx and Bakunin 
in the nineteenth century. The most important implication of my 
revision is that the opposition between Marxists and anarchists 
virtually dissolves upon a deeper understanding of Marxism itself. 
Now, there is a sense in which, say, Noam Chomsky’s attitude 
toward such debates as these is right: they don’t matter, they’re elitist 
and intellectually masturbatory. We know what’s necessary to bring 
about social change: education and organization. Education about 
how the world works—namely through class war, exploitation of 
workers, big business’s near-total control of national politics, etc.—
and organization to take over factories, defend public resources, and 
so on. Chomsky’s anti-intellectualism is refreshing and largely valid. 
On the other hand, insofar as millions of people do have a sectarian 
commitment to some particular ideology, it is not merely an 
intellectual exercise to argue that sectarianism is counterproductive 
and based on misunderstandings. Doing so can have positive 
practical consequences. The world needs an ecumenical left, a left 
that can countenance and integrate all kinds of radicalism, from 
cooperatives to political parties. Marxists, anarchists, feminists, 
environmentalists, unionists, anti-racism activists, and other such 
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people ought to understand that they’re basically on the same side 
and should work together.  
I have to admit I’m also interested in theory for its own sake 
(and for the sake of interpreting history), and accordingly will 
elaborate on the discussion in chapter four in order to clarify what a 
twenty-first century Marxism entails. I’ll return briefly to the topic of 
cooperatives later in the chapter. 
 
Since the publication in 1978 of G.A. Cohen’s Karl Marx’s 
Theory of History: A Defence, the academic school of Analytical 
Marxism has tried to reconstruct Marx’s theory of history in the light 
of the Anglo-American philosophical pursuit of logical precision. 
Debates have erupted over the role that such questionable methods as 
functional explanation play in Marxism, and the discussions of 
Marx’s “base/superstructure” metaphor could fill a small library. As 
is usual with academics, most of this labored intellection has been 
unnecessary and unproductive. Being an academic, I would, 
nonetheless, contribute to it myself were this an academic book; 
instead I’ll make a few suggestions that eschew the obsession with 
logical precision in favor of old-fashioned commonsense reasoning. 
After making a couple observations on the base/superstructure 
metaphor, I’ll confine myself to the theory of revolution. 
The imagery of “economic base vs. political, ideological, and 
cultural superstructure” is woefully imprecise but intuitively 
reasonable, which is why it still commands attention even after 
generations of criticism. Its meaning and truth are revealed in the 
single consideration that the institutions and institutional actors with 
the greatest access to resources are going to have the greatest 
influence over society. Fewer resources, less influence. Institutions 
directly involved in the production and accumulation of resources—
of money, capital, and technology—are naturally going to have the 
most direct access to these resources, and hence the greatest control 
over them. The people who control these institutions, then, are going 
to have more power than other people, and they will seek to make 
other institutions (and ideas) throughout society “compatible” with 
their power or subservient to it. Which, in effect, means making 
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them compatible with the form of organizing relations of production 
in that society that has the most control over the most resources. In 
other words, the “dominant mode of production.” In non-prehistoric 
societies, the class structure and implicit class struggle, which are 
defined by the relations between antagonistic positions in the mode 
of production, will therefore be central to social dynamics. The more 
exploitation of the producing class(es), the more power there will be 
in the hands of the exploiting class(es), i.e., those who occupy the 
dominant positions in the dominant mode of production. (Their 
dominant position is a function of their control over the resources 
necessary to force others to produce for them.) The exploiters will 
try to increase exploitation as the exploited try to diminish it. The 
vicissitudes of this struggle will go far towards explaining other 
political and cultural phenomena, because the struggle—which is 
integrally connected to the evolution of the relations of production, 
of the class structure, of economic institutions, as well as the closely 
related evolution of the forces of production—largely determines 
who has how many and what kinds of resources when, what sorts of 
institutions and values the people with resources will promote, etc.367 
All this is sheer common sense, although its schematic nature 
demands the sort of elaboration for which I don’t have space here. It 
leads directly into the theory of revolution, which I’ll consider now. 
Analytical Marxists have spent decades wringing their hands over 
the supposed Marxist commitment to functional explanation, which 
is scientifically incomplete compared to causal explanation. For 
example, to say that birds have hollow bones because this allows 
them to fly—which is a functional explanation—is not to give a 
complete explanation, which requires invoking the causal 
mechanism Darwin identified of natural selection by random 
variation. Similarly, Marx’s argument that revolution happens when 
production relations start to fetter the use and development of 
productive forces gives no causal mechanism to explain why this is 
                                                 
367 This paragraph is taken from my Notes of an Underground Humanist, 
146, 147. 
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the case. As I said earlier, my revision supplies the necessary 
mechanism, and thus renders all the hand-wringing over functional 
explanation superfluous. Such explanations are merely shorthand for 
causal accounts. 
On the basis of my arguments, one can translate problematic 
statements by Marx into statements that are both substantive and 
possibly true. An example is his hypothesis that “No social order is 
ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is 
sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of 
production never replace older ones before the material conditions 
for their existence have matured within the framework of the old 
society.” Said in this way, the statement is objectionable. It’s 
functionalist and isn’t even entirely meaningful. One can translate it, 
though, as follows. “The overwhelming mass impetus necessary to 
effect a revolution in the dominant mode of production will not arise 
until the latter has nearly exhausted its resources, has reached a point 
of dysfunction such that it cannot efficiently use or develop 
productive forces any further; however, there also has to exist an 
alternative mode of production that has reached such a level of 
societal influence that it can withstand attempts by the old ruling 
class to destroy it.” In some ways this is quite different from Marx’s 
original statement, but it is both inspired by it and more cogent.  
This translation also answers the question that no one has ever 
satisfactorily answered, namely, why hasn’t a truly “post-capitalist” 
revolution occurred anywhere despite all the problems with 
capitalism? It isn’t hard to think of various superficial reasons, such 
as that the capitalist class has had enough means of violence at its 
disposal to crush rebellions. What is needed, though, is a more 
comprehensive answer that acknowledges that the failure of past 
revolutions necessitates a substantial correction to orthodox 
Marxism, which predicted revolution long ago. But what, precisely, 
has to be corrected?  
It turns out the answer is pretty simple: there is not only one 
condition for the success of revolution but two. First, capitalism has 
to be fettering the productive forces such that the majority of people 
live in poverty and oppression relative to the conditions they could 
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be living in if society’s productive potential were not so shackled (or 
used mainly for the benefit of a tiny elite). This is the condition Marx 
stated. It is what gives people the motivation to build a new society. 
The second condition, to repeat, is that a more rational or socially 
appropriate set of production relations has to already be spreading 
and attracting hundreds of millions of people worldwide who 
understand its superiority to the old economy. If this condition 
doesn’t exist, then it doesn’t matter how much “fettering” the old 
production relations are guilty of; they’ll continue to predominate. 
The ruling class will still be able to maintain its hold on power, 
because it commands more resources than its relatively impoverished 
opponents do. In fact, radicals should be resigned to the fact that the 
capitalist class will retain substantial control over society for a long 
time to come, until capitalism has virtually no reserves of power 
left—as the European feudal aristocracy had virtually none left in the 
early twentieth century, when its remnants were still frantically 
trying to maintain their hold on the reins of power. (It took two 
world wars to destroy all vestiges of feudalism in the West.) 
Revolution is not a matter of swiftly overthrowing the state, shooting 
all your opponents, and then organizing a “new society” from the top 
down. 
One might ask if the second condition I’ve identified will ever 
arrive, given that we’re still waiting for it. The answer has to be yes, 
if only because the unsustainable nature of capitalism has become 
blindingly obvious. Unless the human species completely destroys 
itself, which likely isn’t possible, a new mode of production will 
necessarily evolve as the old one succumbs to its contradictions and 
catastrophic environmental consequences. It’s worth remembering, 
too, that the fact that radicals have been expecting an imminent 
socialist revolution since the 1840s means precisely nothing—except 
that they’ve been wildly over-optimistic and have wildly 
misunderstood history. Feudalism was around for many centuries; 
industrial capitalism has been around for barely two, and for less 
than fifty years in much of the world. It would be nice if history went 
faster, but, as it happens, it prefers to go very slowly. 
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Thus, as painful as it is for a Marx-lover to admit this, it’s clear 
that Marx wildly misinterpreted mid-nineteenth-century radicalism. 
It’s time we revised our understanding of history and resurrected the 
idea of “historical necessity.” All the popular discontent and 
rebellions from 1848 to 1871 to 1917 and afterwards were nothing 
like what Marx thought or would have thought—were not pregnant 
with historic potential in the way he hoped: all these battles were 
fought by heterogeneous masses, some of them, like the craftsmen 
who felt themselves besieged by this terrifying new thing called 
industrial capitalism, “reactionary radicals,” 368  and others 
proletarians in the classic Marxist sense, but whose miseries could 
have been (and eventually were) effectively meliorated by mere 
reform. They were not proletarian armies “disciplined, united, and 
organized by the process of capitalist production”369 but disparate 
masses of the lower classes with disparate interests—some 
progressive, some reactionary—temporarily thrown together by the 
sheer chaos of early industrialism. As capitalism matured in the 
twentieth century, the working class was “disciplined and united” 
into explicit reformism, and this was both good and inevitable. When 
reform is possible, revolution is not. Only when broad welfare-statist 
reform has become impossible is (gradual) revolution possible, 
because the dispossessed are forced to turn from obvious reformist 
solutions to less-obvious radical ones. 
In other words, there is no conflict between reform and 
revolution. People should always be fighting for reform. Only when 
it becomes impossible on a large scale does the question of 
revolution arise. 
This idea that “necessity” plays some role in history begs the 
question: what about the twentieth-century revolutions in Russia, 
China, Cuba, and so on? What did they “mean”? Were they socialist 
revolutions, as their leaders claimed? Or merely some form of radical 
coup? Do they have any implications with regard to the ideas I’ve 
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presented in this book? Such questions are made more important by 
the fact that these “revolutions”—the Russian in particular—still 
bewitch many radicals, who mistakenly look back to them for 
inspiration and strategic lessons. The reality is that they have very 
little to say to us who live in advanced capitalist societies, and they 
were certainly nothing like Marxist or socialist revolutions. I’ve 
discussed the Russian example briefly elsewhere, and I’ll be even 
briefer here.370 
Good scholarly accounts of the Russian Revolution, such as 
Christopher Read’s From Tsar to Soviets (1996) and Orlando Figes’ 
A People’s Tragedy (1996), make several facts abundantly clear. 
First, the revolution was something of a historical accident. A 
thousand incidents leading up to the October coup had to go just 
right in order for Lenin’s wild schemes (considered wild by his 
associates) to succeed, and if the prime minister Kerensky had shown 
a little backbone the Bolshevik leadership might have ended up 
ignominiously imprisoned months before the coup was attempted. 
And yes, the events of October were a coup and not a mass uprising, 
as any disinterested retrospective observer has to admit. 
Conspiratorially, secretively, Trotsky, Lenin, and the Military 
Revolutionary Committee (MRC) of the Petrograd Soviet planned 
out what would happen on October 24 and the following few days, 
namely that soldiers loyal to the MRC would occupy the city’s 
telegraph offices, the railway station, nearby bridges, etc., and then 
take over the Provisional Government’s headquarters at the Winter 
Palace. The coup was a swift, decisive series of acts that triggered 
hardly any fighting and barely disrupted the city’s functioning. In the 
following weeks and months the Bolsheviks miraculously clung to 
power, perhaps in part because of Lenin’s immediate moves to 
establish dictatorial control over the government. 
The main reason, of course, that the party was able to stay in 
power in the subsequent weeks was that, for the moment, it had the 
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support of most soldiers, industrial workers, and peasants. Why? 
Because Lenin was an astute politician. Since April 1917 he had 
distanced the Bolshevik party from the unpopular Provisional 
Government and used very popular slogans to propagandize for his 
party, in particular “All power to the soviets!”371 and “Peace, bread, 
land!” The vast majority of the population wanted an immediate end 
to the European war that Russia was mired in; urban workers, many 
starving, wanted an end to the shortages of food; and peasants 
wanted carte blanche to seize aristocrats’ land. So Lenin spent 
months telling them that the Bolsheviks would grant their wishes. 
Not surprisingly, he became exceedingly popular, such that when his 
coup occurred most soldiers in the vicinity of Petrograd accepted it. 
In the following years, the Bolshevik dictatorship and 
bureaucracy grew so bloated and inefficient that even Lenin 
complained about it. Workers’ earlier factory takeovers (before the 
October coup) were reversed as a hierarchy of managers and bosses 
was reinstalled. Popular uprisings against the Red dictatorship were 
crushed in the context of civil war and afterwards, as even the 
Bolsheviks’ former supporters grew terribly disillusioned with this 
“socialist” government that was in many ways more repressive than 
tsardom. Russia was so devastated by its civil war that in 1921 Lenin 
deemed it necessary to end forced grain requisitions and partially 
reverse some of the nationalizations of industry that had taken place 
since 1918. His New Economic Policy began, the most important 
achievement of which was to restore market relations to agriculture 
and thereby stimulate food production. This partial “retreat” to 
capitalism ended in the late 1920s, when Stalin ordered a return to 
full nationalization of the economy, organized the collectivization of 
agriculture, and began his Five-Year Plans to industrialize the Soviet 
Union. The Stalinist bureaucracy proceeded to liquidate millions of 
people and effectively enslave the rest for the sake of developing the 
USSR’s industry and military. This situation lasted until the 
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country’s collapse in 1991 (though things did improve after Stalin’s 
death). 
Now, does any of this seem like workers’ democratic control of 
the economy? That’s what socialism means, after all. Does a secretly 
planned coup in a backward, semi-feudal country eighty percent full 
of peasants seem like a mass working-class revolution in an 
advanced capitalist country? The historical meaning of the so-called 
Russian Revolution is no mystery. In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries (before the Bolsheviks took over) Russia was 
undergoing the transition that some Western European states had 
already experienced, from being a late-feudal country with an 
absolutist monarchy to being a semi-industrial capitalist country with 
either a constitutional monarchy or some other form of representative 
government. Unfortunately, Nicholas II was a desperately 
incompetent ruler reminiscent of France’s Louis XVI, not least in 
being utterly resistant to even minor democratic reforms that the 
population was clamoring for. Combined with the unstable state of 
Europe at the time, riven by imperialism, nationalism, racism, and an 
international arms race—all of which led to the height of 
“instability,” World War I—this fact of the tsar’s incompetence 
made it likely that Russia’s decades-long “bourgeois revolution” 
would go off the rails sooner or later. It finally did, in the context of 
a world war that exacerbated the population’s grievances. A new 
elite with good intentions took advantage of mass discontent to seize 
power—and used it to establish a much more vicious kind of state 
capitalism than existed in the West. Classic historical irony. 
The point is that none of this was revolution, at least not in the 
Marxian sense. The same is true of the Chinese case. These signified 
nothing but transitions to a mature capitalism that got waylaid for a 
few decades and ended up in an (inevitable) return to paradigmatic 
capitalism by the 1990s or 2000s. The major lessons they hold for us 
are in how not to do things. 
The Russian case had another pernicious consequence: it 
cemented the idea in the minds of many Marxists that the way to 
make a revolution is to seize the national state and then remake 
society. This is exactly the opposite of the proper path, and the 
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opposite of what Marxism (despite Marx) prescribes. In chapter four 
I sketched the reasoning behind my revision, or rather purification, 
of Marxism, showing how it follows from a simple conceptual 
alteration and dramatically changes the thrust of the theory of 
revolution. I’ll recapitulate that argument now before considering 
how it bears on the old, and rather tired, debate between Marxism 
and anarchism.372 
To frame the conflict that leads to revolution as between two sets 
of production relations rather than between one set and the 
productive forces it shackles (as Marx does) has other advantages 
besides making the theory more meaningful, supplying causal 
mechanisms that answer academic complaints about functional 
explanation, and answering the question of why revolution hasn’t 
happened yet. It also gives the theory a grassroots, democratic 
emphasis, since the new set of production relations—which, in the 
context of the transition out of capitalism, is necessarily 
“cooperative” as opposed to antagonistic—cannot but emerge 
gradually from the energies of “ordinary people.” In the case of the 
post-capitalist transition, they emerge from ordinary people’s efforts 
to adapt to a world in crisis, efforts that take the form of creating 
cooperatives of all kinds, joining movements for public banking and 
municipal ownership, pressing for nationalization of key industries, 
joining radical political parties with agendas to confiscate wealth, 
agitating for comprehensive participatory budgeting, taking over 
factories and making them worker cooperatives, demanding 
improved and cheaper public resources, and forcing expansion of the 
social and solidarity economy. Eventually, perhaps, one can talk 
about taking over the national state (in whatever form it may exist 
in), but not until the corporate capitalist class has been enormously 
weakened by crisis and all the democratic initiatives that have 
accumulated over decades. 
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It’s obvious how these arguments bear on the “Marxism vs. 
anarchism” issue: they bring Marxism closer to anarchism, by 
jettisoning the (implicit) statism of most orthodox Marxists and 
Leninists. In fact, I’ve argued that the essence of Marxism always 
was anarchist in this way, since the idea of a national state 
organizing a radically new economy—abolishing class structures, 
ending authoritarian hierarchies, eliminating the exploitation of 
workers and an elite’s appropriation of the surplus they produce—is 
both a thoroughly “un-dialectical” notion and inexplicable in 
Marxian terms. Historical actors almost never understand the broad 
significance of their acts or succeed in their designs as they interpret 
them (a Marxian apothegm ironically borne out by the Bolsheviks’ 
total misunderstanding of what they were doing, thinking they were 
establishing socialism or leading a working-class revolution when 
they were really, in effect, just opportunistic political adventurers 
who founded a regime that magnified some of the worst aspects of 
capitalism). History is always an agonizingly slow and unconscious 
process; one cannot sit in the driver’s seat, so to speak, look at a 
map, and direct it where to go. If one tries, as Lenin did, one will 
find that History in fact is still in control and has another destination 
in mind. 
Even the old Marxist strategy of forming workers’ parties and 
entering the electoral arena—which is something that anarchists have 
traditionally been hostile to, since they regard politics and the state 
as an evil—is not especially “Marxist,” though it is realistic and can 
produce gains for the working class. Its un-Marxist element is that 
such parties can, and historically have, become integrated into the 
dominant political and economic order, so that their radical edge is 
dulled and the essential antagonism between labor and capital is 
blurred. They can end up functioning as props for the stability of the 
system they were originally created to overthrow. This was the fate, 
for example, of the German Social-Democratic Party, which already 
by the time of World War I had shed much of its former radicalism. 
(It supported Germany in the war, a nationalist position anathema to 
many Marxists of the time.) Later, many European Communist 
parties followed a similar trajectory. Among the causes of this ironic 
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fact is that mass bureaucracies, such as develop in political parties, 
are intrinsically conservative—routinized, centralized, and 
undemocratic, such that an oligarchy arises at the top which seeks to 
preserve its own power and thus the institutional and social 
configurations that have allowed it to achieve power.373 All this is 
contrary to the radical and democratic thrust of Marxism. 
In addition, there is the tendency for party activity to degenerate 
into the “parliamentary cretinism” that Marx and Engels loathed, “a 
disorder which penetrates its unfortunate victims with the solemn 
conviction that the whole world, its history and future, are governed 
and determined by a majority of votes in that particular 
representative body which has the honor to count them among its 
members, and that all and everything going on outside the walls of 
their house…is nothing compared with the incommensurable events 
hinging upon the important question, whatever it may be, just at that 
moment occupying the attention of their honorable house.” 374  In 
general, the real conditions and struggles of the working class can be 
forgotten or neglected by an insular party elite seduced by power or 
its illusion. 
If there is nothing essentially Marxist about forming political 
parties, so there is nothing un-Marxist about the favored anarchist 
tactic of “direct action.” Marx himself and most of his followers 
have consistently supported and engaged in direct action of all kinds, 
including strikes, sit-ins, armed insurrections, and every 
manifestation of civil disobedience. Indeed, insofar as direct action 
highlights antagonistic and asymmetric power relations, striking at 
the fulcrum of society in the economic sphere or demonstrating that 
the rule of the powerful rests on pure violence, it emerges straight 
from the logic of Marxism. Here too, then, anarchism and Marxism 
are one. 
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If my revision of Marx’s conception of revolution is justified, it 
follows that the ideas bearing his name have much more in common 
with anarcho-syndicalism than Leninist vanguardism, elitism, and 
statism. Anarcho-syndicalism is committed to the task of building 
the new society within the old, according to its understanding that 
“every new social structure makes organs for itself in the body of the 
old organism,” as Rudolf Rocker writes. “Without this preliminary 
any social evolution is unthinkable. Even revolutions can only 
develop and mature the germs which already exist and have made 
their way into the consciousness of men; they cannot themselves 
create these germs or generate new worlds out of nothing.”375 This 
statement seems like common sense, but, judging by the writings and 
practice of a number of Marxists, it is either beyond them or they 
don’t understand its implications. The institutions around which 
anarcho-syndicalists hope to construct a new society are trade unions 
and labor councils—organized in federations and possessing 
somewhat different functions than they have in capitalist society—
but whatever one thinks of these specific institutions as germs of the 
future, one can agree with the basic premise of prefigurative politics 
(or economics). And it is this that is, or should be seen as, 
quintessentially Marxist. The new society will necessarily be erected 
on the basis of new production relations, and these will necessarily 
emerge through generations of popular struggle in the framework of 
a dying corporate capitalism.  
In addition, the “economism” of anarcho-syndicalism that 
Gramsci so deplored is of course reminiscent of Marxism’s 
materialism and economism. Both schools of thought privilege 
economics over politics and culture, focusing on economic struggles 
and such tools of working-class agency as trade unions and labor 
councils. For both, the class struggle is paramount. For both, 
workers’ self-organization is the means to triumph over capitalism. 
James P. Cannon has a telling remark in the context of a discussion 
of the anarcho-syndicalist IWW: “The IWW borrowed something 
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from Marxism; quite a bit, in fact. Its two principal weapons—the 
doctrine of the class struggle and the idea that the workers must 
accomplish their own emancipation through their own organized 
power—came from this mighty arsenal.”376 The very life and work of 
Marx evince an unshakeable commitment to the idea of working-
class initiative, “self-activity” (Selbsttätigkeit), self-organization 
(with the assistance of dedicated organizers, a qualification accepted 
by every leftist worthy of the name). The word “self-activity” 
evolved into the even more anarchist concept of “spontaneity” under 
the pen of Marx’s disciple Rosa Luxemburg, who devoted herself to 
elaborating and acting on the Marxist belief in workers’ dignity, 
rationality, and creativity. 
For instance, in her pamphlet “Marxism vs. Leninism” 
Luxemburg inveighs against the “military ultra-centralism” in party 
organization that Lenin advocates, counterposing it to the 
spontaneity and vitality of a living revolutionary movement 
organically connected to the working masses. Her concluding 
sentence even harks to Kant, the philosopher par excellence of 
human freedom and dignity: “Historically, the errors committed by a 
truly revolutionary movement are infinitely more fruitful than the 
infallibility of the cleverest Central Committee.”377  (Compare the 
quotation from Kant in chapter two of this book.) “The working 
class,” she declares, “demands the right to make its mistakes and 
learn in the dialectic of history.” Left-Marxism, i.e., true Marxism, 
thus merges with anarchism, the only remaining task being to scrap 
the impurity of “a dictatorship of the proletariat”—which 
simultaneously updates Marxism for the twenty-first century and 
provides a theoretical framework to interpret the new and growing 
alternative economy, including worker cooperatives. 
To give due credit to history, however, we should remember that 
the old statist formulations favored by a broad swath of radicals were 
a product of their time and appropriate to it. They were fantasies that 
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never could have been realized, but, given their historical context, 
they were powerfully appealing and may even have seemed 
plausible. The nation-state was still in the ascendant—a fact that 
many Marxists would have denied, believing on the contrary that 
states had entered their terminal phase already in the early twentieth 
century. But Marxists’ overwhelming commitment to state action—
“everything for the sake of taking over the state as soon as 
possible!”—itself belied their hopes, for it grew unconsciously out of 
the social environment of capitalist governments consolidating their 
rule, expanding their bureaucracies, regulating behavior ever more 
intensively, reaching ever further into society’s nooks and crannies 
to take control, growing more aggressive in every respect. It was 
perfectly reasonable in this context to think that revolution 
necessitated seizure of the state apparatus and manipulation of it or 
“smashing” of it for one’s own purposes. And the anarchist notion 
that political activity was unnecessary, that revolution could proceed 
automatically from a general strike or a succession of them that 
would bring the state to its knees, was utterly utopian. As if other 
states wouldn’t immediately send in their armies to crush the 
workers if things got really serious! 
While governments therefore had to be reckoned with—
“seized”—because of their vitality, they were not yet the 
unimaginably hypertrophied entities they became later and are today. 
Today, it’s just idiotic to think “the working class” can take over a 
national government; a hundred or more years ago, it wasn’t quite so 
idiotic. Especially considering the vibrancy of labor movements 
then, the radical consciousness and militancy of a sizable proportion 
of the working class, the wide spectrum of political parties, and the 
tumult of a civilization experiencing transformations unique in 
history, it was surely easy to believe, if one wanted to, that 
successive conquests of national governments were possible. In 
retrospect we can see how impossible that was, and maybe intelligent 
people should have known better; but the combination of moral 
outrage and frenzied hope has ambiguous cognitive consequences. 
Certainly when reading radical tracts of the time, one gets swept up 
in the emotion and the compelling logic and is almost astounded that 
WORKER COOPERATIVES AND REVOLUTION 
246 
revolution didn’t happen. But then in the cold light of reason one 
remembers that history is slow, and that ideologies and intellectual 
self-interpretations are never scientifically accurate.  
Anarchists and Marxists had one conviction in common (aside 
from their shared moral critique of capitalism and vision of an ideal 
society): they both thought that a revolutionary rupture was possible 
and desirable. They had a millennial faith in the coming of a 
redemptive moment that would, so to speak, wash away humanity’s 
sins. By concerted action, the working class would with one fell 
blow, or a series of blows, overturn capitalist relations and establish 
socialist ones. This is the basic utopian mistake that Marxism (if 
purified) can prove wrong but anarchism cannot, because it doesn’t 
have the theoretical equipment to do so. Even anarcho-syndicalists, 
despite their verbal recognition that the seeds of the new society had 
to be planted in the old, shared the utopian belief in a possible 
historical rupture, not understanding that the only feasible way to 
realize their “prefigurative politics” was to build up a new mode or 
modes of production over generations in the womb of the old regime. 
Since this was historically impossible eighty or a hundred years 
ago, when the capitalist nation-state was waxing in power, it would 
have struck revolutionaries as much more unreasonable and utopian 
than the hope for a sudden social upheaval. It made some sense then 
to adopt the Marxist attitude of contempt for worker cooperatives 
and other such “interstitial” endeavors as being distractions from real 
revolutionary work. As the capitalist state and civil society continue 
disintegrating in the coming decades, that attitude will no longer 
make historical sense. The arguments I’ve put forward in this book 
will seem merely truistic. The necessity for a wide range of 
revolutionary strategies, from interstitial to politically con-
frontational, will be obvious—for the interstitial will be the seeds 
that will have to be guarded and supported by the politically 
confrontational, which itself will be increasingly reliant on the 
interstitial for access to resources and a base of support.  
—History is kind enough to offer its own, correct, solutions to 
old problems. Hegel was right about this. The truth appears when the 
moment is ripe. 
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In the end, doctrinal points about Marxism and anarchism are not 
as important as the single overriding imperative that anarchists, 
Marxists, and other radicals have too often violated: work together, 
don’t consume oneself and each other in sectarian squabbles. Strict 
adherence to points of principle is sterile and counterproductive. 
David Graeber probably thinks he is espousing a magnanimous 
position when he says that anarchists ought to be “willing to work in 
broad coalitions as long as they work on horizontal principles,” but 
even this seems inadmissibly sectarian.378 Surely it’s conceivable that 
coalitions not organized on anarchist principles can do valuable 
work. Hierarchy, even in a moderate form, may be a violation of 
human dignity, but the world is in such a state that activists should 
be prepared to tolerate hierarchy for the sake of getting things done. 
Likewise, it’s ridiculous for Leninists, or anyone, to refuse to work 
with anarchists, or to refuse to support worker cooperativism. It 
should be common sense that the transition to a new civilization will 
happen on multiple axes. 
For the sake of clarity, though, I do think it would be useful for 
leftists to abandon their typically voluntaristic conceptualization of 
radical change. It’s an attitude strikingly common among every 
group from centrist liberals to Leninists to anarchists. Given the 
balance of forces, it’s natural for activists to interpret their task as 
that of battling overwhelming tendencies, of pushing back against 
reactionary entities with exponentially more power and resources 
than the left and its popular constituency have. One of the problems 
with such an attitude, at least in the context of hope for systemic 
change, is that it sets one up for disappointment: historical 
movements on the colossal scale of neoliberalism cannot be halted in 
their tracks or reversed by some counter-organizing among trade 
unions and their allies. That simply isn’t how history works, nor does 
the democratic resistance have anything remotely comparable to the 
resources of the global corporate elite. In particular, it is hopelessly 
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benighted to think (as, for example, the editors of Jacobin apparently 
do) that a revival of the centralized welfare state is possible.379 That 
social formation was appropriate to a time of industrial unionism and 
limited international mobility of capital; it has been dying for forty 
years (starting in the U.S. and U.K.), and no such magical 
incantation as “We propose a new anti-austerity coalition” can call it 
back to life. Coalitions of that sort are desperately needed, and their 
targets should be at every level of government, but their outcome 
will not be a new manifestation of twentieth-century social 
democracy. 
The proper way for a radical to conceive of his activism is in 
terms of the speeding up of current historical trends, not their 
interruption or reversal. Systemic trends have never been reversed, 
and cannot be. What radicals are doing now, and should be doing, is 
to contribute to the (self-)undermining of corporate capitalism and 
construction of an alternative. This self-undermining is the trend we 
are witnessing, which coincides with the trend to carry capitalism to 
its most pathological extremes. Just as the earlier liberal phase of 
capitalism’s history eventuated in the Great Depression and had to 
come to such an end—this was its natural endpoint, even its telos, so 
to speak380—so the current neoliberal phase cannot but end in a 
virtual disintegration of the nation-state, its social fabric, and its 
political economy. That is the historical “meaning” and “mission” of 
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neoliberalism, its essence, its “secret,” as Marx might have said.381 
One should understand this and interpret one’s activism accordingly. 
Again, most leftists don’t like to admit that things have to get 
worse before they get better, preferring the liberal’s optimistic faith 
that if only we got our act together and willed a system-wide change 
for the better—perhaps a return to the welfare state—it could 
happen. No acute social crisis is necessary, only determination and 
competence. This elevation of will above objective social conditions 
and possibilities, aside from being the opposite of Marxism, is 
reminiscent of Lenin, who evidently thought a revolution could 
emanate from the will of one or two men (if they organized a coup 
and so on). One might even agree with what Orlando Figes says in 
the following comments: 
 
All the main components of Lenin’s doctrine—the stress 
on the need for a disciplined revolutionary vanguard; the 
belief that action (the “subjective factor”) could alter the 
objective course of history (and in particular that seizure of 
the state apparatus could bring about a social revolution); his 
defense of Jacobin methods of dictatorship; his contempt for 
liberals and democrats (and indeed for socialists who 
compromised with them)—all these stemmed not so much 
from Marx as from the Russian revolutionary tradition. 
Lenin used the ideas of Chernyshevsky, Nechaev, [etc.]…to 
inject a distinctly Russian dose of conspiratorial politics into 
a Marxist dialectic that would otherwise have remained 
passive—content to wait for the revolution to mature 
through the development of objective conditions rather than 
eager to bring it about through political action. It was not 
Marxism that made Lenin a revolutionary but Lenin who 
made Marxism revolutionary.382 
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While Marx himself, being a man of action, was occasionally 
susceptible to this “Leninist” way of thinking, the logic of his system 
does demand that one “wait” (though not passively) for conditions to 
mature rather than believe that skilled propagandizing, political 
maneuvering, and coalition-building alone can get the job done. 
Thus, just as the mature welfare state couldn’t happen until things 
got worse—as they did with the Great Depression and World War 
II—so a transcending of capitalism can’t happen until things get 
much worse than they are now. It is this that will induce people to 
come together, as it did eighty years ago, to effectually demand 
systemic changes. 
Given that the centralized welfare state is becoming structurally 
untenable,383 what will necessarily evolve is an alternative economy. 
Exactly how this cooperative economy will interact with a decaying 
capitalism is impossible to predict—although it is already so 
interacting in places all over the world. Particularly in the early 
stages of the process, before they have established a myriad of 
supporting institutions, cooperatives and other anti-capitalist 
organizations will have to compromise some of their principles in 
order to compete successfully and survive in a hostile political and 
economic environment. But as the networks accumulate capital and 
experience, as well as grudging support from political and economic 
elites—as happened, too, during the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism (with regard to absolutism’s support for capitalist 
industry)—they will acquire such power that they undermine the 
foundations of the current society. The world-order will come to 
consist of a mix of cooperative and competitive social relations such 
that it is no longer clear what is the “dominant” mode of production. 
Eventually this will change; cooperativism will continue 
“snowballing,” propelled by its own momentum, as capitalism was in 
an earlier era. Just as worker co-ops’ current rarity reinforces itself, 
so will their future growth reinforce itself. Throughout this history 
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the nation-state will be declining, in part because many of its 
functions will be taken over by other institutions. Whatever 
counterattacks there are from the elite will not be able to stop these 
processes; capitalism will have lost any competitive advantages over 
cooperativism, because the latter’s efficiencies, which were in some 
ways ill-suited to a competitive, atomistic, profit-driven society, will 
finally be irresistible. It seems likely that even at the end of this 
process there will remain a role for the market and the price-
mechanism—and even, in a minor capacity, for wage-labor, which 
will probably never be completely abolished everywhere in the 
world384—but precisely what that role will be is, again, impossible to 
say. 
Prophecies are not necessary, however. What is necessary is only 
to embrace and institutionalize the attitude of people like Armando 
Robles and his fellow workers, Brendan Martin, Leah Fried, and the 
whole grassroots vanguard of the revolution. Militant action is what 
will birth a new world; abstract intellection, such as this book 
contains, will not. We need only remember the old truth, “The 
people united will never be defeated!” That is the pith of the Left’s 
accumulated wisdom, and the guide to action. 
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